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Employees of the Department of Public Health & Welfare v.
Department of Public Health & Welfare (8th Cir. 1971)
Plaintiffs, named employees of various Missouri state institutions,
brought a class action suit against their employers in the United States
District Court for the Western District of Missouri, to recover unpaid
overtime compensation allegedly due them under the Fair Labor Standards
Act.' Defendants2 successfully moved for dismissal3 of the complaint under a theory of eleventh amendment-based state sovereign immunity, 4 and
plaintiffs appealed. A panel of the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit
reversed, 5 but after a rehearing en banc, 6 the court vacated its prior judgment of reversal and affirmed the judgment of dismissal, holding that the

suit was barred by the eleventh amendment and that Missouri had not
waived sovereign immunity or consented to this suit. Employees of the
Department of Public Health & Welfare v. Department of Public Health
& Welfare, 452 F.2d 820 (8th Cir. 1971).
1. 29 U.S.C. §§ 201 et seq. (1970), formerly ch. 676, 52 Stat. 1060 (1938).
2. The defendants were the Department of Public Health & Welfare of the
State of Missouri, the State Board of Training Schools, and various State Board
members and officials having supervision of the state hospitals and training schools
involved. The latter were sued in their official capacity and as individuals. Employees
of the Dep't of Pub. Health & Welfare v. Department of Pub. Health & Welfare,
452 F.2d 820 (8th Cir. 1971).
3. The district court's opinion is unreported.
4. The amendment provides:
The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to

any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United
States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign
State.
U.S. CONST. amend. XI. Although the eleventh amendment does not mention suits
by a citizen against his own state, it has been construed as being a bar to such suits.
See notes 9-13 and accompanying text infra.
5. The unreported opinion of the panel was filed on April 2, 1971. One of the
panel judges who voted for reversal wrote the dissent to the final decision. The
theory of reversal was that although sovereign immunity applied to the case,
Missouri had constructively consented to suit, or had waived its immunity, by
operating the institutions involved. See notes 14-16 and accompanying text infra.
6. At the rehearing, supplemental briefs were filed by the parties. The Secretary
of Labor, at the invitation of the court, filed an amicus curiae brief supporting the
arguments of the plaintiff employees. 452 F.2d at 822.
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State sovereign immunity from suit by individuals has traditionally
been grounded in the eleventh amendment. 7 Although it makes no mention
of suits against a state by its own citizens, the amendment has been interpreted by the courts as a bar to such suits, as well as those specifically
mentioned.8 This judicial expansion is credited to the Supreme Court's
decision in Hans v. Louisiana,9 where plaintiff individual, suing his own
state, argued that the eleventh amendment did not apply to such a suit.
The Court held that such suits were not ones to which the judicial power
extends. It is unclear whether the decision was based on the eleventh
amendment or on common law sovereign immunity,' 0 but since the majority

opinion discussed at length the background of the eleventh amendment
and its implications," it was generally assumed that the holding was
based on the eleventh amendent,12 and that reading has been consistently

13
followed ever since.
The strength of eleventh amendment-based sovereign immunity has
recently been weakened by the Supreme Court's use of the concept of
implied consent or waiver to avoid the effects of state immunity.' 4 In

7. See note 4 supra. The amendment was a reaction to an unpopular 1793
Supreme Court decision in which the Court held that it had jurisdiction to hear a suit
brought against a state by citizens of another state. Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S.
(2 Dall.) 419 (1793). By so holding, the Court literally interpreted article III of
the Constitution, which states, in pertinent part, that the judicial power of federal
court shall extend to controversies "between a State and Citizens of another
State." U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2. For a detailed explanation of the relationship
between Chisholm and the eleventh amendment, see Cullison, Interpretation of the
Eleventh Amendment (A Case of the White Knight's Green Whiskers), 5 HouSTON
L. REV. 1, 10-14 (1967).
8. See note 13 infra. For a further history of the amendment and its interpretation, see generally Guthrie, The Eleventh Article of Amendment to the
Constitution of the United States, 8 COLUM. L. REV. 183 (1908) ; Hyneman, Judicial
Interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment, 2 IND. L.J. 371 (1927); Note, The Present
Status of the Eleventh Amendment, 10 VAND. L. REV. 425 (1957); Reference, Federal
Judicial Power, A Study of Limitations - II: The Eleventh Amendment, 2 RACE
REL. L. REP. 757 (1957).
9. 134 U.S. 1 (1890).
10. See note 12 and accompanying text infra.
11. 134 U.S. at 10-15.
12. There was, however, an equally strong indication that the Supreme Court
considered state immunity from suit by its own citizens inherent in the concept of
sovereignty, regardless of the existence of the eleventh amendment. Id. at 13. See
text accompaning notes 29-37 infra.
13. See, e.g., United States v. Mississippi, 380 U.S. 128, 140 (1965) ; Ford Motor
Co. v. Department of Treas., 323 U.S. 459, 464 (1945); Ex parte Young, 209 U.S.
123, 150 (1908) ; Chandler v. Dix, 194 U.S. 590, 591 (1904) ; Scott v. Board of
Supervisors, 336 F.2d 557, 558 (5th Cir. 1964); Skokomish Indian Tribe v. France,
269 F.2d 555, 560 (9th Cir. 1959) ; Union Trust Co. v. Stearns, 119 F. 790, 791 (lst
Cir. 1903) ; Smith v. Rackliffe, 87 F. 964, 968 (9th Cir. 1898); DeLong Corp. v.
Highway Comm'n, 233 F. Supp. 7, 17 (D. Ore. 1964), affd, 343 F.2d 911 (9th
Cir. 1965); Blair Holding Corp. v. Rubinstein, 133 F. Supp. 496, 502 (S.D.N.Y.
1855). But see McCartney v. West Virginia, 156 F.2d 739, 740 (4th Cir. 1946).
14. Parden v. Terminal Ry. of Ala. State Docks Dep't, 377 U.S. 184 (1964).
The groundwork for this case was laid in Petty v. Tennessee-Missouri Bridge
Comm'n, 359 U.S. 275 (1959). There, the defendant was a bi-state agency created
by an interstate compact subsequently approved by Congress pursuant to article I,
section 10 of the Constitution. Among other things, the compact provided the agency
with the power to sue and be sued in its own name. While this would seem to
show unquestionably that there was consent to suit, the issue was not that simple.
In the first place, under Tennessee and Missouri law, the sue-and-be-sued clause
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Parden v. Terminal Railway of Alabama State Docks Department,15 the

Court held that where Congress was acting in the exercise of its constitutional power to regulate interstate commerce, it could force the states
to choose between entering the area of regulated activity and thereby waiving immunity from suit, or retaining immunity only by avoiding activity
in the regulated area entirely. 16 The Court made amenability to suit in the
federal courts a precondition to state activity in the regulated field.
As was true of the legislation involved in Parden,17 the Fair Labor
Standards Act was enacted by Congress pursuant to its constitutional power
to regulate interstate commerce.18 Aimed at the elimination of "labor conditions detrimental to the maintenance of the minimum standard of living
necessary for health, efficiency, and general well-being of workers," 19 the
Act's basic provisions set minimum wages, 20 established maximum hours, 21
and discouraged "oppressive" child labor practices. 22 Although it had not
originally done so, Congress later expressly applied the Fair Labor Stand23
ards Act to states acting as employers in certain categories of activity,
and the Supreme Court has upheld Congress' power under the commerce
24
clause to do so.

When faced in the instant case with the question whether the
eleventh amendment applied to suits by individuals against states brought
under the Fair Labor Standards Act, the Eighth Circuit followed the traditional reading of Hans and held that it did, 25 thereby granting the immunity
did not amount to a waiver of immunity. Second, there was a well-established proposition that sue-and-be-sued clauses gave consent, if at all, to suit in state, not federal,
courts. See, e.g., Murray v. Wilson Distilling Co., 213 U.S. 151, 172 (1909). The
Petty Court ignored the latter problem, decided that waiver in this case was a
problem of federal rather than state law, and found that immunity was waived under

federal law. 359 U.S. at 280. For other examples of waiver, see Comment, States Waiver of State Immunity to Suit with Special Reference to Suits in Federal Courts,
45 MicH. L. Rav. 348 (1947).
15. 377 U.S. 184 (1964).
16. Id. The dissent in Parden agreed with the majority that Congress had the
power to put the states to this choice, but felt that Congress had not done so here
and must not be taken to have done so unless there is express language upon which
to rely. Id. at 198-200 (White, J., dissenting). See generally Note, Parden v.
Terminal Ry. of Ala. State Docks Dep't: The Passing of Sovereign Immunity, 69
DicK. L. REv. 270 (1965).
17. Federal Employers' Liability Act, 45 U.S.C. §§ 51 to 60 (1970).
18. 29 U.S.C. § 202(b) (1970).
19. Id. § 202.
20. Id. § 206.
21. Id. § 207.
22. Id. § 212.
23. Id. § 203(d). As originally enacted in 1938, the Act defined employer so as
to exclude states and political subdivisions of states, and did not cover employees in
institutions such as those involved in the instant case, even if privately operated.
Subsequent amendments in 1961 and 1966 added institutions, hospitals and schools to
the regulated categories, and withdrew the exemption of states and their political
subdivisions with respect to their employees in the new categories. See Maryland
v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183, 185-87 (1968). In contrast, the Federal Employers' Liability
Act - the legislation involved in Parden - gives no such indication that Congress
intended it to apply to the states. Much of the discussion in Parden was directed to
establishing that Congress had so intended. 377 U.S. at 185-90.
24. Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183 (1968). The Court expressly refused to
decide, however, the sovereign immunity problems raised by its decision. Id. at 200.
25. 452 F.2d at 823-24.
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asserted by the defendant the status of a constitutional guarantee. 26 Faced
with the argument that Missouri had waived its immunity, the court decided
that Congress had not fairly informed Missouri that it would lose its immunity by continuing to operate its mental hospitals and training schools.:"
Relying on a presumption against a waiver of what it considered to be
a constitutional right, the court determined that the presumption was not
overcome, and distinguished Parden factually on several points. 28 In analyzing the Eighth Circuit's refusal to adopt the Parden waiver theory, it is
essential to consider the original basis for judicial expansion of the eleventh
amendment to suits against states by their own citizens. 29 If the expansion
is deemed to have been constitutionally required, then there is difficulty in
deciding that the sovereignty is impliedly waived. If however, it is simply
the reassertion of a common law concept of sovereign immunity,30 then the
question is less difficult. 81
The better reasoned view would seem to be that the extension of
immunity is based on the common law rather than the Constitution, in spite
of the fact that many of the cases which have subsequently relied on Hans
v. Louisianaconsider it to be part of the eleventh amendment and thus constitutional in nature.32 Prior to the eleventh amendment, and even before
ratification of the Constitution itself, it was assumed that the new system of
government framed in the Constitution would not alter the fundamental
common law concept that a sovereign state could not be sued without its
consent.3 3 When this assumption was undermined by the Supreme Court
26. Id. at 825-26.
27. Id. at 826. The court was not even willing to concede that Congress had the

constitutional power to do this, at least so far as previously undertaken governmental
functions are concerned. Id. at 825.
28. Id. at 826-27. For the factual distinctions between Parden and the instant
case, see text accompanying notes 41-56 infra. In adopting the presumption against
waiver, the court took the Supreme Court's waiver theory literally, and applied rigid
constitutional standards - that waiver of a constitutional right must be knowing,
voluntary and intelligent. 452 F.2d at 826. In so doing, the court impliedly agreed
with the Parden dissent that:
A decent respect for the normally preferred position of constitutional rights
dictates that if Congress decides to exercise its power to condition privileges
within its control on the forfeiture of constitutional rights its intention to do so
should appear with unmistakable clarity.
377 U.S. at 199 (White, J., dissenting). For the position that a constitutional right
was not really involved, see text accompanying notes 29-37 infra.
29. See notes 9-13 and accompanying text supra.
30. See, e.g., The Siren, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 152, 154 (1868).
31. It should be noted, however, that these considerations would have no relevance
if the suit in Parden or the noted case had been against a state by citizens of a
different state, because such a suit is irrefutably within the purview of the eleventh
amendment. Nevertheless, the implication of Parden was that the result would have
been the same had the plaintiff been a citizen of a different state. See Note, Private
Suits Against States in the Federal Courts, 33 U. CHI. L. REV. 331, 342-43 (1966).
32. See note 13 supra.
33. This was true even though article III, on its face, seems to threaten state
sovereign immunity. See note 7 supra. One writer has detailed this assumption.
See 1 C. WARREN, THE SUPREME COURT IN UNITED STATES HISTORY 91 (rev. ed.
1947). The author states:
The right of the Federal Judiciary to summon a State as defendant and to
adjudicate its rights and liabilities had been the subject of deep apprehension
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in a fact situation different from Hans and the instant case, 34 the eleventh
amendment restored the assumption, but only as to that factual situation in
which it had been successfully challenged.3 5 Since immunity for a state
when sued by its own citizens had never been attacked, there was nothing
for the eleventh amendment to restore in the type of immunity. Thus, Hans
by implication reaffirmed a pre-Constitution common law immunity with
respect to suits by citizens against their own states, and did not, as is often
assumed, make the eleventh amendment say something it clearly does not. 6
Indeed, one court specifically stated that immunity of a state from suit by its
own citizens does not arise from the eleventh amendment, and found it "unmistakable" that Hans had based such immunity on the inherent nature of
sovereignty rather than the eleventh amendment.3 7 It is submitted that the
court in the instant case need not have been so concerned that a "constitutionally granted sovereign immunity" was being waived - because it was
not. 8
It is clear that the court was correct in determining that the sovereign
immunity problems created by the 1966 amendment to the Fair Labor
Standards Act were open and undecided. 39 This is true even though the
Parden Court would seem to have answered sovereign immunity problems
in cases involving congressionally created causes of action. 40 Much of the
and of active debate at the time of the adoption of the Constitution; but the

existence of any such right had been disclaimed by many of the most eminent
advocates of the new Federal Government, and it was largely owing to their
successful dissipation of the fear of the existence of such Federal power that the
Constitution was finally adopted.
Id. See also Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 12-15 (1890) ; 3 J. ELLIOTT, DEBATES
ON TEE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 527, 533, 555-56 (2d ed. 1901). Indeed, it seems that

the Constitution may not have been passed with article III in its present form had not

its proponents been successful in convincing the skeptics that it would allow states
to be plaintiffs, yet not force them to be defendants.
34. See note 7 supra.
35. As a result, it is merely a quirk of history that the Constitution specifically
protects the sovereign immunity of a state when sued by citizens of another state, but

fails to protect the immunity of a state when sued by its own citizens. There is no
apparent logic in this, and likewise no logical reason why there should be fewer
impediments to the waiver of one type of immunity than the other.
36. See note 13 supra.
37. McCartney v. West Virginia, 156 F.2d 739, 740 (4th Cir. 1946). One commentator has carefully examined the history of the eleventh amendment and the
decision in Hans, and reached the same conclusion. See Note, supra note 31, at 334-36.
38. Had the plaintiffs been citizens of a state other than Missouri, the court's
concern would have been understandable, for Missouri's claim of sovereign immunity
would then have been clearly grounded in the eleventh amendment. However, the
discussion of the distinction between a constitutional as opposed to common law
immunity is not meant to obscure what might be just as important - that the
Parden waiver theory was meant to and can encompass suits against a state by
citizens of a different state. See note 31 supra.
39. 452 F.2d at 825. The Supreme Court had emphatically stated in Wirtz that
"[q]uestions of state immunity are therefore reserved for appropriate future cases."
392 U.S. at 200. The implication was that although the Fair Labor Standards Act
was a generally valid exercise of the commerce clause power, sovereign immunity
might be of overriding importance in at least some of the cases where the two
would conflict. Id.
40. See text accompanying notes 14-16 supra.
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Eighth Circuit's reasoning in the noted case was dependent upon distinguishing Parden from the instant case, leading eventually to the conclusion
that sovereign immunity must be given greater weight than the congressional legislation. The court found it significant that if the Supreme Court
had refused to adopt a constructive consent theory in Parden, employees
of state owned railroads would have a right without a remedy ;41 whereas
in the instant case, denial of a direct personal right of an employee against
his state still left two indirect avenues of legal recourse. 42 The existence
of these alternative remedies was central to the court's conclusion that
sovereign immunity should override congressional regulation of commerce. 43 However, it is submitted that the court's assertion that its denial
of a direct right will have but a minimal effect is illusory. It is more likely
that Congress' purpose in bringing state employees within the coverage of
the Fair Labor Standards Act will be thwarted should employees such as
44
Just
the Missouri plaintiffs be forced to forego personal rights of action.

as there is judicial reluctance to allow a non-litigant's constitutional rights
to be vindicated by another person, 45 so should there be reluctance to force
third party assertion where rights expressly created by Congress are involved, especially since the rights may never be asserted at all.4"
41. Under the Federal Employers' Liability Act, enforcement is only through a
direct personal right of action by the injured employee, or his survivor in case of
death. 45 U.S.C. § 51 (1970).
42. 452 F.2d at 827 n.1. The Secretary of Labor is permitted to sue on behalf of
an employee for the amount of his claim, or for injunctive relief. 29 U.S.C. §§ 211(a),
216(c), 217 (1970). The court also noted that employees themselves might be able to
assert a claim for injunctive relief under the doctrine that an illegal act by a state
official strips him of his official character and makes injunctive relief possible. 452
F.2d at 826. See Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908). In relation to this doctrine,
see generally Block, Suits Against Government Officers and the Sovereign Immunity
Doctrine, 59 HARV. L. REv. 1060 (1946) ; Davis, Suing the Government by Falsely
Pretending to Sue an Officer, 29 U. CHI. L. Rlv. 435 (1962) ; Jaffe, Suits Against
Governments and Officers: Sovereign Immunity, 77 HARv. L. REV. 1 (1963).
43. 452 F.2d at 826.
44. In the first place, sheer numbers would make it impossible to channel all
personal claims through the secretary. 452 F.2d at 833. Secretary suits on behalf
of employees are accomplished only after the employee files a written request with
the secretary and waives his right of action. 29 U.S.C. § 216(c) (1970). There
seems to be, as the dissent in the instant case indicated, "[a] strong inference that
Congress intended to afford state employees the same direct right of suit against
their employers as is possessed by covered employees of nongovernmental employers."
452 F.2d at 831 (Bright, J., dissenting).
45. See Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249 (1953); Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee
Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 149-54 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring). The
rationale is that unless there are unusual circumstances, assertion by the interested
party himself will be the best assurance that the rights will be fully enforced. While
the rationale was developed in cases that did not involve a statute, it should equally
apply where the only person left to assert the right is one whose interests may be
different than the real party in interest, should the latter be denied a direct right.
See note 46 infra.
46. The secretary has discretion to sue under the alternative provisions, and may
have interests that are not identical to the personal interests of an individual employee. Indeed,
A suit by a state employee under § 216(b) represents the only remedial provisions of the Act which assures [a state employee] of the opportunity of
having his claim presented to a court.
452 F.2d at 833 (Bright, J., dissenting). Unless he is permitted to assert his right
himself, the state employee may have no redress at all.
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The Eighth Circuit noted, in addition, that since Congress permitted
double damages and attorney's fees in remedies under the Fair Labor
Standards Act (which it had not done under the Federal Employers' Liability Act in Parden) it could not have intended to include states as defendants, thereby subjecting them to such penalties. 47 What the court failed to
notice (or at least mention) was that double damages and fees are within
the discretion of the district court 4s and could simply be made nonapplicable when a state is the defendant.
The court also drew a distinction between proprietary and governmental functions. It stated that because Missouri had no alternative but to
continue to operate the institutions involved, 49 the state could not have been
held to have voluntarily waived its immunity. In Parden, on the other
hand, it was not particularly imperative that Alabama operate a railroad,
and its choice to do so, the court decided, could be more easily construed
as a voluntary and intelligent waiver of immunity. 50 Such a conclusion,
however, fails to recognize that Congress had the power to apply regulations to even those employers that had no realistic option to forego the
activity entirely. 51 It seems likely that Congress included states as employers with full knowledge that they must carry on functions such as
52
those involved in the case at bar.
To further buttress its conclusion that Parden did not control the
present case, the court noted that Missouri did not enter any new form
47. 452 F.2d at 826.
48. 29 U.S.C. § 260 (1970). Although the court's discretion is limited to cases

where the employer has made a showing of "good faith" or "reasonable grounds" for
thinking that he was not violating the Act, still, as the dissent points out, it is
unlikely that a state would not be able to make such a showing. 452 F.2d at 832
(Bright, J., dissenting). It seems illogical to conclude that penalty provisions show
congressional intent that states should not be sued by individuals, since they are not
mandatory anyway.
49. 452 F.2d at 826. The reasoning was that someone had to operate training
schools and mental hospitals - to protect the public and the patients - and there
was little likelihood that private enterprise would do so should the state cease to
perform this service. Id.
50. Id. at 827.
51. If the immunity asserted by Missouri is not constitutional in its origin, it
need not be "voluntarily" waived. See text accompanying notes 29-37 supra. It is
only when a fundamental constitutional right is involved that courts impose strict
conditions for waiver, including the requirement of an "intentional relinquishment
or abandonment of a known right or privilege." Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464
(1938). Thus the constitutional difficulties involved in any concept of implied (as
opposed to express) waiver of a right are dissipated when the right involved is not a
constitutional one. Moreover, the Supreme Court in Wirta had already expressed its
opinion, as the dissent noted, on the proprietary-governmental distinction:
[I]t is clear that the Federal Government, when acting within a delegated power,
may override countervailing state interests whether these be described as
"governmental" or "proprietary" in character.
392 U.S. at 195, quoted at 452 F.2d at 832.
52. In a case substantively similar to the instant one, the Tenth Circuit concluded that "Congress contemplated the financial burden that the Amendments could
cause for the states." Briggs v. Sagers, 424 F.2d 130, 134 (10th Cir. 1970). The
Tenth Circuit permitted the employees of a Utah-owned institution for the custody
and treatment of mentally deficient children and adults to sue their employer, upon a
finding that Parden was dispositive of the sovereign immunity issue. Id. at 131-32.
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of activity after the Fair Labor Standards Act amendment,53 whereas
Alabama began operating a railroad some twenty years after the Federal
Employers' Liability Act was passed.5 4 While the distinction is appealing,
it should not be of great weight. Where Congress has determined that
regulation is essential to general welfare, the overriding federal concern
must extend to activities already in operation as well as those not yet undertaken. 55 Additionally, the distinction is not entirely relevant to the court's
major concern - the intelligence of a waiver of immunity. The court inferred that because of the twenty year time lapse, Alabama's waiver, if
any, was somehow more conscious and therefore more intelligent than
could possibly have occurred in the instant case. However, Alabama accompanied its defense of sovereign immunity in Parden with the assertion
that it in fact had no idea that it was waiving sovereign immunity by
operating a railroad. 50 Moreover, the decision to continue activity in an
area after Congress has regulated it could well be as intentional and knowing as entry into the regulated area in the first place. Thus it cannot be concluded from either the logical inference or the facts of the comparison that
Alabama acted more knowingly and intelligently than did Missouri.
If, as submitted, the factual distinctions between Parden and the noted
case are not important, then the instant case is even more compelling than
Parden in asserting that Congress' power to regulate commerce should override sovereign immunity. Since the Supreme Court was willing to find constructive waiver of immunity in order to give protection to a relatively
small number of people - employees of state owned railways - even where
57
Congress had not made clear its desire that such protection be given,
then a fortiori constructive waiver is applicable were Congress has specifically applied legislation to states as employers, 8 where the class of
53. The state hospitals and schools had been in existence for some twenty years
prior to the 1966 amendment.

54. 452 F.2d at 827.
55. United States v. California, 297 U.S. 175, 184-85 (1936). In this case the
Federal Safety Appliance Act was applied to a California state-operated railroad.
The Court decided it was unimportant whether the state operated the railroad in its
"sovereign" or "private" capacity. Id. at 183-84. See also Briggs v. Sagers, 424 F.2d
130, 133 (1970).
56. 377 U.S. at 194. Since the Parden theory is predicated upon an implied or
"constructive" waiver basis, the Eighth Circuit's preoccupation with "conscious"
waiver or "waiver in fact" was somewhat inappropriate.
57. See note 23 supra. Without specific congressional action to point to, such as
existed in the instant case in the form of the 1966 amendment, the Parden Court's assurance that Congress meant to override sovereign immunity sounds somewhat

strained :

If Congress made the judgment that, in view of the dangers of railroad work and
the difficulty of recovering for personal injuries under existing rules, railroad
workers in interstate commerce should be provided with the right of action
created by the FELA, we should not presume to say, in the absence of express
provision to the contrary, that it intended to exclude a particular group of such
workers from the benefits conferred by the Act.
377 U.S. at 189-90.
58. See note 23 supra.
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persons meant to be protected is much greater, 59 and where the purpose
and need of regulation is a more fundamental and pressing expression of
60
congressional regulation of commerce.
In essence, the Eighth Circuit was dealing with the classic problem of
balancing states' rights and federal power, requiring the application of what
the Parden Court called "the common sense of this Nation's federalism." 61
When the problem is seen in this light, the Eighth Circuit's factual distinctions seem contrived and of no help.6 2 In Parden, the Court's "common
sense" led to this conclusion:
While a State's immunity from suit by a citizen without its consent
has been said to be rooted in "the inherent nature of sovereignty,"...
the States surrendered a portion of their sovereignty when they
granted Congress the power to regulate commerce.6 3
By empowering Congress to regulate commerce, then, the States
necessarily surrendered any portion of their sovereignty that would
stand in the way of such regulation. 4
The Eighth Circuit's decision suggests that perhaps sovereign immunity and the eleventh amendment are not so much in disfavor as trends
have indicated. 65 Nevertheless, the Supreme Court has shown its disfavor
through the fictional doctrine of implied waiver or implied consent to
suit.66 This fiction no doubt resulted from the increasingly vital need that
59. There can be no question that employers of state and local schools and
hospitals number far greater than employees of state-owned railroads, the latter being
relatively few in number. For an indication of the number of persons brought within
the coverage of the Fair Labor Standards Act by the 1966 amendment, see Brief for
the Secretary of Labor as Amicus Curiae, Employees of the Dep't of Pub. Health
& Welfare v. Department of Pub. Health & Welfare, 452 F.2d 820, 833 (8th
Cir. 1971).
60. The stated congressional purpose behind the 1966 amendment was to attain a
minimum standard of living necessary for health, efficiency, and general well
being of workers . . .with all deliberate speed consistent with the policy of the
Act and the welfare of the American people.
2 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 3004 (1966). In contrast, the Federal Employers'
Liability Act was drawn to a much narrower purpose - protecting not all interstate
railroad employees, but only those few that are injured.
61. 377 U.S. at 196.
62. The real issue was whether or not the surrender of state sovereignty in the
form of the commerce clause should override common law state immunity from suit
in federal courts. The inconclusive factual distinctions raised by the Eighth Circuit
seem more calculated to avoid rather than answer this question; for if Congress has
the power to condition state activity on amenability to suit in federal court, it has
more clearly exercised that power in the noted case than in Parden. On the issue
of the legislature's power to condition the grant of a privilege upon waiver of constitutional rights, see American Communications Ass'n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382 (1950) ;
United States v. Appalachian Elec. Power Co., 311 U.S. 377 (1940) ; Stephenson v.
Binford, 287 U.S. 251 (1932); Fox River Paper Co. v. Railroad Comm'n, 274 U.S.
651 (1927); Note, Judicial Acquiescence in the Forfeiture of Constitutional Rights
Through Expansion of the Conditioned Privilege Doctrine, 28 IND. L.J. 520 (1953).

63. 377 U.S. at 191 (footnote omitted).
64. Id. at 192.
65. See generally Note, supra note 31.

66. Parden v. Terminal Ry. of Ala. State Docks Dep't, 377 U.S. 184 (1964).
One circuit has followed the Supreme Court. Briggs v. Sagers, 424 F.2d 130 (10th
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private federal remedies be available without entanglement in eleventh
amendment technicalities ;67 but it seems to lead to the anomalous result
that federal courts are open to a suit by a citizen against a state based on
a congressionally created cause of action, yet closed when the suit involves
other types of federal questions such as a violation of a constitutional right
68
State
which Congress has not guaranteed by appropriate legislation.
the
of
interpretation
traditional
the
from
flowing
immunity
sovereign
insuits
of
range
a
wide
precluded
has
Hans
and
eleventh amendment
69
sovTo
allow
constitutional.
volving federal questions, most of them
ereign immunity to bar those suits and yet not impede others based on
congressionally created causes of action seems to place federal legislation
above the Constitution in importance.
Perhaps the Eighth Circuit's decision merely reflects a distaste for
the fictional quality of the implied waiver theory and its anomalous result,
rather than a respect for sovereign immunity itself. 70 If this is true there
is a need for a less fictional method of releasing federal courts from the
71
block of state immunity in the area of federally-created rights. Whatever method is eventually used by the Supreme Court to shed the traditional sovereign immunity doctrine, developed in earlier days when state
sovereign immunity was not a tremendous inconvenience, it appears that
the needs of our times require that it be done. However valid sovereign
immunity once was, and however disciplined the Eighth Circuit's refusal
to accept a fictional waiver theory may be, the instant case is but a temporary halt to the continued erosion of state sovereign immunity.
Stephen Cushmore
Cir. 1970). The theory has so far been limited to situations in which Congress has
created a federal cause of action in a regulated area of activity and a state has carried
on that activity.

67. As the majority noted in Parden:

States have entered and are entering numerous forms of activity which, if carried
on by a private person or corporation, would be subject to federal regulation ...
In a significant and increasing number of instances, such regulation takes the
form of authorization of lawsuits by private parties. To preclude this form of
regulation in all cases of state activity would remove an important weapon from
the congressional arsenal with respect to a substantial volume of regulable conduct.
377 U.S. at 197-98.
68. The paradox seems to result from a distaste for the results of sovereign
immunity and a hesitancy to disregard traditional eleventh amendment doctrine.
69. See, e.g., Duhne v. New Jersey, 251 U.S. 311 (1920) (action to enjoin the
enforcement of the eighteenth amendment) ; Fitts v. McGhee, 172 U.S. 516 (1899)
(suit alleging deprivation of property without due process) ; Skokomish Indian Tribe
v. France, 269 F.2d 555 (9th Cir. 1959) (suit alleging deprivation of property in
violation of treaty).
70. It is submitted, however, that the Eighth Circuit's factual distinctions were
even more contrived than the waiver theory itself. See text accompanying notes
41-56 supra.
71. One writer has suggested the following rule:
[Flederal courts should honor state immunity when enforcing state-created
rights, but they should be free to follow or fashion federal rules regarding
suability of states when enforcing federally-created rights.
Cullison, supra note 7, at 35. For the full development of this suggested postulation.
see Cullison, supra at 16-24. The rule is based upon an analogy to the Erie doctrine.
Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
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DAMAGES

MEASURE OF DAMAGES IN SURVIVAL ACTIONS CONSISTS
OF DECEDENT'S PROJECTED NET EARNINGS REGARDLESS OF WHETHER
SUIT WAS INSTITUTED BEFORE OR AFTER DEATH.

Incollingo v. Ewing (Pa. 1971)
The plaintiffs, a child and her parents, instituted an action for injuries
allegedly caused to the minor child by the wrongful administration of an
antibiotic drug. One month after the action was brought, the child died
and her parents were appointed administrators of her estate and were
substituted for her as plaintiffs in the action.' A verdict was returned
against the defendants 2 and judgment was entered on the verdict. The
trial court awarded damages for the decedent's pain and suffering and
her loss of gross earnings reduced to present worth 3 - with no deduction
for the cost of personal maintenance expenses. On appeal to the Supreme
Court of Pennsylvania, the judgment was affirmed and the measure of
damages was upheld. On reargument, however, the court held that in all
future survival actions - whether begun before or after the decedent's
death - in addition to allowances for pain and suffering, the proper
measure of damages should include compensation for the decedent's loss
of gross earning power, less personal maintenance expenses from the time
of death through the decedent's estimated lifespan, reduced to present
worth. Incollingo v. Ewing, 444 Pa. 299, 282 A.2d 206 (1971).
In Pennsylvania, relatives and heirs of a decedent can recover damages by two separate actions - a wrongful death action and a survival
action.4 The first of these is pursuant to the "Death by Wrongful Act
Statute," 5 enacted in Pennsylvania in 1851 and extended in 1855. 6 This
1. This substitution was made pursuant to PA. STAT. tit. 20, § 320.602 (1950).
2. The action was originally brought against the plaintiffs' druggist. Joined
as defendants were an osteopath, the drug manufacturer and the minor's pediatrician.
A jury verdict was returned in favor of the druggist, but against the other defendants
in the sum of $215,000. Incollingo v. Ewing, 444 Pa. 263, 269-70, 282 A.2d 206, 210-11
(1971).
3. See note 30 infra.
4. Pozzuolo Estate, 433 Pa. 185, 192, 249 A.2d 540, 544 (1969).
5. The "Death by Wrongful Act Statute" [hereinafter referred to as the Death
Act] provides:
Whenever death shall be occasioned by unlawful violence or negligence, and no
suit for damages be brought by the party injured during his or her life, the
widow of any such deceased, or if there be no widow, the personal representatives
may maintain an action for and recover damages for the death thus occasioned.
PA. STAT. tit. 12, § 1601 (1953). The wrongful death statutes as a group can be
found in PA. STAT. tit. 12, §§ 1601 to 1604 (1953).
6. The Death Act was extended by the Act of 1855, which created a new
cause of action for certain persons named therein. The Act provides that only the
husband, widow, children or parents of the deceased are entitled to recover damages
for his death and the sum recovered shall be distributed in proportion to the intestate
share each would have in the decedent's personal estate. If none of the enumerated relatives survive the decedent, then the personal representative is entitled
to recover the expenses incurred by the estate as a result of the injury and death.
PA. STAT. tit. 12, § 1602 (1953).
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Act created a right of action7 unknown to the common law,8 applicable
in situations where death has resulted from a violent or negligent act and
where no suit, pursuant to that violent or negligent act, has been brought
by the injured party during his lifetime. It is intended to secure compensation for certain statutorily-designated dependents.9 The amount of
recovery consists of damages for the decedent's death, expenses incurred
for medical, surgical and nursing care, funeral expenses, and such other
expenses as could have been recovered by the decedent had he instituted
an action in his lifetime. 10 The statutes are vague as to what constitutes
damages for the decedent's death, but the courts have interpreted these
damages to include the loss of pecuniary benefits which persons entitled
to recover under the statute would have received from the deceased had
he not died. 1 They do not, however, include damages sustained by the
7. The action for wrongful death must be brought within one year after death.
PA. STAT. tit. 12, § 1603 (1953). This action can be brought during the period of
one year subsequent to death, even though at the time of the death the decedent's
personal right of action was barred by the statute. Western Union Tel. Co. v.
Preston, 254 F. 229 (3d Cir. 1918).
8. McFadden v. May, 325 Pa. 145, 147, 189 A. 483, 484 (1937). At common
law, if an injured person died prior to judgment, the cause of action ceased at his
death, even when he had instituted an action in his lifetime. A personal representative
or relative who had suffered harm as a result of the death could not bring an action
against the person allegedly causing the death, except for the loss of services of the
deceased between the time of injury and the date of death. Baker v. Bolton, 1 Camp.
493, 170 Eng. Rep. 1033 (N.P. 1808). This situation was remedied in England in
1846 by "Lord Campbell's Act," 9 & 10 Vict., c. 93 (1846). The Act provided that
the jury could give "such Damages as they may think proportioned to the Injury
resulting from such Death" to the surviving spouse, parent, or child. Nearly all

states have death acts modeled after "Lord Campbell's Act." See Developments in
the Law - Damages - 1935-1947, 61 HARV. L. REV. 113, 166 (1947). The Pennsylvania Death Act is based on "Lord Campbell's Act." Howard v. Bell Tel. Co.,
306 Pa. 518, 520-21, 160 A. 613, 614 (1932).
9. See note 6 supra. Pennsylvania procedural rules govern the time when
plaintiffs may bring an action for wrongful death. Rule 2202 provides that during the
first six months after death the personal representative is the only one entitled to sue
under the Death Act. However, during the next six months either the personal
representative or any person entitled to recovery may bring suit, but the institution
of one action bars any later action. PA. R. Civ. P. 2202. See Stafford v. Roadway
Transit Co., 70 F. Supp. 555, 563 (W.D. Pa. 1947), modified, 165 F.2d 920 (3d
Cir. 1948).
10. PA. STAT. tit. 12, § 1604 (1953). See, e.g., Stafford v. Roadway Transit Co.,
70 F. Supp. 555, 564 (W.D. Pa. 1947), modified, 165 F.2d 920 (3d Cir. 1948).
11. Kaczorowski v. Kalkosinski, 321 Pa. 438, 441, 184 A. 663, 665 (1936). It
has been held that children suing for their father's death were entitled only to the
present worth of such sums as they might reasonably have expected from their
father for support and maintenance. Alio v. Pennsylvania R.R., 312 Pa. 453, 459,
167 A. 326, 328 (1933). In making the determination as to what the father would
provide the children as support and maintenance, consideration may be given to the
father's "age, ability and disposition to labor, and his habits of living and expenditure."
Pennsylvania R.R. v. Butler, 57 Pa. 335, 338 (1868). See also Glasco v. Green,
273 Pa. 353, 358, 117 A. 79, 80 (1922). The fact that adult sons may inherit a large
estate as a result of their father's death.does not affect their ability to recover for
their father's death, nor may such fact be admissible on the question of damages.
Stahler v. Philadelphia & R. Ry., 199 Pa. 383, 49 A. 273 (1901). Further, a widow
has been denied recovery in a wrongful death action where her negligence contributed
to her husband's fatal injuries. See Minkin v. Minkin, 336 Pa. 49, 54-55, 7 A.2d 461,
464 (1939).
In the case of the death of a wife and mother, in addition to medical and
funeral expenses, recovery includes the loss of her services, less the probable cost of
her maintenance during her life expectancy. Gaydos v. Domabyl, 301 Pa. 523, 533-34
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13
decedent. 1 2 Furthermore, neither exemplary damages nor damages for
14
pain and suffering are recoverable, since the aim is to compensate for
the loss sustained.
The second available cause of action is a survival action. What is
commonly referred to as a survival action can be one of two distinct
actions, each being a derivative of the common law action which accrued
5
to the injured party as a result of an alleged tortious act.' Both receive
6
authorization through the survival statutes,' the most current of which
is found in the Fiduciaries Act of 1949.17

152 A. 549, 553 (1930).
Damages for the death of a nine year old son were held to be the potential
return that the father might have received from his son's earnings between the ages
of sixteen and twenty-one, less maintenance expenses for the son from the time of
death until majority. Chambers v. Ellis, Inc., 104 Pa. Super. 41, 47, 158 A. 583, 585
(1932). But should the child not have received proper care and treatment following
the injury which results in death, this might reduce damages. City of Bradford
v. Downs, 126 Pa. 622, 630, 17 A. 884, 885 (1889). Other cases make no mention
that contributed earnings begin at sixteen, but indicate that any of the child's
earnings received by his parents, prior to his reaching majority, should be considered.
See, e.g., Liguori v. Philadelphia, 351 Pa. 494, 41 A.2d 563 (1945).
12. Dennick v. Scheiwer, 381 Pa. 200, 201, 113 A.2d 318, 319 (1955).
13. Palmer v. Philadelphia B. & W.R.R., 218 Pa. 114, 66 A. 1127 (1907);
Pennsylvania R.R. v. Henderson, 51 Pa. 315 (1866) ; Pennsylvania R.R. v. Vandever,
36 Pa. 298 (1860).
14. Kaczorowski v. Kalkosinski, 321 Pa. 438, 441, 184 A. 663, 664-65 (1936).
15. See Miller v. Preitz, 422 Pa. 383, 387, 221 A.2d 320, 322 (1966). See also
PA. STAT. tit. 20, §§ 320.601, 320.602 (1950).
16. The first survival statute in Pennsylvania dealt only with actions commenced before the decedent died and provided that such action shall not abate with
the death of the injured party, but shall pass on to the personal representative.
Act of April 15, 1851, Pub. L. No. 669, § 18. This statute was re-enacted in the
Fiduciaries Act of 1917, section 35(a). At the same time, in section 35(b) of the
Fiduciaries Act of 1917, a new survival statute was introduced, providing that where
no action had been started by the decedent during his lifetime, his personal
representative could initiate such action on behalf of the estate. This latter provision
was soon declared unconstitutional because of a defect in its title, but was later
corrected and re-enacted in what is known as the Survival Act of 1937. Both
sections 35(a) and 35(b) of the Fiduciaries Act of 1917 have been incorporated in
the Fiduciaries Act of 1949, PA. STAT. tit. 20, §§ 320.601 to 320.603 (1950). See note
17 infra. A discussion of some of the legislative history of the survival statutes can
be found in the Pennsylvania supreme court's opinions in Radobersky v. Imperial
Volunteer Fire Dep't, 368 Pa. 235, 81 A.2d 865 (1951); Murray v. Philadelphia
Transp. Co., 359 Pa. 69, 58 A.2d 323 (1948); and Pezzulli v. D'Ambrosia, 344 Pa.
643, 26 A.2d 659 (1942). See also Montgomery & Marshall, A Survey of the
Pennsylvania "Wrongful Death" and "Survival" Statutes, 25 PA. B. Ass'N Q. 284
(1954).
17. The relevant provisions of the Fiduciaries Act of 1949 are sections 320.601
to 320.603.
Section 320.601 provides:
All causes of action or proceedings, real or personal, except actions for
slander or libel, shall survive the death of the plaintiff or of the defendant, or the
death of one or more joint plaintiffs or defendants.
Section 320.602 provides in pertinent part:
(a) . . . The personal representative of a deceased party to a pending action
or proceeding may become a party thereto ....
(d) . . . [H]e shall have all the rights and liabilities of a party to the action
or proceeding.
Section 320.603 provides:
An action or proceeding to enforce any right or liability which survives a
decedent may be brought by or against his personal representative alone or
with other parties as though the decedent were alive.
PA. STAT. tit. 20, §§ 320.601 to 320.603 (1950).
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The first of these is a surviving action. This action is begun by an
injured party prior to his death and is continued by his personal representative subsequent to his death.'5 Thus, this continuation may be
characterized as "survival of suit." 19 Recovery under the survival statutes
is for loss due to injury and not to death, 20 and the institution of an
action by the decedent prior to his death acts as a bar to a later action
brought under the Death Act.2 1 The institution of such an action also
acts as a bar to a separate and distinct action being brought by the decedent's personal representative; that is, the personal representative can
continue the action already brought, but cannot institute a different action
22
for the same injury.
A true survival action 23 is one begun by the decedent's personal representative after the decedent's death to recover damages for the injuries and
loss sustained by the decedent. This survival action may be characterized
as "survival of cause of action,' 24 since it is the cause of action, and
not the suit, which survives the decedent. The damages recovered under
either situation, "survival of suit" or "survival of cause of action," go to
the decedent's estate. 25 It is important to note that while both a wrongful
death action and a survival action 26 grow out of the same injury to the
18. See PA. STAT. tit. 20, §§ 320.601, 320.602 (1950).
19. The Incollingo court suggests that the phrases "survival of suit" and "survival
of cause of action" to distinguish the two types of survival situations. 444 Pa. at 304,
282 A.2d at 227. In this Note, the term "survival of suit" will be used synonymously
and interchangeably with surviving action; and "survival of cause of action" will
be used interchangeably with survival action.
20. Edwards v. Gimbel, 202 Pa. 30, 39, 51 A. 357, 359 (1902).
21. See PA. STAT. tit. 12, § 1601 (1953).
22. A survival action, like an action for personal injuries, is subject to a two
year statute of limitations. Stegner v. Fenton, 351 Pa. 292, 40 A.2d 473 (1945).
23. PA. STAT. tit. 20, §§ 320.601, 320.603 (1950).
24. See note 19 supra. The Pennsylvania Constitution provides that such causes

of action will survive. PA. CONST. art. 3, § 18.

25. Pantazis v. Fidelity & Deposit Co., 369 Pa. 221, 224-25, 85 A.2d 421, 423
(1952); Funk v. Buckley & Co., 158 Pa. Super. 586, 591, 45 A.2d 918, 921 (1946).
This should be contrasted to recovery made in a wrongful death action, in which case
the money would not become part of the decedent's estate but would be compensation to
the statutorily designated persons. Frazier v. Oil Chem. Co., 407 Pa. 78, 81-82,
179 A.2d 202, 205 (1962). Since the sum recovered in a wrongful death action is
not an asset of the estate, the Orphans' court has no jurisdiction to act over the
distribution of money recovered. See Chapman Estate, 40 Pa. D. & C. 2d 601 (1966).
Exclusive jurisdiction is in the court of Common Pleas. Usner v. Duersmith, 346 Pa.
494, 495, 31 A.2d 149, 150 (1943). In a survival action, however, the sum recovered
does become part of the decedent's estate, and the Orphans' Court does have
exclusive jurisdiction over the amount recovered. Fisher v. Dye, 386 Pa. 141, 145,
125 A.2d 472, 476 (1956) ; See Burns v. Goldberg, 210 F.2d 646, 650 (3d Cir. 1954) ;
Pozzuolo Estate, 433 Pa. 185, 192-93, 249 A.2d 540, 544-45 (1969) (orphans' court
lacked jurisdiction where administrator of decedent's estate averred that the only
assets to be distributed were proceeds from a wrongful death action).
The Pennsylvania Constitution prohibits any statutory limitation on the
amount which can be recovered in a death or survival action. PA. CoNsT. art. 3, § 18.
26. In this sense, the phrase "survival action" should be limited to the concept of
survival of cause of action," for if a surviving action is brought this precludes a
wrongful death action or a new and distinct survival action by the personal
representative.
Though the causes of action created by the wrongful death and survival
statutes are dissimilar in nature, they must nevertheless be tried together. The
Pennsylvania rules of civil procedure, adopted in conformity with the court's
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decedent, they are separate, 27 different in nature, and may be brought
simultaneously.
Prior to 1948, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania maintained that
the same amount of damages are recoverable in a "survival of suit"
situation as would have been recoverable by the decedent had he lived
through the time of judgment. 28 Thus, in a "survival of suit" action,
recovery could be had for the pain and suffering 29 of the decedent from
the time of injury to the time of death, as well as the present worth30
suggestion in Pezzulli v. D'Ambrosia, 344 Pa. 643, 650, 26 A.2d 659, 662 (1942),
provide in pertinent part:
A cause of action for the wrongful death of a decedent and a cause of action
for his injuries which survives his death may be enforced in one action but if
independent actions are commenced they shall be consolidated for trial.
PA. R. Civ. P. 213(e). This procedure helps insure against the possible duplication
of damages where the two causes of action are brought. The courts have warned
against excessive overlapping of damages in such situations. See, e.g., Haddigan v.
Harkins, 304 F. Supp. 173, 178 (E.D. Pa. 1969), vacated, 441 F.2d 844 (3d Cir. 1970).
It has been held that to avoid duplication, the recovery permitted the next of kin
under the Death Act must be deducted from that sum which the personal representative
recovered under the Survival Act. Pezzulli v. D'Ambrosia, 344 Pa. 643, 650, 26 A.2d
659, 662 (1942).
27. Frankel v. Burke's Excavating, Inc., 223 F. Supp. 945, 947 (E.D. Pa. 1963);
Schwab v. P. J. Oesterling & Son, Inc., 386 Pa. 388, 392, 126 A.2d 418, 420 (1956).
Although exemplary damages are not recoverable in a wrongful death action,
they have been allowed in survival actions. In Hennigan v. Atlantic Ref. Co., 282
F. Supp. 667, 683 (E.D. Pa.), aff'd, 400 F.2d 857 (3d Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 395
U.S. 904 (1969), the court stated:
[S]ince the function of punitive damages is to punish outrageous conduct and to
discourage similar conduct in the future, . . . it would appear to be inconsistent
to disallow such an award where the conduct of the defendant is not only
reprehensible but in fact results in death.
It should also be noted that in a survival action, the negligence of a husband
causing the death of his wife does not in any way reduce the recovery of the
administratrix. Burns v. Goldberg, 210 F.2d 646, 650 (3d Cir. 1954). For treatment
of a similar situation where the action is for wrongful death, see Minkin v. Minkin,
336 Pa. 49, 7 A.2d 461 (1939).
28. Pezzulli v. D'Ambrosia, 344 Pa. 643, 646, 26 A.2d 659, 661 (1942) ; Kaczorowski v. Kalkosinski, 321 Pa. 438, 441, 184 A, 663, 664 (1936); McCafferty v.
Pennsylvania R.R., 193 Pa. 339, 345-46, 44 A. 435, 436 (1899) ; Maher v. Philadelphia
Traction Co., 181 Pa. 391, 397-98, 37 A. 571, 572 (1897); Pennsylvania R.R. v.
McCloskey's Adm'r, 23 Pa. 526, 530 (1854).
29. Of course, where death is instantaneous, there are no damages for pain
and suffering. See Fisher v. Dye, 386 Pa. 141, 146 n.2, 125 A.2d 472, 475 n.2 (1956).
While funeral expenses are recoverable in a wrongful death action, they may not be
recovered in a survival action since they are not an item which would have been
recoverable by the decedent had he lived. Skoda v. West Penn Power Co., 411 Pa.
323, 336, 191 A.2d 822, 829 (1963); Radobersky v. Imperial Volunteer Fire Dep't,
368 Pa. 235, 243, 81 A.2d 865, 869 (1951).
30. Present worth is the amount which, invested at the legal rate of interest,
would be sufficient to equal the decedent's periodic earnings during his life expectancy.
Damages awarded at trial should be reduced to present worth since a lump sum
initially invested would be worth more than a number of later received lump sums
of equal total amount. For a detailed discussion of the concept of present worth
and its mathematical application, see McSparran v. Pennsylvania R.R., 258 F. Supp.
130 (E.D. Pa. 1966). A more general analysis of the concept can be found in
Bernstein, Damages in Personal Injury and Death Cases in Pennsylvania, 23 PA.
B. Ass'N Q. 9, 13-15 (1951), and Montgomery & Marshall, supra note 16, at 290-92.
Despite the difficulties involved in the application of the present worth concept, juries
are denied the use of "present worth tables." See McCaffrey v. Schwartz, 285 Pa. 561,
132 A. 810 (1926).
The legal rate of interest, which is 6 per cent in Pennsylvania, should be
used in reducing the damages awarded to present worth. Murray v. Philadelphia
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of likely future earnings8 ' through the period of the decedent's life
expectancy, 2 undiminished by the deceased's projected maintenance costs.
In Pezzulli v. D'Ambrosia,33 the court maintained that this same
measure of damages should also be applied in "survival of cause of action"
situations.3 4 In Pezzulli, a twelve year old boy was fatally injured by the
defendant's truck. Subsequent to his death, his father brought a wrongful
death action and a survival action, the latter under the Survival Act of
1937.3' Thus confronted with a "survival of cause of action" case, the
court said that the damages should be the same as in "survival of suit"
situations, with no deduction for projected maintenance costs. 3 6
In 1948, the court was again confronted with a "survival of cause
of action" situation in Murray v. Philadelphia Transporation Co.A
In
Murray, an infant was hit by the defendant's streetcar and died immediately.
On the issue of damages in the survival action, brought by the decedent's
administrator, the court rejected what it had said several years earlier
in Pezzulli, and held that in a "survival of cause of action" suit, the
damages should be reduced by the amount the decedent would probably
have expended on his personal maintenance had he lived.38 The court
did not specify, however, what constituted maintenance expenses, 9 nor
was it clear as to whether the damages in "survival of suit" situations
should also be reduced by the decedent's personal maintenance costs.
Transp. Co., 359 Pa. 69, 74 n.7, 58 A.2d 323, 325 n.7 (1948), citing Windle v. Davis,
275 Pa. 23, 29, 118 A. 503, 505 (1922). There has been criticism to the effect that
using the maximum rate of interest in computing present worth is unrealistic and
improperly reduces the amount of damages recovered. Murray v. Philadelphia
Transp. Co., 359 Pa. 69, 79 n.2, 58 A.2d 323, 328 n.2 (1948) (Stern, J., dissenting).
Justice Musmanno had similarly criticized the use of the maximum rate of interest.
Gregorius v. Safeway Steel Scaffolds Co., 409 Pa. 578, 589, 187 A.2d 646, 652
(1963) (dissenting opinion). See RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 924, comment d at 635
(1939).
31. The fact that death has occurred in the surviving action, as opposed to an
action in which the plaintiff is still alive, means that the diminution in earning power
is total. See Pezzulli v. D'Ambrosia, 344 Pa. 643, 647, 26 A.2d 659, 661 (1942).
32. Pezzulli v. D'Ambrosia, 344 Pa. 643, 646-47, 26 A.2d 659, 661 (1942);
McCafferty v. Pennsylvania R.R., 193 Pa. 339, 346, 44 A. 435, 436 (1899) ; Maher
v. Philadelphia Traction Co., 181 Pa. 391, 398, 37 A. 571, 572 (1897). If death occurs
from an independent cause before trial, and the personal representative continues the
suit, there is no longer any question as to life expectancy, and the death eliminates
any speculation as to the likely duration of the injured person's life. Littman v.
Bell Tel. Co., 315 Pa. 370, 378, 172 A. 687, 690 (1934).
33. Pezzulli v. D'Ambrosia, 344 Pa. 643, 26 A.2d 659.
34. Id. at 649, 26 A.2d at 662.
35. Act of July 2, 1937, No. 563, [1937] Pa. Laws 2755, superseded by PA. STAT.
tit. 20, § 320.603 (1950).
36. 344 Pa. at 649, 26 A.2d at 662.
37. Murray v. Philadelphia Transp. Co., 359 Pa. 69, 58 A.2d 323 (1948), noted in
96 U. PA. L. REV. 893 (1948) and 9 U. PiTT. L. REV. 266 (1948).
38. 359 Pa. at 74, 58 A.2d at 325.
39. In the majority opinion, Justice Linn used the words "cost of maintenance"
interchangeably with "living expenses," but did not state that they were synonymous,
nor did he define either term. 359 Pa. at 74, 58 A.2d at 325. The court in Pezzulli
rejected the theory that recovery should be limited to "probable accumulations" of
the decedent's estate, i.e., the present worth of what would be left to creditors, legatees

and heirs. The court reasoned that the cost of maintenance does not include all of
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Three years later, in Radobersky v. Imperial Volunteer Fire Department,40 the court temporarily cleared up the water Murray had
muddied by distinguishing "survival of suit" ahd "survival of cause of
action" situations with regard to the measure of damages. In Radobersky,
a husband and wife sued for injuries suffered in a collision between their
car and the defendant's fire truck. Subsequent to the institution of the
suit but prior to trial the husband died and his executrix was substituted
for him to continue the suit. Faced with the question of the proper
measure of damages in the "survival of suit" action before it, the court
held that damages should include the prospective loss of gross earnings
undiminished by the amount the decedent would have expended on his
own personal maintenance. 41 The Murray rule, which allowed for the
deduction of personal maintenance expenses, was held to apply only to
"survival of cause of action" cases, where suits are instituted after the
42
decedent's death by his personal representative or executor.
However, twenty years after Radobersky, the Incollingo court recognized the inherent inconsistency in the coexistence of the net earnings
rule of Murray (i.e., projected future earnings diminished by maintenance
costs) and the gross earnings rule of Radobersky (i.e., projected future
earnings undiminished by maintenance costs), and expressly overruled
Radobersky, adopting Murray as the rule in both "survival of suit" and
"survival of cause of action" situations. 43 In the majority opinion, Justice
Pomeroy stated:
[W]e hold that in all survival actions, damages are properly to be
measured by decedent's pain and suffering and loss of gross earning
power from the date of injury until death, and loss of earning power
less personal maintenance expenses from the time of death through de44
cedent's estimated working lifespan.
the decedent's probable expenditures. 344 Pa. at 649, 26 A.2d at 662. One commentator
defines "cost of maintenance" as:
[T]hat necessary and economical sum which a decedent would be expected to
spend, based upon his station in life, for food, clothing, shelter, medical attention
and some recreation.
Bernstein, Damages in Personal Injury and Death Cases in Pennsylvania - A
Supplement, 26 PA. B. Ass'N Q. 26, 34 (1954).
40. Radobersky v. Imperial Volunteer Fire Dep't, 368 Pa. 235, 81 A.2d 865 (1951).
41. Id. at 242, 81 A.2d at 868-69.
42. Id.
43. 444 Pa. at 309, 282 A.2d at 229. Six years earlier the court had been asked
to consider whether Radobersky and Murray were inconsistent, but it declined to do so
because the question was not raised in the lower court. See Evans v. Philadelphia
Transp. Co., 418 Pa. 567, 579-80, 212 A.2d 440, 446 (1965).
44. 444 Pa. at 309, 282 A.2d at 229.
In Skoda v. West Penn Power Co., 411 Pa. 323, 191 A.2d 822 (1963),
an action was brought under a survival statute. The court held that in computing
damages, the amount of the decedent's earnings from the time of injury until trial
should be reduced by the amount he would have contributed to his family. Id. at 335,
191 A.2d at 829. It is submitted that there was never any foundation for such a
holding and that the language of Incollingo properly overrules it.
The court has generally spoken in terms of lifespan rather than working
lifespan. Under the working lifespan concept, a strict interpretation could cause
problems in situations in which the decedent would continue to have income from
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The court indicated that the primary issue before it was whether the
two disparate rules of damages should continue side by side or whether one
of them should properly be discarded. It did not question the propriety
of the lower court's application of the Radobersky rule to the facts of the
case,45 since from the time Radobersky had been decided, the court had
46
uniformly applied its rule to all "survival of suit" situations.
The appellants in Incollingo argued that the distinction between the
two separate measures of damages was unjustifiable and that there should
be one uniform rule for both "survival of suit" and "survival of cause of
action" situations - the net earnings rule of Murray. They argued that
damages under the gross earnings rule of Radobersky were excessive and
in effect punitive. On the other hand, the appellees urged the court to
apply the gross earnings rule of Radobersky to the present case, since, like
Radobersky, it involved a "survival of suit" action. The appellees further
urged that, should the court adopt a single measure of damages for both
"survival of suit" and "survival of cause of action" cases, it should be the
gross earnings rule. Finally, it was the appellees' contention that in the
event the court should adopt the Murray rule, it should not be applied
47
in the present case but given only prospective application.
The court, while analyzing the judicial precedent on the issue of
damages, noted that Murray was in accord with Pezvulli only to the extent
that both indicated that the measure of damages should be the same in
both "survival of suit" and "survival of cause of action" situations. In
Pezzulli, the court had allowed the cost of maintenance to be deducted
from the amount of prospective earnings, but only because the plaintiff
in the case did not object to the judge's instructions to the jury on the
amount of damages to be awarded. 48 The court could see no reason why
an amount, recoverable by the plaintiff had he lived, should be reduced
on account of his death. 49 Indeed, the Pezzulli court made it very plain
that had the plaintiff objected to the instructions, he would have received
gross earnings undiminished by the decedent's maintenance costs.50 The
Murray court, however, relegated this real rule of Pezzulli to mere dictum,
while emphasizing that the jury verdict based on net earnings had been
business after his retirement. Such income might be excluded under Incollingo.
The court might simply have taken the approach that estimated working lifespan
is the same as estimated lifespan.
45. 444 Pa. at 301, 282 A.2d at 225-26.
46. See, e.g., Evans v. Philadelphia Transp. Co., 418 Pa. 567, 579, 212 A.2d 440,
446 (1965); Chappell v. Pittsburgh & W. Va. Ry., 402 Pa. 646, 650, 168 A.2d 330,
332 (1961).
47. 444 Pa. at 302, 282 A.2d at 226.
48. 344 Pa. at 649, 26 A.2d at 662.
49. Id. at 648, 26 A.2d at 661-62. Justice Stern reasoned:
Why should the amount of damages which would have been recoverable by
him be reduced by the death occasioned by his injuries, so that his cause of
action, when assigned by act of law to his executor or administrator, is for a
smaller recovery than it was when the right vested in him during his life?
Id. at 648. 26 A.2d at 662.
50. Id. at 649, 26 A.2d at 662.
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51
Murray
upheld - completely ignoring the true reason for the decision.
reasoned that when the plaintiff brings an action, but dies prior to trial,
he no longer has a reason to be compensated for future maintenance expenses which will never arise. Therefore, his administrator should not be
able to recover anything for his maintenance during his life expectancy.
The Murray court believed that such reasoning is equally applicable to
52
an action brought by the administrator, since in this case as well there
would never be future maintenance expenditures made by the decedent.
However, in his dissent in Murray, Justice Stern expressed the belief
that once judicial interpretation has been given to a statute, and the
legislature does not act to amend it, it must be assumed that the meaning
given by the court expresses the legislative intent. He noted that subsequent
to Pezzulli there had been three sessions of the legislature and no action
53
He also maintained that
had been taken to amend the survival statute.
even if the court should characterize the rule in Pezzulli as dictum, subse54
quent decisions nevertheless had converted it into established principle.
The Incollingo court, while recognizing the conflict between Pezzulli
and Murray, nonetheless believed that the Murray court intended its
decision to apply to both "survival of suit" and "survival of cause of action"
situations. The general tone of the Murray holding, as well as Justice
Stern's dissent, 55 tend to substantiate this view. Incollingo recognized,
however, that Radobersky had distinguished Murray and limited Murray's
applicability to "survival of cause of action" situations. In considering
the problems which result from "survival of suit" and "survival of cause
of action" cases being governed by two separate measures of damages, the
court looked to Justice Stern's dissent in Murray, which reasoned that
the measure of damages awarded in a suit would vary substantially
depending on whether or not the plaintiff filed the complaint before the
moment of death. 56 The court felt that it could not allow these two rules
of damages to continue together any longer, when both "are clearly
intended to compensate the decedent's estate for precisely the same

injury.

' 57

51. 359 Pa. at 73, 58 A.2d at 325.
52. Id. at 73-74, 58 A.2d at 325.
53. Id. at 80-81, 58 A.2d at 328 (dissenting opinion).
54. Id. at 77, 58 A.2d at 327 (dissenting opinion).
55. Id. at 80, 58 A.2d at 328 (dissenting opinion).
56. In his dissent, Justice Stern warned that if the present decision were to
be interpreted as awarding a smaller measure of damages in a "survival of cause of
action" case than in a "survival of suit" case:
[S]uch an escape would be merely from Scylla to Charybdis, for the wholly
deplorable consequence would be to restore the practice which prevailed before
• . . [the statutory authorization of a "survival of cause of action"] of an
unseemly race to the prothonotary's office to have a writ issued before the
victim of the accident passed away so as to reap the fruit of a larger measure
of damages.
359 Pa. at 80, 58 A.2d at 328 (dissenting opinion).
57. 444 Pa. at 306, 282 A.2d at 228.
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In formulating the appropriate rule of damages, the court determined
that the damages should compensate for the full extent of the injury5 s and
should be exactly equivalent to the amount of the loss.5 9 Since in both
"survival of suit" and "survival of cause of action" cases the decedent's
estate and not the decedent himself is the recipient of the amount recovered,
the important question is what damages fairly compensate the estate. With
this perspective, the estate should not be entitled to greater damages because a complaint was filed five minutes before death as opposed to five
minutes after death. The reality of the situation in a "survival of suit" case,
as in a "survival of cause of action" case, is that no expenditures will ever
have to be made for the decedent's personal maintenance. To compensate
the estate for these non-existent expenses would be to award damages
where none existed. Therefore, to be properly compensatory, the court
concluded that an award of damages must be reduced by the projected
amount of the decedent's maintenance throughout his life expectancy. 60
Having determined that net earnings was the proper measure of
damages in all survival situations, the court still faced the problem of
whether or not it should apply that rule in the instant case. The appellee
in Incollingo successfully contended that, should the court adopt the
Murray net earnings rule, it should do so prospectively. 6' The court, upon
58. See McLane v. Pittsburgh Ry., 230 Pa. 29, 79 A. 237 (1911) (damages for
pain and suffering in personal injury case).
59. Forsyth v. Palmer, 14 Pa. 96, 97 (1850) (damages in trespass action).
60. 444 Pa. at 308, 282 A.2d at 229.
61. The constitutionality of this procedure was established by the Supreme Court
of the United States in Great N. Ry. v. Sunburst Oil & Ref. Co., 287 U.S. 358
(1932). Sunburst involved the interpretation of a Montana statute and the prospective
overruling of a prior decision as to the meaning of the statute. The question before
the Court was whether it was a denial of due process for a court to adhere to a
precedent in the case before it, yet state its intention not to follow this precedent
in the future. Justice Cardozo, who delivered the opinion in Sunburst, indicated that
an individual state would determine what policies it would follow in regard to
overruling, and this would largely depend on the juristic philosophy of its judges.
Id. at 365. He also made it clear that it made no difference whether the case was
at common law or involved statutory construction. Id.
The Supreme Court has also indicated that any overruling of a case must
be done in "a manner that will not prejudice those who might have relied on it." James
v. United States, 366 U.S. 213, 221 (1961). The Court has warned that in particular
cases there might be "equities that would warrant only prospective application" of
the enunciated rule. Simpson v. Union Oil Co., 377 U.S. 13, 24-25 (1964).
Much has been said by the commentators as to the virtues and vices of
prospective overruling. In 1924, Robert von Moschzisker, the Chief Justice of the
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, maintained that such a method of overruling was
objectionable for three basic reasons. First, it reduced any rule formulated by the
court to mere dicta. Second, it discouraged appeals since it provided no benefit to
the party challenging an existing rule; and third, it amounted to legislation by the
courts. See von Moschzisker, Stare Decisis in Courts of Last Resort, 37 HARV. L.
REV. 409, 426-27 (1924). It has also been argued that such a device makes it
easier for a court to overrule a prior decision in any given case. See Note, The
Effect of Overruled and Overruling Decisions on Intervening Transactions,47 HARV.

L. REV. 1403, 1412 (1934). One commentator met von Moschzisker's arguments,
saying that any holding is really no more than a prophecy as to how the court will
hold in the future, and that prospective holdings, as prophecies, are entitled to be
given greater significance than remarks made in passing. It was submitted that
appeals will not be discouraged to any appreciable extent, since businesses would
still find it worthwhile to challenge an existing rule even if they would not reap
immediate benefits. See Note, Prospective Operation of Decisions Holding Statutes
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considering this contention, realized that to remand the case, even for
the limited purpose of measuring damages, would necessitate an extensive
and expensive duplication of evidence. This could have been avoided had
the appellants requested a special finding at an earlier stage in the proceedings to determine the portion of damages that the jury allocated to
the decedent's probable future earnings. Had that been done, all that would
have been necessary on remand would be to determine the decedent's
projected maintenance expenses. 62 Weighing the equities involved, the
court held that the net earnings measure of damages did not apply in
the case at bar, but would apply to cases where the trial is commenced
subsequent to the date of its decision. 63 Justice Roberts dissented to the
majority's prospective overruling of the gross earnings rule of Radobersky,
and maintained that the new rule should have been applied in the instant
case.6 4 His reasons were based on two of the common objections to
prospective overruling :65 (1) that prospective overruling discourages parties from taking an appeal; and (2) that it reduces the rule of a court to
dictum. In response to the former argument, the majority believed that
prospective overruling would not have a chilling effect on appellate proceedings so long as the procedure remained the exception and not the
rule.6" In answer to the latter argument, they asserted that the Incollingo
holding "will be acted upon as any other decision of this Court."67 In this
regard, a comparison of Incollingo and Pezzulli raises an interesting issue.
Both cases held a single rule of damages as being applicable to all future
survival actions. However, while Pezzulli was mistakenly limited, the
Incollingo court seemed determined to avoid a similar fate, and made it
quite clear that the net earnings rule, despite its prospective effect, is now
the law in Pennsylvania.
From a practical standpoint, in computing damages in any survival
action, there should be no inclusion of money which would have gone
toward the maintenance expenses of the decedent. Such expenses will
never be a burden on the estate, since they will never be effectuated. Thus,
to include them in the amount of recovery in "survival of suit" actions
Unconstitutional or Overruling Prior Decisions, 60 HARV. L. REV. 437, 439-40
(1947). As to von Moschzisker's third argument, it does not seem that prospective
overruling is any more of a usurpation of legislative powers than is overruling where
the new rule is applied to the case at bar. See Kocourek & Koven, Renovation of the
Common Law Through Stare Decisis, 29 ILL. L. REv. 971, 995-96 (1935). For an
excellent discussion of prospective overruling and the arguments for and against it,
see Levy, Realist Jurisprudence and Prospective Overruling, 109 U. PA. L. REv. 1

(1960).
62. 444 Pa. at 309-10, 282 A.2d at 230.

63. Id. at 311, 282 A.2d at 230.
64. Id. at 311, 282 A.2d at 231 (dissenting opinion).
65. See Commonwealth v. Spencer, 442 Pa. 328, 338, 275 A.2d 299, 305 (1971)
(Roberts J., dissenting).
66. 444 Pa. at 310-11, 282 A.2d at 230.

67. Id. at 310, 282 A.2d at 230.
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would be to award an amount over an above the economic loss incurred by
the estate. Professor McCormick has observed:
Since the premature death has not only cut off the prospective earnings
of the deceased, but has cut off his living expenses also, it is difficult
to justify the award of gross earnings as a measure of the loss caused
by the death ....

68

The net earnings rule, therefore, as originally suggested by Murray and
finally subscribed to by Incollingo, more closely represents the loss suffered
by the estate and is more accurately compensatory in both "survival of suit"
and "survival of cause of action" cases. In this respect, the Incollingo
decision has been long overdue.
Fred B. Fromhold

FEDERAL SECURITIES REGULATION

SECTION 13(d) SHAREHOLDER GROUP UPON FORMATION MUST IDENTIFY MEMBERSHIP AND PLANS CORPORATE ISSUER HAS STANDING TO SEEK
SHAREHOLDER COMPLIANCE WITH DISCLOSURE REQUIREMENTS.

GAF Corp. v. Milstein (2d Cir. 1971)
GAF Corporation sought to enjoin the Milstein family, which collectively owned 10.25 per cent of the outstanding GAF convertible preferred stock, from using its ownership as a power base to gain control of
GAF.' The company based its claim for relief upon the Milsteins' alleged
violation of sections 13(d) and 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934 (the "Act").2 GAF alleged that under section 13(d)3 the Milsteins
68. MCCORMIcK, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF DAMAGES § 96, at 342-43 (1935).
See also RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 925, comment b at 641 (1939).
1. GAF's specific prayer was for an injunction to prevent the Milsteins from
acquiring any shares of any class of GAF stock, from soliciting proxies, from voting
any shares acquired during their combination and from otherwise acting to further
the alleged conspiracy. GAF Corp. v. Milstein, 453 F.2d 709 (2d Cir. 1971), cert.
denied, 40 U.S.L.W. 3511 (U.S. April 25, 1972).
2. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 §§ 1 et seq., 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a et seq.
(1970).
3. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 13(d), 15 U.S.C. § 78m (Supp. V, 1969),
as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 78m (1970). The section provides in part:
Any person who, after acquiring directly or indirectly the beneficial ownership of any equity security of a class which is registered pursuant to section 781
[Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 12] of this title . . . is directly or indirectly
the beneficial owner of more than 10 per centum [now five per cent] of such
class shall, within ten days after such acquisition, send to the issuer of the
security at its principal executive office, by registered or certified mail, send to each
exchange where the security is traded, and file with the Commission, a statement
containing such of the following information, and such additional information,
as the Commission may by rules and regulations prescribe . ...
(3) When two or more persons act as a partnership, limited partnership,
syndicate, or other group for the purpose of acquiring, holding, or disposing of
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were required to file a schedule 13D, disclosing information relevant for
investor decisions, 4 within ten days of the formation of their group, and
that the subsequent filing of the Milsteins' schedule 13D was untimely.5
In the second count of its complaint, GAF alleged that the Milsteins'
schedule 13D contained deliberately false and misleading statements of
fact. GAF maintained that its shareholders had been, and would continue
to be, irreparably harmed unless the Milsteins were enjoined from their
activities.6 The Milsteins moved for dismissal of the complaint under rule
12(b) (6)T for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted.8
The district court granted the Milsteins' rule 12(b) (6) motion on
both counts of the complaint. As to the first count, the court held that
securities of an issuer, such syndicate or group shall be deemed a "person" for
the purposes of this subsection.
This section was contained in legislation commonly referred to as the Williams Bill.
Act of July 29, 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-439 § 2, 82 Stat. 454, as amended, 15 U.S.C.
§ 78m (1970). The provision has been amended to change the 10 per cent figure to
five per cent. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 13(d), 15 U.S.C. § 78m (1970).
4. Schedule 13D requires: (1) identification of the parties making the purchase
and background information on each for the preceding ten years; (2) identification
of the source and type of financing used in the purchase; (3) identification of the
purposes of the purchase and, if one purpose is to gain control, a statement of plans
as to actions after acquiring control; (4) identification of prior holdings of all
securities of the same class; and (5) identification of any arrangements with other
persons with respect to the issuer's securities. The schedule must be filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission, sent to each exchange where the security is
traded, and sent to the issuer of the security. SEC Schedule 13D, 17 C.F.R.
§ 240.13d-101 (Supp. 1971).
5. The Milsteins filed a schedule 13D on September 24, 1970, in which they
disclaimed any legal obligation under section 13(d). 453 F.2d at 714. In its
complaint, GAF failed to allege the exact time of the formation of the Milstein
group, a necessary allegation to determine if the ten day filing period had elapsed
and if, in fact, the filing was untimely. However, since the case was before the
Second Circuit on appeal from the denial of a rule 12(b) (6) motion, the court was
bound to accept as true the allegation that the group's acquisition, by its formation,
of the convertible preferred shares occurred after the effective date of the Williams
Bill and more than ten days prior to the actual filing. Id. at 715.
However, GAF's allegation might not have been an accurate statement of
the actual situation. The Milsteins received the entire 10.25 per cent of GAF
convertible preferred shares when the Rubberoid Company was merged into GAF
in May 1967. Id. at 713. As a result, the Milsteins could urge at trial that the
group had been formed at or before the merger, a full year prior to the bill's adoption.
Since it was conceded that section 13(d) is not retroactive (id. at 718 n.17 ), the
Milsteins would not have been required to make a section 13(d) filing.
6. Since GAF had prevailed over the Milsteins in a 1971 proxy contest, the
latter asserted that the entire controversy was moot, the "injury" from non-disclosure
having been cured by the proxy victory. The court, however, was obliged to accept
as true the allegation that the Milsteins' conspiracy continued. Id. at 714 n.11. Although
the court indicated that the existence of injury would be weighed at the trial on
the merits in determining what, if any, relief should be granted, it probably realized
that acceptance of the mootness defense would remove any effective sanction from
section 13(d). That is, if a subsequent filing or extraneous circumstances could
render moot a section 13(d) claim, there would be little reason to disclose until a
complaint were filed. Underlying this realization is the theory that the public interest
demands full compliance with securities regulations, notwithstanding that the particular matter in controversy may have long since become public knowledge. A
similar intimation was made in Sisak v. Wings & Wheels Express, Inc., [1970-71
Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP.
92,991, at 90,670 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 9,
1970). See note 24 infra.
7. FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b) (6).
8. 453 F.2d at 712. In the alternative, the Milsteins sought summary judgment.
FED. R. Civ. P. 56.
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the mere formation of a group of shareholders, with a view to seeking
control, was not a reportable event under section 13(d).' With respect
to its dismissal of the second count, the district court held that GAF, as
an issuer, lacked standing under section 10(b) to assert the claim of false
and misleading statements. 10 On GAF's appeal, the United States Court
of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed, holding as to count one that a
shareholder group collectively owning ten per cent (now five per cent)
of a class of an issuer's outstanding securities and formed for the purpose
of acquiring, holding or disposing of said securities must make a disclosure filing under section 13(d) upon formation. As to count two, the
Second Circuit held that the issuer of the securities has standing under
section 13(d) to sue for injunctive relief for either an untimely or a false
section 13(d) filing." GAF Corp. v. Milstein, 453 F.2d 709 (2d Cir.
1971), cert. denied, 40 U.S.L.W. 3511 (U.S. April 25, 1972).
In analyzing a judicial opinion involving statutory interpretation, a
knowledge of the statute's historical context is necessary.' 2 The main
legislative purpose in enacting the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 was
"to insure the maintenance of fair and honest markets . . .in . . . [securi-

ties] transactions."' 8 However, the wave of cash tender offers in the mid9. GAF Corp. v. Milstein, 324 F. Supp. 1062 (S.D.N.Y.), rev'd 453 F.2d 709
(2d Cir. 1971). The district court interpreted section 13(d) as requiring a filing by
a group owning more than ten per cent of a class of securities only upon an actual
acquisition of greater than two per cent of the outstanding shares of that class. 324
F. Supp. at 1067. The two per cent exemption is embodied in section 13(d) (6) (B),
which provides:
(6) The provisions of this subsection shall not apply to-

(B) any acquisition of the beneficial ownership of a security which,

together with all other acquisitions by the same person of securities of the
same class during the preceding twelve months, does not exceed 2 per centum
of that class ....
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 13(d) (6) (B), 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d) (6) (B) (1970).
Since the Milsteins had actually acquired only 1.6 per cent of GAF's out-

standing common stock while owning the convertible preferred stock, this acquisition
being of a different class, was not sufficient to require disclosure. Moreover, even
if it had been of the same class, it would have been within the two per cent exemption
obviating the need for disclosure.
10. 324 F. Supp. at 1072. The district court, in considering the general anti-fraud
provisions of the Act as found in section 10(b), was less than clear as to its specific
ruling, but apparently followed the trend of denying an issuer standing to assert a
section 10(b) claim. Id. Section 10(b) has spawned voluminous litigation as to the
proper interpretation of the phrase "in connection with the purchase or sale of any
security." Although generally the decisions had relaxed the purchase and sale
restriction, no case had expressly extended standing to an issuer under section
10(b). 453 F.2d at 721.
11. The Second Circuit affirmed the district court's holding that GAF as an
issuer lacked standing under section 10(b). 453 F.2d at 722. The court realized that
there was no need to construe section 10(b) in order to provide the relief sought by
GAF, for under the Second Circuit's holding the relief requested could be provided
under section 13(d). Id.
12. History is particularly relevant here for the statute is admittedly ambiguous.
Id. at 716 n.14. However, the resort to history as an aid to construction has its
inherent dangers. For a sage admonition to those who construe statutes, see
Frankfurter, Some Reflections on the Reading of Statutes, 47 COLUM. L. REv. 527
(1947).
13. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 2, 15 U.S.C. § 78b (1970).
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sixties 14 had demonstrated that the then existing market regulations did

not provide investors with sufficient or timely information upon which to
intelligently base their investment decisions. This inadequacy of information was especially experienced when substantial holders of securities
decided to acquire additional shares in a target company or when a tender
offer was made.' 5 As a result, Congress added the Williams Bill to the
Act in 1968.16 Basically, the Bill required disclosure of certain information 17 by any person' 8 who, through acquisition, became an owner of ten
per cent of a class of security, or through a tender offer would become
such an owner upon the offer's consummation. The Bill was intended to
supplement the disclosure provisions of the Act's section 16,19 as that
section did not require groups owning ten per cent or more to file, nor
did it require filing on the part of a future owner, as a tender offeror
20
might be.
Prior to the instant case, section 13(d) had been the subject of only
occasional litigation. The question of when a filing was required under
the section was first raised in Bath Industries, Inc. v. Blot.2" In Bath, the
14. H.R.

REP.

No. 1711, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1968).

The cash tender offer or tender offer consists of a bid to buy the shares of a

company, at generally higher-than-market prices. If certain conditions are met, the
person making the offer obligates himself to purchase, at the bid price, all or a
specified portion of the shares tendered by those wishing to sell. Id.
15. Id.
16. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 §§ 12(i), 13(d), 13(e), 14(d) to 14(f),
15 U.S.C. §§ 781(i), 78m(d), 78m(e), 78n(d) to 78n(f) (Supp. V, 1969), as amended,
15 U.S.C. §§ 781(i), 78m(d), 78m(e), 78n(d) to 78n(f) (1970). See note 3 supra.
17. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 §§ 13(d), 14(d), 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(d),
78n(d) (Supp. V, 1969), as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(d), 78n(d) (1970). See note
3 supra.
18. Within the meaning of the Williams Bill, "person" refers to an individual
or a group of individuals. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 13(d) (3), 15 U.S.C.
§ 78m(d)(3) (1970). See note 3 supra.
19. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 16, 15 U.S.C. § 78p (1970). Section 16(a)
provides in pertinent part:
(a) Every person who is directly or indirectly the beneficial owner of more
than 10 per centum of any class of any equity security . . . or who is a director
or an officer of the issuer of such security, shall file . . . within ten days after
he becomes such beneficial owner, director, or officer, a statement with the
Commission . . . of the amount of all equity securities of such issuer of which
he is the beneficial owner ....
20. 113 CONG. REC. 24664 (1967) (remarks of Senator Williams).
21. 427 F.2d 97 (7th Cir. 1970). Aside from the question of timing, the
adequacy of the disclosure made in a schedule 13D had been considered in cases
involving tender offers. Due to the tender offer context, the issuer was granted
standing to assert the inadequacy. Susquehanna Corp. v. Pan American Sulphur Co.,
423 F.2d 1075 (5th Cir. 1970) ; Electronic Specialty Co. v. International Controls
Corp., 409 F.2d 937 (2d Cir. 1969).
The information disclosed by the Milsteins in the instant case apparently
fulfilled the schedule 13D requirements; GAF had asserted, rather, that it was
false and misleading. GAF Corp. v. Milstein, 453 F.2d 709, 712 (2d Cir. 1971).
Indeed, it is arguable that the Milsteins disclosed more information than is required.
Schedule 13D does not expressly require the filing parties to state any "'present
intention as to whether or not any additional securities of [the issuer] (might) be
acquired by them in the future ....
' " Id. at 714. Any control aspirations must be
disclosed (see note 4 supra), but, by making the above statement, the Milsteins
may have exceeded this requirement. In this respect, the group's alleged purchase of
1.6 per cent of the outstanding GAF common shares could indicate an intention
contrary to that expressed in the gratuitous statement. In fact, this was a basis
for GAF's claim of false filing. Id. at 721 n.23.
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for the Seventh Circuit interpreted secto file within ten days of an agreement
concert to acquire additional shares,"22
was consonant with the legislative intent

28
as expressed in the Williams Bill.

Soon after Bath, conflicting holdings as to the meaning of section
13(d) were enunciated in two cases involving testamentary bequests of
24
sizeable blocks of securities. In Sisak v. Wings & Wheels Express, Inc.,
the District Court for the Southern District of New York ruled that an
estate's "receipt" of securities was an "acquisition" within the meaning of
the section, triggering the filing requirement.2 5 However, in Ozark Air
Lines, Inc. v. Cox, 20 the District Court for the Eastern District of Mis-

souri held that a trust's "receipt" of shares was not an "acquisition" for
which the section demanded a filing.2 7 The only other judicial interpretation of section 13(d), apart from a tender offer context, 28 was made in
22. 427 F.2d at 109 (emphasis supplied by the court). In Bath, the members of a
group individually owned less than ten per cent of the outstanding shares, but

collectively owned substantially more than ten per cent. Since no schedule 13D was
filed until after litigation had begun, the court held that the filing was untimely,
ostensibly because a filing had been due within ten days of the group's formation in
pursuit of acquiring additional shares.
However, the court actually based its finding of untimeliness upon the fact
that a member of the group had purchased additional shares subsequent to the group's
formation, and that a filing was required within ten days of that purchase. The
Bath court recognized the difficulty in enforcing the interpretation that a filing was
needed upon formation. Thus, it was further held that upon the purchase of additional
shares by a member of a group, there arose a "rebuttable presumption" of the
formation of that group, and that the purchase was made pursuant to an agreement
by the group to acquire additional shares. From this it is evident that the theory
of the holding was altered by the facts supporting it; i.e., the court desired to require
filing upon formation, but recognized that the formation of the group could only
be pinpointed by a subsequent purchase by the group. Therefore, disclosure was
only required within ten days of the purchase. Id. at 110.
23. Id. at 109. See text accompanying note 52 infra.
24. [1970-71 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. fI 92,991, at 90,666
(S.D.N.Y. Sept. 9, 1970). The suit in Sisak had been brought by shareholders of
an air freight company against an estate into which had passed the decedent's
holdings of 31 per cent of the company's outstanding shares. The estate did not
file a schedule 13D until some 18 months after receipt of the securities, when it
petitioned the Civil Aeronautics Board for permission to sell the securities to another
air freight company. Id. The shareholders alleged that the filing was untimely and
inadequate, and on that ground, the court issued a preliminary injunction pending a
CAB resolution of the merger aspects of the transfer. Id. at 90,670.
25. Id. at 90,668.
26. 326 F. Supp. 1113 (E.D. Mo. 1971). In Ozark, a non-profit hospital was
the beneficiary of a trust containing over 16 per cent of the issuer's outstanding
common stock. The hospital did not file a schedule 13D until several months after
the Civil Aeronautics Board granted it permission to vote the shares. This filing
was held not to have been untimely, on the ground that the section's purpose was
to regulate acquisitions which had the "effect of changing or influencing the control
of the issuer or affecting the market." Id. at 1117. Since a bequest only changes
the name of the owner of the shares and does not involve any market activity, the
hospital's acquisition did not require a section 13(d) filing.
27. Id. The Ozark court was obviously influenced by the lower court decision in
GAF and, in fact, expressly adopted the analysis formulated by Judge Pollack. Id.
at 1118.
28. Also enacted in the Williams Bill were provisions regulating tender offers.
Section 14(d) requires a disclosure filing (a schedule 13D) and section 14(e)
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Grow Chemical Corp. v. Uran,0 wherein the court held that a purchaser
of securities could maintain an action under section 13(d) for the failure
of a more-than-ten per cent beneficial owner to file a schedule 13D.80
To support its holding that the formation of a group owning more
than ten per cent of a class of securities triggers the filing requirements
of section 13(d), the GAF court first examined the language of the statute
' 1
itself. Recognizing that section 13(d) (3) and its definition of "person" 2
were crucial to the GAF complaint, the court concluded that the Milsteins3
"constituted a 'group' and thus, as a 'person,' were subject to the provisions of section 13(d)."33 Then, confronted with the absence of a
statutory definition of "acquire," 34 the court resorted to a dictionary
definition -

"'to

come into possession

(or)

control.'

"5

With this

definition as its basis, the court concluded that:
[T] he group ...could have gained "beneficial control" of the voting
rights of the preferred stock only after its formation . .

.

. Mani-

festly ...the group when formed [acquired] a beneficial interest in
the individual holdings of its members . . . [for] "voting control of

stock is the only relevant element of beneficial ownership.136

In other words, the court equated acquisition with "gaining control."
Since a group, upon formation, obtains control of the votes of its members,
and since the court considered voting control as the only element of beneficial ownership, a group acquires beneficial ownership when formed.
provides remedies for tender offer violations. Securities Exchange Act of 1934
§§ 14(d), 14(e), 15 U.S.C. §§ 78n(d), 78n(e) (1970). See note 21 supra.
29. 316 F. Supp. 891 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
30. Id. at 892. The Grow case was decided on a rule 12(b) (6) motion and,
as a result, few facts were contained in the report of the case, making an assessment
of its impact difficult. However, the opinion does show that the corporate plaintiff's
alleged injury was that its 13 per cent purchase of securities could have been made
at a lower price had the defendant filed a schedule 13D. Id. at 891.
31. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 13(d)(3), 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d)(3)
(1970). See note 3 supra.
32. The Milstein defendants consisted of a father, his married daughter, and
his two sons. 453 F.2d at 712. Although there was no indication as to the individual
ownership of the family's convertible preferred shares, it appeared that the two
sons were the only Milsteins to purchase the common stock. Id.at 714. At a trial
on the merits, such factors would be significant in establishing whether a group
had actually been formed. However, since the instant proceeding was on a rule
12(b) (6) motion, the court was obliged to assume the truth of GAF's allegations,
including the averment that the Milsteins had acted in concert. Thus, the assertion of
section 13(d) claims may in the future effectively eliminate the use of a rule 12(b) (6)
motion and automatically require a trial on the merits. Such a result would make
the section a convenient tool for incumbent management to use to harass shareholders whom it sees as threats to its continued control. The GAF court recognized
the danger of spurious allegations, but its suggested panacea of shareholder remedies
for waste (id. at 719-20), may not provide adequate compensation for the innocent
shareholders who are unable to avoid a trial on the merits.
33. Id. at 715.
34. Id. at 716 n.14. Although using "acquisition," or a form thereof, several
times, section 13(d) does not define the term nor does the context reveal a
particular meaning to be attributed to it. See note 3 supra.
35. Id. at 715, quoting WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 18
(1971). Although the court attempted to avoid making "'a fortress out of the
dictionary,'" its success is uncertain.
36. Id.at 715-16 (citations omitted and emphasis added).
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Therefore, the group is required to file under section 13 (d) when formed.
This approach avoids many of the limitations of prior judicial interpre7
tations of section 13 (d) (1) and its interaction with section 13(d) (3) .
Moreover, the court's approach implicitly recognizes the concept of "constructive acquisition," 38 a result which has brought the statute closer to
its purported legislative purpose3 9
Nevertheless, the court's construction of the two sections does not
cure all of the statute's imperfections. 40 Indeed, the court's very logic
could be viewed as simply an excursion in semantics, and aside from the
single use of the dictionary, the Second Circuit failed to produce additional
support for the definitions it attributed to key statutory words. 41 Moreover, the court's treatment of "acquisition" appears to have glossed over
the considerable difficulty that the term had given other courts. 42 The GAF
court's interpretation, while it has some justification in the statute and
legislative history, cannot be considered the only one possible, for the
prior contrary decisions had taken refuge in the same supporting sources.
37. The district court's interpretation had been criticized for its limiting effect.
GAF had contended that requiring a filing only after an actual acquisition would make
the "holding and disposing" language of section 13(d) (3) superfluous and urged
that this language required a group, once formed, to file even if its purpose were
merely to hold or to sell securities. 324 F. Supp. at 1069. Also, the Bath and Ozark
decisions appear susceptible to similar criticism. See notes 22 & 26 supra. Although
the Second Circuit's holding may have vitiated this particular objection, the court
did suggest that some purposes for formation will exempt a group from a section
13(d) disclosure filing. 453 F.2d at 719. See note 94 infra.
38. In the instant case, GAF argued that when a group is formed there is a
constructive conveyance of the members' shares to the group, resulting in a constructive
acquisition of the stock by the group. 324 F. Supp. at 1066. Acceptance of such a
concept is implicit in the reasoning of the Second Circuit in GAF. See text accompanying note 52 infra.
39. See text accompanying note 44 infra.
40. The court recognized that questions as to the extent of section 13 (d)'s
operation continued to exist. 453 F.2d at 719 & n.20.
41. The only other support utilized by the GAF court was the Bath definition
of "beneficial ownership." Id. at 716, citing Bath Indus., Inc. v. Blot, 427 F.2d 97, 112
(7th Cir. 1970). However, the supportive value of this opinion is diminished by
GAF's rejection of the Bath court's determination of the legislative purpose of
section 13(d). 453 F.2d at 718.
42. Bath Indus., Inc. v. Blot, 427 F.2d 97 (7th Cir. 1970); Ozark Air Lines,
Inc. v. Cox, 326 F. Supp. 1113 (E.D. Mo. 1971) ; GAF Corp. v. Milstein, 324 F. Supp.
1062 (S.D.N.Y. 1971). See notes 22, 26 & 9 supra. It is arguable that these courts
were overly concerned with the practical application of a holding which would require
a filing upon formation. In this regard, the determination of the time of a group's
formation would be a difficult task and conceivably an unwise use of judicial
resources, particularly as in the instant case where the "group" was a family. In
such a situation, the alleged conspiratorial contacts might be inseparable from normal
familial relations. GAF Corp. v. Milstein, 324 F. Supp. 1062, 1069 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
These practical problems are relevant because the exact date of formation is crucial;
it necessarily determines the ten day filing period, the passage of which, without a
filing, gives rise to a statutory violation.
Notwithstanding the practical difficulties in applying its holding, the Second
Circuit perceived that the suggested alternatives failed to focus on the real problem "whether the individuals indeed constituted a 'group'." 453 F.2d at 718. Moreover,
the GAF court had great confidence in the ability of the district courts to fashion
appropriate equitable relief should the practical difficulty actually arise in a trial
on the merits. Id. at 718-19.
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Recognizing that the statute might be considered less than a "model
of clarity," 43 the court demonstrated that its reading of the statutory

language was justified by the "purpose" for the enactment of section 13 (d).
The GAF court concluded that the "purpose" was "to alert the marketplace to every large, rapid aggregation or accumulation of securities,
regardless of technique employed, which might represent a potential shift
in corporate control .... -44 To support this conclusion, the Second Circuit cited the statute itself section 13(d) (1) (C) 45 and section
13(d)(6) (D) 46 - and reasoned that the requirement that the person
filing disclose his intention with respect to the acquisition of control
(section 13(d) (1) (C)) juxtaposed with the opportunity for exemption
from disclosure of certain acquisitions (section 13 (d) (6) (D)) indicated
that Congress intended that all potential changes in control should be
revealed. It is questionable whether the sections cited actually support
the court's conclusion, for it is arguable that section 13(d) (1) (C) was
only intended to express one of the five informational responses required
in a filing 47 and was not a provision which determined the time of filing.
Additionally, section 13(d) (6) (D) may have been directed toward the
internal functioning of the SEC rather than being a directive as to the
48
quantum of disclosure intended.
43. Id. at 716. The lower court's reasoning was somewhat tenuous in its assertion
that the statute was clear. 324 F. Supp. at 1066-67. Apparently, the lower court
believed that the legislative history was unreliable and chose instead to adopt a rule
that could be justified by the section itself, even though the rule would not have as
broad an effect as the committee reports justified. Id. at 1067. The different constructions offered by the district and circuit courts serve as a poignant example of
Justice Frankfurter's discussion of the different approaches to statutory interpretation.
See Frankfurter, supra note 12.

44. 453 F.2d at 717.
45. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 13(d) (1) (C), 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d) (1) (C)
(1970). The section provides:
[If the purpose of the purchases or prospective purchases is to acquire

control of the business of the issuer of the securities, any plans or proposals
which such persons may have to liquidate such issuer, to sell its assets to or merge
it with any other persons, or to make any other major change in its business or
corporate structure.
46. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 13(d) (6) (D), 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d) (6) (D)
(1970). The section provides in pertinent part:
(6) The provisions of this subsection shall not apply to(D) any acquisition or proposed acquisition of a security which the
Commission, by rules or regulations or by order, shall exempt . . . as not
entered into for the purpose of, and not having the effect of, changing or
influencing the control of the issuer or otherwise as not comprehended within
the purposes of this subsection.
47. Section 13(d)(1) contains subsections (A) to (E) which set forth the
information to be disclosed in a schedule 13D. Securities Exchange Act of 1934
§ 13(d) (1), 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d) (1) (1970). See note 4 supra.
48. The district court in GAF used a similar approach to determine what it
claimed to be the congressionally-intended effect of section 13(d) (3), contrary to
that asserted by the circuit court. The lower court stated that a group's intention
to acquire, hold or sell securities was not the triggering factor for a section 13(d)
filing, but was simply a criterion to be used to determine if a group had been
formed. 324 F. Supp. at 1069. Section 13(d) (3) determined only the types of
"persons" who would come within section 13(d) (1) and those persons would
be
required to file only "after acquiring" securities. Id.

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1972

29

Villanova Law Review, Vol. 17, Iss. 4 [1972], Art. 5

VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 17

However, stronger support for the GAF court's determination of the

"ipurpose" of section 13(d) was found in the congressional committee
reports on the Williams Bill. 49 The reports stated that the Bill's general
purpose was:
[T]o provide for full disclosure in connection with cash tender offers
and other techniques for accumulating large blocks of equity securities of publicly held companies. 50
However, they became relatively specific with respect to section 13(d):
The purpose of section 13(d) is to require disclosure of information by persons who have acquired a substantial interest, or increased their interest in the equity securities of a company by a
substantial amount, within a relatively short period of time. 5 '
Finally, and most convincingly, the reports stated:
The group would be deemed to have become the beneficial owner,
directly or indirectly, of more than 10 percent of a class of securities
at the time they agreed to act in concert. Consequently, the group
would be required to file the information called for in section
13(d) (1) within 10 days after they agree to act together, whether or
52
not any member of the group had acquired any securities at that time.
A reading of these three passages alone would indicate that section 13(d)
was intended solely "to alert the marketplace to . . . a potential shift in
corporate control ' 5 3 and to require a filing upon the formation of a group.
However, the legislative history also stated, as the court conceded in a
footnote, "that the [Bill] was designed for the benefit of investors and not
to tip the balance of regulation either in favor of management or in favor
of the person seeking corporate control. ' 54 This passage, when considered
in conjunction with the purpose of the Act as a whole, justifies a comparative measuring of the various interests involved. Although a purpose
of the Williams Bill may be to assure disclosure of potential changes in
control, 56 the Bill's concentration on full disclosure should be considered
49. S. REP. No. 550, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967) ; H.R. REP. No. 1711, 90th Cong.,
2d Sess. (1968). The use of the legislative history in interpreting section 13(d) appears
justifiable since the statute is unclear. However, the district court found the committee
reports conflicting and thus not available to aid in construing the section. 324 F. Supp.
at 1067. On the other hand, the Second Circuit found the reports to be consistent
and reasoned that a failure to utilize them would shut off the only source of
illumination for the statute. 453 F.2d at 716.
50. S. REP. No. 550, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1967); H.R. REP. No. 1711, 90th
Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1968).
51. S. REP. No. 550, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (1967); H.R. REP. No. 1711, 90th
Cong., 2d Sess. 8 (1968).
52. S. REP. No. 550, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 8 (1967); H.R. REP. No. 1711, 90th
Cong., 2d Sess. 8-9 (1968) (emphasis added).
53. 453 F.2d at 717.
54. Id. at 717 n.16 (emphasis added).
55. See text accompanying note 13 supra.
56. A bill's original purpose may be mellowed or lost in the statute as it is
enacted. Professor Loss, a leading commentator on securities regulation, concluded
that the indicated purpose of section 13(d) had not been incorporated in the statute
as enacted. 453 F.2d at 717 & n.15. Moreover, a recitation of purpose which is not

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol17/iss4/5

30

Editors: Recent Developments

MARCH

1972]

RECENT DEVELOPMENTS

in light of the Act's objective of maintaining "fair markets" without giving
an undue advantage to management or insurgents. The Second Circuit
resolved these conflicting interests as follows:
[W]e are well aware that it was Congress's intention primarily to
protect investors in the security. [T]he statute cannot be faulted if it
achieves this goal without a question, and as a by-product manageaware of those seeking to seize control of the
ment also becomes
57
corporation.
The lower court in GAF made an equally-valid but different resolution
of the balance, 58 limiting disclosure to situations in which there is substantial market activity (where a group makes purchases beyond the two
per cent exemption), a circumstance in which the investor has a great
interest. Requiring disclosure for his protection in such circumstances
would exceed any advantage incumbent management might receive therefrom in resisting a control fight. On the other hand, if the market activity
is slight or non-existent (where a group makes small purchases or holds
for investment), a circumstance in which the investor has little interest,
requiring disclosure would only serve to aid incumbent management and
might deter legitimate attempts to influence company policy. In the
former situation, the interest in protecting investors and maintaining
market integrity would outweigh any advantage to management, which,
accordingly, would not be excessive. In the latter situation, there would
be an advantage only to management since the investor would receive minimal additional protection and market integrity would be jeopardized. Thus,
the alternative resolution would effectuate the purpose of the Williams
Bill only in conjunction with the purpose of the Act as a whole. However, the more important issue is not which of the proffered resolutions is
correct, but whether the court is the proper body to make the resolution.
There would be no abuse of judicial restraint in awaiting a legislative
declaration of the priorities. 59
If the GAF court's determination of the purpose of section 13(d) is
valid, it serves as a legitimate basis for the holding that section 13(d)
requires a filing upon the formation of a group. Indeed, the final argument advanced by the court was based upon this determination of purpose.
The court urged that a different definition of the purpose would nullify the
section's effectiveness. If the statute does not require disclosure upon
formation so as to afford investors the opportunity for timely assessment
apparent on the face of the statute may, if controlling, deprive the public of adequate
notice of what is required to comply with the statute. 324 F. Supp. at 1067-68.
Finally, as Judge Pollack admonished, "we do not legislate by committee report,
we legislate by statute." Id. at 1068. See generally Frankfurter, supra note 12.
57. 453 F.2d at 718 n.19.
58. 324 F. Supp. at 1070.
59. A counterargument might be that a wrong should not go unremedied.
However, since a trial on the merits would be needed to prove the existence of the
wrong, a wise course might be to avoid formulating a broad and sweeping rule
until a more definite record is presented.
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of "the potential for changes in corporate control and [adequate valuation
of] the company's worth," 0 the raison d'9tre of the section would go
unfulfilled. Thus, the court utilized its version of the legislative purpose
for section 13(d) to justify its version of the meaning of the statute.
Although there is a basis for this maneuver,"1 the entire argument appears
cyclical. The court's conclusions are dependent upon each other and thus,
the argument loses its effectiveness if either is incorrect. Moreover, it is
questionable that even the immediate holding will give full effect to the
alleged statutory purpose.
In this regard, some illustrations may indicate the necessity for continued concern over the effectiveness of the section's disclosure requirement. First, the Second Circuit's interpretation still leaves a considerable
amount of non-market activity exempt from the filing requirements of
section 13(d). For example, shareholders owning less than five percent
of a corporation's outstanding shares could form a group without having
to file a schedule 13D until their collective ownership exceeded the
threshold level. As a result, a well-organized group with ample resources
could substantially increase its holdings by market purchases or by
privately-negotiated sales0 2 within the ten day grace period established by
section 13(d) (1). Therefore, a potential or, perhaps, an actual change
in control could arise without a violation of the disclosure requirements.
Clearly, the present holding would not aid the investor in evaluating his
position in this situation, for the "potential" for change would be realized
before any disclosure would have to be made. 63 A second illustration
would be the formation of a group of non-shareholders having similar
plans for the acquisition of control. The potential for a control change in
this situation would seem as real as in the case of a group owning 5.1 per
60. 453 F.2d at 717.
61. The approach is suggested in a very perceptive analysis of section 13(d),
one to which the GAF court made repeated references. See Comment, Section
13(d) and Disclosure of Corporate Equity Ownership, 119 U. PA. L. REv. 853, 876
(1971).
62. Privately-negotiated sales appear to be a relatively unfettered method of
acquiring control. The presence of numerous holders of large blocks of securities,
such as pension funds, foundations and insurance companies, affords the wealthy
control-minded investor an opportunity to acquire control without having to make
prior disclosure. For example, should he negotiate with several such holders on
an individual basis for private sale of their holdings, all transactions to be consummated within a ten day period, he would be required to disclose his ownership
only within ten days after it exceeded the five per cent level. Of course, he would
also be required to comply with other sections, if applicable, such as sections 16(a)
and 13(d) (2). See notes 19 supra & 78 infra. Since large block holders were among
the defendants in Bath, this method of acquisition appears to be far from theoretical.
Bath Indus., Inc. v. Blot, 427 F.2d 97, 103-04 (7th Cir. 1970). However, such
holders generally maintain a neutral policy in control contests. See Note, 71 COLUM.
L. REV. 466, 475-76 (1971).
63. If the plan to acquire control necessitates market purchases, the demand
would be ostensibly reflected in an increase in the market price of the securities.
Although such an effect would increase the expense of obtaining control, it would
also give the investor the impression that his shares were more valuable. However,
since he would be without knowledge of the group's plans, the increased value might
be illusory for the group, upon acquiring control, could foreseeably act in a manner
inimical to the investor's interests.
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cent of the outstanding securities, yet the sub-threshold group (owning
less than five per cent or none at all) could conspire in anonymity without
fear of liability until it owned five per cent. Third, the GAF court's
holding would not require disclosure of the existence of a bad faith group
which had deliberately concealed its formation. Admittedly, no interpretation of section 13(d) would assure disclosure of such a group, but the
present holding may encourage such surreptitious behavior. Since legitimate consultations and voting agreements may make the participating
shareholders a group for the purposes of section 13(d), the resulting disclosure requirement may prompt these shareholders to avoid such situations or simply to conceal the informal combinations.64 Finally, it appears
evident that almost any variation 5 of these situations could occur and
remain outside the statutory requirements.60
Once the Second Circuit determined that the complaint alleged
a section 13(d) violation, it considered whether GAF, as a corporate
issuer, had standing to assert the violation. Two conclusions were made:
(1) GAF had standing to assert an untimely filing claim, 7 and (2) GAF
also had standing to assert a claim of false and misleading statements in
the Milsteins' schedule 13D. 68
The Second Circuit offered substantial support for its conclusion that
GAF had standing to maintain a claim for untimely filing. 69 The court
relied upon cases which had held that a private right of action was avail64. See notes 32 supra & 94 infra.
65. A group owning less than five per cent might be able to avoid filing when
its ownership exceeded the five per cent level, for if its total acquisitions within a
twelve month period were less than two per cent, they would arguably be exempt
under section 13(d) (6) (B). See note 9 supra. On the other hand, section 13(d) (1)
may require a filing whenever ownership exceeds five per cent. The statute is
unclear as to which section would control. The district court alluded to the problem:
Conceivably, Congress may have felt that a first filing - when the group is
formed - is more important to the public than later filings when a small
amount of stock is purchased, but nowhere is it indicated that the legislators
felt one filing is more significant than another. There is simply no statutory
authority for saying that a . . . purchase of not more than 2% is exempt, but
a group must report when it makes no purchases at all.
324 F. Supp. at 1068 (emphasis added).
66. One must remember that the prior interpretations of section 13(d) contain
similar, if not aggravated, defects. This indicates that the statute itself may be
defective. Nevertheless, if the purpose of the statute is to maintain fair and free
markets without undue aid to incumbent management, the statute may be less deficient,
simply because it was not intended to provide for full and complete disclosure but
only increased disclosure. See text accompanying notes 88-92 infra.
67. The court did not expressly state that untimely filing was a violation which
GAF had standing to assert. However, since the court in its initial remarks divided
the complaint into two violations, "failing to file the required statements and . . .
filing false ones" (453 F.2d at 712), but expressly dealt with only the latter in
considering standing, its initial discussion of standing, by implication, must be
considered as a discussion of standing to assert a claim of untimely filing. Id. at 719.
68. Id. at 720.
69. Shareholders and purchasers had previously been given standing under
section 13(d) to bring an action for untimely filing. Sisak v. Wings & Wheels
Express, Inc., [1970-71 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. ff 92,991 (S.D.N.Y.
Sept. 9, 1970); Grow Chem. Corp. v. Uran, 316 F. Supp. 891 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
See notes 24 & 30 supra. But see Ozark Air Lines, Inc. v. Cox, 326 F. Supp. 1113
(E.D. Mo. 1971). See note 26 supra.
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able under the federal securities laws, 7° that an issuer, as a private party,
had standing, 71 and that an issuer had standing under sections 14(d) and
14(e). 7 2 Further, since sections 14(d) and 14(e) were enacted at the
same time as section 13(d), the GAF court reasoned that symmetry de7
manded the extension of standing to an issuer under section 13(d). '
Finally, the court concluded that the issuer's ideal position, both as a
recipient of a schedule 13D 74 and as a sentinel over transactions in its
own securities, made GAF an appropriate party to enforce section 13 (d).75
In regard to its holding that section 13(d) afforded GAF standing
to assert claims of false and misleading filings, the Second Circuit was
without any express precedent, but relied on more esoteric arguments.
The court concluded that:
[T]he securities acts should not be construed technically and restrictively, but "flexibly to effectuate (their) remedial purposes."
With this teaching in mind, we conclude that the obligation to file
truthful statements is implicit in the obligation to file with the issuer,
and a fortiori, the issuer has standing
under section 13(d) to seek
76
relief in the event of a false filing.
To support this conclusion the court stated that false disclosures would
undermine the purpose of the Williams Bill, as well as the Act as a whole,
70. J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964).

stated :

Here the Supreme Court

It appears clear that private parties have a right under § 27 to bring suit
for violation of § 14(a) of the Act. Indeed, this section specifically grants ...
jurisdiction over "all suits in equity and actions at law brought to enforce any

liability or duty created" under the Act.
Id. at 430-31. Although section 14(a) did not expressly grant a private right of
action, the Court further stated that "among its chief purposes [was] 'the protection
of investors,' which certainly implie[d] the availability of judicial relief . .. .
Id. at 432. Thus, it was held that a private party has standing to claim a violation
of section 14(a).
71. Studebaker Corp. v. Gittlin, 360 F.2d 692 (2d Cir. 1966). In Gittlin, a
corporate issuer, threatened with a proxy fight, obtained injunctive relief against a
shareholder who had made untimely filing of proxy materials.
72. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 §§ 14(d), 14(e), 15 U.S.C. §§ 78n(d),
78n(e) (1970). See note 28 supra.
The court cited Electronic Specialty Co. v. International Controls Corp.,
409 F.2d 937 (2d Cir. 1969), wherein a corporate issuer was held to have standing
to assert a claim of inadequate disclosure by one making a tender offer for its shares.
73. 453 F.2d at 719.
74. Id. See note 4 supra. The court suggested that the simple fact that the
issuer received a schedule 13D could alone be sufficient reason to grant standing
to the issuer. Id.
75. Id. Recognizing a possible objection to its conclusion, the court discounted
any suggestion that the holding would tip the balance in favor of incumbent management as against insurgents. It argued that careful scrutiny of management allegations
by the district courts, along with the traditional shareholder remedy for waste, would
obviate any difficulties in this regard. Id. at 719-20. But see note 32 supra.
76. 453 F.2d at 720 (citation omitted and emphasis supplied by the court). In so
stating, the court summarily dismissed the Milsteins' claim "that false filing does
not violate the section that requires the filing . . . but rather the penal provisions
on false filings . . . for] the anti-fraud provisions .... ." Id. False filing claims
had been asserted previously through a provision (section 14(a)) other than the penal
or anti-fraud provisions. See note 70 supra. Thus, the court apparently reasoned
that section 13(d) also implicitly permitted a false filing claim.
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and would often be more harmful than no filing at all. 77 Moreover, the
presence of the requirement in section 13(d) (2) and in rule 13d-2 to
amend a schedule 13D upon the occurrence of a material change in the
facts stated in the schedule suggested to the court that there was an
obligation under section 13(d) to make truthful filings.7 8 Finally, the
argument that the issuer was an ideal plaintiff was repeated. The court
opined that the SEC, in the event of an alleged section 13(d) violation,
was already too overburdened and lacked the issuer's particular expertise
to assert all the proper claims.79 In the court's view, shareholders were
also less than suitable claimants, for they do not have "the necessary background information," the issuer's "immediate access" nor, too frequently,
the necessary incentive to sue. s0
The rationale used by the Second Circuit to afford GAF standing under
section 13(d) is not completely convincing. Although symmetry may
demand the extension of standing to an issuer, such an argument appears
to encroach upon the legislative function. Had Congress so desired, it
could have expressly authorized standing for the issuer under section 13 (d)
as it did under the companion sections regulating tender offers.8 ' The
fact that Congress chose not to act makes any interpretation of its inaction
77. Id. at 720.
78. Id. Section 13(d) (2) states in part:
If any material change occurs in the facts set forth in the statements ...
an amendment shall be transmitted to the issuer and the exchange and . . .
the Commission ....

Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 13(d)(2), 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d)(2)

(1970).

Rule 13d-2 states in part:
If any material change occurs in the facts set forth in the statement . . .
the person who filed such statement shall promptly file with the Commission
and send to the issuer and the exchange an amendment disclosing such change
SEC Rule 13d-2, 17 C.F.R. § 240.13d-2 (Supp. 1971).
Although the court may be correct in the inference drawn from section
13(d) (2) that section 13(d) obligates one to truthful filing, this inference lends
only indirect support for granting the issuer standing to claim a false and misleading
filing. Rather, such an inference indicates only a type of section 13(d) violation
and not the parties having standing to assert that violation. Moreover, it is uncertain
whether a "material change" includes increasing one's ownership by less than two
per cent of the outstanding shares as was allegedly done by the Milsteins here.
But cf. 453 F.2d at 721 n.2 3.
79. Id. at 721.
80. Id. In its reference to the unsuitability of shareholders as plaintiffs, the
GAF court implied that the standing it afforded the issuer under section 13(d)
did not extend to shareholders. However, it is arguable that if the issuer need not
demonstrate its reliance on an alleged violation in order to assert a claim, shareholders
should not be required to either, for the holding and its apparent rationale - " 'private
enforcement . . . [as] a necessary supplement to Commission action' " - indicate
that compliance with the traditional elements of shareholder standing should not be
required to enforce securities regulations. Id. See Rosenblatt v. Northwest Airlines,
Inc., 435 F.2d 1121, 1124 (2d Cir. 1971).
81. The court, in passing, attempted to refute this argument. 453 F.2d at 720
n.22. It asserted that section 14(e) was the result of "a clear need for an anti-fraud
provision," whereas a section 13 (d) false filing, not having so widespread an effect
as a section 14(d) violation, did not compel an express standing provision. Id.
Notwithstanding the court's assessment, congressional silence could as easily indicate
an intention to prevent the use of section 13(d) in a contest for corporate control,
and in any event, silence alone cannot be given conclusive weight.
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highly speculative.82 Additional doubt as to the wisdom of the holding is
prompted by the paucity of precedent for upholding an issuer's standing
under section 13(d) alone.83 Even with the noblest judicial "teachings"
as guides, it is submitted that courts should not assume a law-making
8 4
role absent clearly-compelling circumstances.
Furthermore, it is not readily apparent that the issuer's "unquestionably . . . [ideal] position to enforce section 13(d)" 8 5 mandated the

extension of standing to GAF. Simply asserting (convincingly or not)
that the SEC and shareholders are not always in a position to enforce
the section 8 does not demonstrate that the issuer has been granted standing. This, at most, merely suggests that standing for the issuer might
have been intended in order to give the section its full effect. The only
implication raised by the court's approach was that Congress may have
favored the extension of standing to the issuer under section 13(d).87
However, there are substantial indications that Congress, on the
contrary, disproved such a result. For example, the legislative history
affirmatively demonstrates that Congress intended not to entrench incumbent management by enacting section 13(d).88 Further, the inference
is permissible that the section was only intended to supplement the extensive regulatory scheme of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and,
accordingly, was to be implemented in conjunction with the Act's emphasis on maintaining "free and fairly functioning markets. '8 9 Thus, the
section's objective of providing the investor with increased information
would be tempered so as not to upset the market equilibrium established
by the Act as a whole. Therefore, it is arguable that the new provision
was intended to be enforced with complete objectivity. Certainly, it was
not enacted to provide an added weapon for any of the competing interests
in a corporate control contest. 0
Moreover, the reluctance of other courts to grant the issuer standing
under section 10(b) raises doubts as to the validity of the Second Cir82. See Frankfurter, supra note 12, at 539.
83. The Bath decision is apparently the only other instance in which an issuer
had been granted standing, yet in that case the standing question was not raised.
Bath Indus., Inc. v. Blot, 427 F.2d 97 (7th Cir. 1970).
84. The instant case may very well lack compelling circumstances. See note 6
supra.
85. 453 F.2d at 719.
86. The shareholder may not be such a disparate plaintiff. See note 80 supra.
87. See Frankfurter, supra note 12, at 539.
88. S. REP. No. 550, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 3-4 (1967) ; H.R. REP. No. 1711,
90th Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1968) ; 113 CONG. REC. 856, 24664 (1967) (remarks of
Senator Williams).
89. GAF Corp. v. Milstein, 324 F. Supp. 1062, 1069 (S.D.N.Y. 1971). See
text accompanying note 13 supra. Admittedly, this approach is also based upon
speculation.
90. The district court apparently applied a similar "balancing of interests"
rationale to justify its definition of acquisition. 324 F. Supp. at 1070. See text
following note 58 supra. Since the lower court concluded that the Williams Bill
was intended only to require disclosure after substantial non-exempt acquisitions
achieved through market purchases or tender offers, it differed with the Second
Circuit as to the purpose of the Bill and whether that purpose was superior to the
purpose of the Act as a whole.
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cuit's grant of standing under section 13(d). In this regard, the GAF
court's own hesitancy "to open the door to issuers ...

seeking more than

'injunction' relief" 91 in a section 10(b) action, but its willingness to
grant the issuer standing under section 13(d) seems somewhat incongruous. If the denial of section 10(b) standing has been based upon the
fear that issuers, out of self-interest, might abuse such standing, the present holding does not allay these fears and, unfortunately, makes section
92
13 (d) susceptible to the same abuses.
Despite the aforementioned deficiencies, the GAF holding will have
a considerable impact in the field of securities regulation. The interpre93
tation of section 13(d) as requiring a group to file upon formation
will apply to nearly all combinations collectively owning five per cent
or more of a class of an issuer's securities. Thus, there should be few
instances in which the investor will have to make his securities decisions
in ignorance of such a group's existence or of its plans. 94 Admittedly, the
holding will be difficult for the trial courts to implement, for determining
the time of a group's formation, in particular, appears much like "an
attempt to grasp quicksilver." 95 Nevertheless, these difficulties seem
minor when compared with the holding's effect of increasing public awareness of potential changes in corporate control. Undoubtedly, certain
groups, such as foundations and other traditional holders of large blocks
of securities, may object to the increased disclosure. Nevertheless, such
objections are not sufficient to limit the applicability of the instant holding
but, rather, call for SEC action in establishing any necessary exemptions
under section 13(d).96

However, the greatest impact of the instant case in the securities field
should be from the Second Circuit's grant of standing to an issuer to
assert a claim of false and misleading section 13(d) filings. This extension of standing has significantly expanded the number of potential
plaintiffs under section 13(d) and appears to be a legitimate precedent
for like extension of similar provisions of the Securities Exchange Act.
In the same vein, the GAF court has expanded the relief available to
potential plaintiffs under section 13 (d) and, perhaps, under other reporting
91. 453 F.2d at 722.
92. See note 32 supra.
93. See text accompanying notes 31-37 supra.
94. There is some uncertainty as to the inclusiveness of the court's holding.
In response to the Milsteins' contention that the holding would include more groups
than the court intended, the court asserted that management groups customarily
are not formed to acquire, to hold or to dispose of the issuer's securities and, thus,
they would be exempt from filing. 453 F.2d at 719. Also, the court implied that
the only situation in which management groups might be required to file would be
after express agreements to pool their interests. Id. at 719 n.20. However, these
responses appear inappropriate in light of the purported legislative intent to require
the disclosure of the existence of all groups. Moreover, it is arguable that the
broad purposes of "acquiring, holding or disposing" would encompass the formation
of any management group.
95. 324 F. Supp. at 1068.
96. The SEC has the power to exempt certain acquisitions from the disclosure
requirements. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 13(d) (6) (D), 15 U.S.C. §
78m(d) (6) (D) (1970). See note 46 supra.
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provisions, since false and misleading, as well as untimely, filings were
deemed violative of section 13(d). It is apparent that future "fraud"
violations, at least under section 13(d), may be asserted without relying
on the traditional "fraud" section, section 10(b), and its more restrictive
standing requirements 7 Although the court's holding is a colorable and
logical extension of prior judicial pronouncements, the extension may
be unwarranted. Considering the dangers inherent in granting an issuer
standing and the difficulties of making the rule workable, the GAF
court may well have crossed the fine line betwen permissible statutory
interpretation and the power to legislate.
Overall, GAF has made considerable progress toward realization
of the legislative goal of assuring full disclosure of corporate equity
ownership. Unfortunately, the deficiencies of the holding and of the
opinion, along with those of the statute itself, portend many subsequent
judicial encounters with section 13(d) before the goal is achieved.
Stephen D. Ford

LABOR LAW -

PUBLIC EMPLOYEES

-

NON-CIVIL SERVICE EMPLOYEES

ARE EMPLOYEES AT WILL AND MAY BE SUMMARILY DISCHARGED
ON ACCOUNT OF POLITICAL ASSOCIATION.

American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees
v. Shapp (Pa. 1971)
Plaintiffs, three employees of the Pennsylvania Department of Transportation' and an AFL-CIO union claiming to represent 5,000 transportation department workers, brought an action in the commonwealth court 2
against both the Governor of Pennsylvania and the Secretary of Trans97. See note 10 supra.
1. The Pennsylvania Civil Service Law of 1941, PA. STAT. tit. 71, §§ 741.1 et seq.
(1962), gives all employees included therein certain rights and protections, especially
in regard to hiring, promotion and discharge. These include: hiring and promotion
principally on the basis of test scores, PA. STAT. tit. 71, §§ 741.601 to 741.602
suspension without pay for disciplinary reasons only, PA. STAT. tit. 71,
PA. STAT. tit. 71, § 741.807(a)
(1962). Moreover, religion, race or party affiliation are specifically excluded as
proper reasons for discharge. Id.
The employees here, however, were not covered by the Act since they were
classified under the category "unskilled labor." PA. STAT. tit. 71, § 741.3(w) (Supp.
1971). Therefore, whatever statutory protection plaintiffs enjoyed came from the
Pennsylvania Public Employe Relations Act, PA. STAT. tit. 71, §§ 1101.101 et seq.
(Supp. 1971). See notes 22 & 87 infra.
2. The Commonwealth Court has original jurisdiction over civil actions brought
against the Commonwealth itself or against one of its officers, acting in his official
capacity, with two exceptions neither of which applies here. One exception is for
a writ of habeas corpus or post-conviction relief; the other is for proceedings under
the Eminent Domain Code. PA. STAT. tit. 17, § 211.401 (a) (1) (Supp. 1971).
(1962);

§ 741.803 (1962) ; discharge only for "just cause,"
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portation, seeking a preliminary injunction to prevent the workers' discharge solely because of their political affiliation with the Republican
party. The plaintiffs' theory was that although they were hired on
account of their political affiliation, this factor in itself was an unconstitutional basis for discharge,8 as a violation of the employees' rights of
freedom of association, and rights of equal protection and due process.
The commonwealth court heard argument on April 21, 1971, but
did not issue an injunction until May 10, during which time plaintiffs
and 2,000 other employees were discharged. The injunction provided
that the status quo as of May 10 remain; that is, there should be no
further termination of employment without notice and a hearing, and
employees whose employment had been terminated after April 21 must
be given an opportunity for rehiring as vacancies arose.4
In a 4 to 3 decision, the Pennsylvania supreme court reversed the
commonwealth court, holding that the Governor has the power to hire
and fire at will all employees not protected by the Civil Service Act
"irrespective of their ability, their politics or their political connections." 5
Moreover, the court held that the plaintiffs were denied no constitutional
rights by such politically motivated firings. American Federation of State,
County and Municipal Employees v. Shapp, 443 Pa. 527, 280 A.2d 375
(1971).
The state of the law regarding the rights of public employees has
changed substantially since the time of Justice Holmes, when the established view was that the government, if acting in a proprietary capacity,
could treat its employees as if it were a private employer. 6 Therefore,
government employment was considered a privilege held at the will of the
employer, and without the constitutional rights associated with citizenship
3. The reason given for the dismissal of the employees was that "when they
were hired they were sponsored for their employment by officials of the Republican
Party .... ." American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees v.
Shapp, 443 Pa. 527, 537 n.1, 280 A.2d 375, 379 n.1 (1971). The majority treats the
stipulation as an admission that political reasons were the basis of hiring; the
dissent does not.
4. Id. at 532, 280 A.2d at 376. The court contended that this May 10 order
was in effect a preliminary injunction; yet it hardly maintained the status quo that
existed at the time of the suit's inception. The May 10 order was useful, however, to
the extent that it enjoined the Commonwealth from continued firings of transportation
workers until the instant court dissolved the injunction.
5. Id. at 536, 280 A.2d at 378.
6. Justice Holmes, in McAuliff v. Mayor of New Bedford, 155 Mass. 216,
220, 29 N.E. 517, 518 (1892), wrote:
The petitioner may have a constitutional right to talk politics, but he has no
constitutional right to be a policeman. There are few employments for hire in
which the servant does not agree to suspend his constitutional right of free
speech, as well as his idleness, by the implied terms of his contract. The servant
cannot complain, as he takes the employment on the terms which are offered him.
But see Slochower v. Board of Educ., 350 U.S. 551, 555 (1955), wherein Mr.
Justice Clark stated:
To state that a person does not have a constitutional right to government
employment is only to say that he must comply with reasonable, lawful, and
nondiscriminatory terms laid down by the proper authorities.
See Van Alstyne, The Constitutional Rights of Public Employees: A Comment on
the Inappropriate Uses of an Old Analogy, 16 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 751 (1969).

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1972

39

Villanova Law Review, Vol. 17, Iss. 4 [1972], Art. 5

VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW

[VOL.

17

in terms of an employer-employee relationship with the government.
While the United States Supreme Court has ruled on other questions
related to public employment, neither that Court nor the Pennsylvania
supreme court has ever ruled on the constitutionality of the "spoils
system" - a government employment system based on political patronage.
The United States Supreme Court has rejected the theory that public
employment "may be conditioned upon surrender of constitutional rights
which could not be abridged by direct government action." 7 In the area
of first amendment rights, the Court has held that government may regulate
in the area only with narrow specificity. 8 For example, the Supreme
Court has held that public employees retain their first amendment right
to comment upon matters of public concern without fear of job loss. 9
Finally, in dealing with the question of discharge from public employment,
the Court has stated that "constitutional protection does extend to the public
servant whose exclusion . . . is patently arbitrary or discriminatory."' 0

In the instant case, the Pennsylvania supreme court first sought to
determine whether there were some "apparently reasonable grounds as
well as pertinent legal principles to support the preliminary injunction.""
The court reasoned that absent such grounds the injunction could not be
left standing. However, the court then framed the issue so as to eliminate
any reasonable claim by premising the question on the belief that the
plaintiffs had no constitutional or statutory protection from discharge.
The court wrote:
The basic issue boils down to this: Can the Governor of Pennsylvania
discharge at will any and every employee of our State Government
who is not protected from discharge (a) by the Constitutional provision of procedural Due Process, with a right to notice and a hearing,
or (b) by any other provision of the Constitution, or (c) by any
Federal Statute, including the Civil Rights Act and the Voting Rights
Act, or (d) by any State Statute, including Civil Service Statutes
and the Public Employe Relations Act ?12
7. Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 705 (1967).
8. Button v. NAACP, 371 U.S. 415, 433 (1963).
9. Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563 (1968). See Leahy, The Public
Employee and the First Amendment - Must He Sacrifice His Civil Rights To Be a
Civil Servant, 4 CALIF. W.L. REv. 1 (1968).

10. Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183, 192 (1952).
11. 443 Pa. at 533, 280 A.2d at 377. This requirement is a necessary prerequisite under Pennsylvania law for the granting of a preliminary injunction. See
Community Sports, Inc. v. Denver Ringsby Rockets, Inc., 429 Pa. 565, 240 A.2d 832
(1968). To obtain a preliminary injunction, the proponent must also prove the
necessity of preventing immediate and irreparable harm which would not be compensated by damages, greater injury in refusing the injunction than granting it, and
the need to preserve the status quo until a final determination is made. Alabama
Binder & Chem. Corp. v. Pa. Indus. Chem. Corp., 410 Pa. 214, 189 A.2d 180 (1963).
12. 443 Pa. at 533, 280 A.2d at 377 (emphasis added). To phrase an issue in
such a way would tend to make a reader suspicious of the reasoning to follow.
In framing the question in this way, the court assumed that the plaintiffs had no
statutory or constitutional claim, which in fact was the real issue in the case.
Therefore, the court in actuality was not framing a question, but stating their
conclusion, for if the issue was as the court stated it, even the plaintiffs would agree
that the court reached the correct decision under the law.
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Without such protection the plaintiffs would have no claim, but of course
the existence of such a claim is the essence of the case. It was the court's
premise that the settled principle regarding public employment is that
absent controlling legislation, a public employer can summarily discharge
employees. 13 To support this proposition, the court cited Cafeteria Workers
Local 473 v. McElroy'4 which, according to the court, upholds the government's freedom to terminate employment at will. In Scott v. Philadelphia
Parking Authority,15 the Pennsylvania supreme court held that non-Civil
Service employees were employees-at-will and took their jobs subject to
summary removal. 16 The court stated that the policy for such a position
was set in the Mitchell v. Chester Housing Authority case, 17 wherein it
held that the proper functioning of government required agencies to be
responsive to the elected representatives of the public so that a proper
chain of responsibility could be established.' 8
Having established the status of such employees, the court stated that
patronage employees have no constitutional or statutory claim when they
are fired on political grounds. 19 The court supported its holding with
respect to statutory protection by examining the appropriate sections of
the Voting Rights Act, 20 the Civil Rights Act of 187121 and the Pennsylvania Public Employe Relations Act of 1970,22 and concluded that
13. 443 Pa. at 534, 280 A.2d at 377.
14. 367 U.S. 886 (1961). Compare Vitarelli v. Seaton, 359 U.S. 535 (1959).
In Vitarelli, the Court prevented the summary discharge of an Interior Department
employee, although upholding the principle of summary discharge of non-civil
service employees. The discharge was not proper because the department did not
conform with procedure it had established for such cases. Id. at 539.
15. 402 Pa. 151, 166 A.2d 278 (1960).
16. Id. at 154, 166 A.2d at 280.
17. 389 Pa. 314, 132 A.2d 873 (1957).
18. Id. at 328, 132 A.2d at 880.
19. 443 Pa. at 534, 280 A.2d at 377.
20. Act of May 31, 1870, ch. 114, § 1, 16 Stat. 140, codified in 42 U.S.C. § 1971
(1970). It is the court's contention that the Voting Rights Act is not here appropriate

because the aim of that legislation was to make sure that no qualified voter would

be deprived of that privilege on account of race or color or hindered in its exercise
because of any form of intimidation. 443 Pa. at 535, 280 A.2d at 378. If that is
the extent of a claim under that statute, then there would seem to be no grounds
here for its application. Certainly, the court has correctly stated the statute's
original purpose and use until the present time.

21. Act of April 20, 1871, ch. 22, § 1, 17 Stat. 13, codified in 42 U.S.C. § 1983

(1970). Section one of this Act provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage, or any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen
of the United States or any other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the
deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution
and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in
equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
22. The Pennsylvania Public Employe Relations Act of 1970, PA. STAT. tit. 43,
§ 1101.701 (Supp. 1971), provides:
Collective bargaining is the performance of the mutual obligation of the
public employe and the representative of the public employes to meet at reasonable
times and confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours and other terms
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"[i]t is clear ...these plaintiffs do not come within the provisions or
protections of any of the aforesaid Acts. '23 It was the court's opinion
that, in effect, the question of the limits of political patronage is a legislative
question. Therefore, since no reasonable basis in law for the issuance of
the injunction was presented, 24 the commonwealth court was reversed.
The applicability of the three cases cited by the majority was questioned, with some merit, by the dissent. 25 The Scott and Mitchell cases
both concerned employees in positions of policy implementation, if not
actual policy making.2 6 Consequently, the principle established in Mitchell
and reiterated in Scott seems both proper and necessary since to argue
otherwise would mean that men at the very top in the administrative
hierarchy who oppose the new board or chief executive would nonetheless
be the men who would form and implement much of the policy with which
they disagree. As Mitchell stressed, the essence of the day-to-day operations of their jobs involves policy and politics, and, certainly, removal for
political reasons is not only proper, but perhaps necessary for a smoothly
functioning government. 27 Such men are employees-at-will because of the
very nature of their positions. The plaintiffs here, however, are semiskilled or unskilled workers, whose job is simply to maintain public
highways. Thus, the applicability and rationale of the Mitchell and Scott
decisions seems to be strained. The Mitchell doctrine is not appropriate
here since the plaintiffs are not policy implementors in any sense. Few
administrations differ on the basic principle that road maintenance is
necessary within the Commonwealth, so that policy would not change with
changes in administration. On the level of the employees in question,
and conditions of employment, or the negotiation of an agreement or any
question arising thereunder ....

But see PA. STAT. tit. 43, § 1101.101 (Supp. 1971), where the stated public policy
behind the Act was:
[T]o promote orderly and constructive relationships between all public employers
and their employes subject, however, to the paramount right of the citizens of
this Commonwealth to keep inviolate the guarantees for their health, safety
and welfare.
See note 87 infra.

23. 443 Pa. at 536, 280 A.2d at 378. The court makes that statement after
the citing of the statutes, without explanation or reasoning or authority as to why
these are not appropriate. Moreover, the question of first amendment rights is
not discussed at all.
24. Id. at 536, 280 A.2d at 378.
25. Id. at 538-39, 542-43, 280 A.2d at 379-80, 381-82 (Barbieri, J., dissenting).
26. Mitchell and Scott were the heads of the Chester Housing Authority
and Philadelphia Parking Authority, respectively. It is a stipulation in the instant
case that the employees occupy "non-policy making positions." Id. at 538 n.2, 280
A.2d at 379 n.2.
27. In Mitchell, the court wrote:
[Glood administration requires that the personnel in charge of implementing
the policies of an agency be responsible to, and responsive to those charged
with the policy-making function, who in turn are responsible to a higher
governmental authority, or to the public itself, whichever selected them. This
chain of responsibility is the basic check on government possessed by the public
at large.
389 Pa. at 328, 132 A.2d at 880. In Scott, the court added to the above statement:
"[Tihe power to dismiss summarily is the assurance of such responsibility." 402
Pa. at 154, 166 A.2d at 280-81.
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only incompetence or inefficiency would change the policy "implementation"
and no one contends that such reasons would not be reasonable grounds
for removal. It would seem, therefore, that the policy considerations
stressed in Mitchell in no way compel the applicability of the same standard
of employment for both directors and highway repairmen, and the use
of such a standard in the present context is both unwarranted and
unsupportable.
The court's reliance upon Cafeteria Workers is also open to question.
The plaintiff in that case was a short order cook who, working on a
Naval base for a private employer, was refused a security badge and
therefore was not allowed to enter the base. 28 The contract between the
Government and the private employer reserved to the security officer the
right to determine who met security regulations. Further, the contract
provided that the employer could not engage employees at the base if
they did not meet the security standards. The United States Supreme
Court upheld the Government's action even though it did not provide a
hearing or statement of the reasons for its denial of security clearance. 29
While the Cafeteria Workers decision gives some support to summary
discharge from government employment, it has only limited applicability
to the precise question in the instant case. First, the rights of public
employees were not in issue in Cafeteria Workers;3° and second, the
only question was the plaintiff's continued employment at a particular
base for security reasons.3 1 Moreover, Mr. Justice Stewart, writing for
the Court, acknowledged that the Government does not have the freedom
of action of private employers in such matters, and concluded:
We may assume [the discharged employee] could not constitutionally
have been excluded from the Gun Factory if the announced grounds
for her exclusion has been patently arbitrary or discriminatory that she could 8not
have been kept out because she was a Democrat
2
or a Methodist.
Further, Justice Brennan in his dissent wrote:
In other words, if petitioner's badge had been lifted avowedly on
grounds of her race, religion or political opinions, the Court would
concede that some constitutionally protected interest . . . had been
83

injured.

28. 367 U.S. at 887-88.
29. The Court, per Mr. Justice Stewart, stated:
It has become a settled principle that government employment, in the absence
of legislation, can be revoked at the will of the appointing officer.
Id. at 896-97.
30. Id. at 888.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 898. Justice Stewart also stated:
In United Public Workers the Court observed that: "[N]one would deny"
that "Congress may not 'enact a regulation providing that no Republican, Jew
or Negro shall be appointed to federal office, or that no federal employee shall
attend Mass or take any active part in missionary work.'"
Id. at 897 (citation omitted).
33. Id. at 900 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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Even if the court was correct in its view that Cafeteria Workers applies
to the instant situation, it does not follow that the court's interpretation
of that decision was well founded. A totally plausible interpretation might
be that under certain circumstances persons may be denied employment
for a rational reason or, perhaps, no reason, but that the government
cannot so act for a stated "wrong" reason. The Cafeteria Workers Court
itself acknowledged that a "wrong" reason for exclusion would encompass
political party affiliation and religious preference, and possibly, therefore,
any reason which infringed upon a constitutionally protected right or one
which was based on essentially discriminatory grounds. 3 4 In the present
case, the stipulated reason for discharge was political affiliation expressly stated to be an impermissible basis for removal by the Cafeteria
Workers Court.3 5

Finally, the court, in contending that the plaintiffs were denied neither
statutory nor constitutional rights, may have erred in light of recent
decisions in this area. Notably, the court never adequately discussed the
questions relating to the denial of the plaintiffs' first amendment right
of freedom of association, fourteenth amendment rights of due process
and equal protection, and civil rights under the Civil Rights Act of 1871. 36
There is no doubt that actions of the Governor constitute state action
so as to make these federal guarantees applicable to the Commonwealth
under the fourteenth amendment.3 7 Consequently, his actions must be
consistent with applicable constitutional guarantees.38 Thus, the problem
is whether these discharges, based on political party membership, violated
the petitioners' constitutional rights.
The Supreme Court in NAACP v. Alabama39 discussed the right of
freedom of association under the first and fourteenth amendments, stating:
Effective advocacy of both public and private points of view, particularly controversial ones, is undeniably enhanced by group association,
34. Id. at 897-98.
35. Id.
36. See note 21 supra.
37. See Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339 (1879). There, the Court stated:
[T]he prohibitions of the Fourteenth Amendment are addressed to the
states . . . They have reference to actions of the political body denominated

a state, by whatever instruments or in whatever modes that action may be
taken. A State acts by its legislative, its executive, or its judicial authorities.
It can act in no other way . . . . Whoever, by virtue of public position under
a State government, deprives another of property, life, or liberty, without due
process of law, or denies or takes away the equal protection of the laws, violates
the constitutional inhibition; and as he acts in the name and for the State,
and is clothed with the State's power, his act is that of the State. This must
be so, or the constitutional prohibition has no meaning. Then the state has
clothed one of its agents with power to annul or to evade it . . . . State
legislation must act upon persons, not upon the abstract thing denominated a
State, but upon the persons who are agents of the State in the denial of the
rights which were intended to be secured.
Id. at 346-47. See also United States v. Harris, 106 U.S. 629 (1882).
38. In Uniformed Sanitation Men Ass'n v. Commissioner of Sanitation, 392
U.S. 280 (1968), Mr. Justice Fortas wrote that "[p]etitioners as public employees
are entitled, like other persons, to the benefit of the Constitution . .." Id. at 284-85.
See note 7 and accompanying text supra.
39. 357 U.S. 449 (1958).
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as this Court has more than once recognized by remarking upon the
close nexus between the freedoms of speech and assembly. It is
beyond debate that freedom to engage in association for the advancement of beliefs and ideas is an inseparable aspect of the "liberty"
assured by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,
which embraces freedom of speech. Of course, it is immaterial whether
the beliefs sought to be advanced by association pertain to political,
economic, religious or cultural matters, and state action which may
have the effect of curtailing the freedom to associate is subject to
the closest scrutiny.40
Moreover, the Court has reinforced this position with regard to the right
of political association by specifically declaring that "the right of individuals
to associate for the advancement of political beliefs . ..rank[s] among
our most precious freedoms." 4 1 Therefore, it is clear in the context of the
present case that the plaintiffs have the constitutional right of association,
specifically "for the advancement of political beliefs." Therefore, it must
be determined whether the state, consistent with the first and fourteenth
amendments, may limit this freedom when individuals become public
employees.
The Court in United States v. Robel42 had an opportunity to rule on
the question of the Government's right to discharge a public employee on
account of his political association. In that case, Robel, a Communist
Party member employed by a shipyard which handled government work,
was discharged under section 5(a) (1) (D) of the Subversive Activities
Control Act of 1950.4 ' The Court declared that section unconstitutional

as a violation of freedom of association, stating:
But the operative fact upon which the job disability depends is the
exercise of an individual's right of association, which is protected
by the provisions of the First Amendment .... Thus, § 5(a) (1) (D)

contains the fatal defect of overbreadth because it seeks to bar employment both for association which may not be proscribed consistently
with First Amendment rights .
4
not tolerate.

.

.

. This the Constitution will

40. Id. at 460-61 (footnotes omitted).
41. Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 30 (1968).
42. 389 U.S. 258 (1967). It is submitted that an argument may be made that
the "national security" cases are not controlling in the instant case on the basis that
the effects of the state actions in each differed. In the national security cases,
the effect of the governmental action was to brand an individual a Communist, while
in the instant case the plaintiffs were fired not so much to label them Republicans,
but to make room for Democrats in patronage jobs.
43. Subversive Activities Control Act of 1950, § 5(a) (1) (D), ch. 1024, tit. I,
§ 5, 64 Stat. 992, as amended, 50 U.S.C. § 784(a) (1) (D) (1970). This statute,
in force at the time of the Robel decision, provided:
When a Communist organization . .. is registered or there is in effect a
final order of the Board requiring such organization to register, it shall be
unlawful for any member of such organization, with knowledge or notice that
such organization is so registered or that such order has become final if such
an organization is a Communist-action organization, to engage in any employment
in any defense facility.
44. 389 U.S. at 263, 266. Justice Brennan, concurring in Robel, stated:
Since employment opportunities are denied by 5(a) (1) (D) simply' on the
basis of political associations the statute also has the potential of curtailing free
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This language indicates that the state may not use political membership
as a basis for discharge from public employment in all cases; but, a certain
type of associational tie may serve as a proper basis for discharge.
Again, in Bates v. City of Little Rock 45 the Court held that "[w] here
there is a significant encroachment upon personal liberty, the State may
prevail only upon showing a subordinate interest which is compelling." 48
When the individual's freedom of association has conflicted with the
state's right to discharge an employee for his political association, the
Court has held that to sustain such a discharge the state must show that
the individual's membership was a "clear and present danger to a substantial interest of the State." 47 These guidelines were applied by the
Court in Robel so as to reject the Government's claim of a compelling
state interest in denying to Communist Party members the right to work
in a defense plant, and in Elfbrandt v. Russell,48 the right to teach in public
schools. In the instant case, the legitimate state interest the Commonwealth was seeking to uphold was never stated, but on the facts it is
doubtful, in light of the above examples, that any such "compelling"
interest could be found. Certainly, in attempting to exclude Robel and
Elfbrandt, the state could at least attempt to argue in terms of national
security. In the instant case, however, the discharge of employees from
their non-policy making positions on the ground that some substantial
state interest was served by the exclusion of Republicans from such
positions would seem clearly unsupportable.
The next question, also largely ignored by the court, was whether
the plaintiffs were denied due process under the fourteenth amendment.
Due process is an elusive concept, difficult to define apart from the
particular context in which it is to be applied. 49 In the area of public
expression by inhibiting persons from establishing or retaining such associations.
Id. at 270.
45. 361 U.S. 516 (1960).
46. Id. at 524.
47. Elfbrandt v. Russell, 384 U.S. 11, 18 (1966). Although the standard is
not an easy one to sustain, the Supreme Court recently, in Connell v. Higginbotham,
403 U.S. 207 (1971), upheld a state loyalty oath as a condition of public employment.
Mr. Justice Marshall wrote in concurrence:
Such a forward-looking promissory oath of constitutional support does
not in my view offend the First Amendment's command that the grant or denial
of governmental benefits cannot be made to turn on the political viewpoints or
affiliations of a would-be beneficiary.
Id. at 209. Similarly, in Law Students Civil Rights Research Council v. Wadmond,
401 U.S. 154 (1971), the Court upheld the right of a state to require an applicant
to the bar to affirm that he will support the United States and New York state
constitutions.
48. 384 U.S. 11 (1966). The Robel analysis has been upheld as it applied to
the states, by not allowing the state to exclude a person from employment only on
the basis of association. Baird v. State Bar, 401 U.S. 1 (1971) ; Keyishian v.
Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589 (1967). Another recent case has held that the
overbroad type of inquiries involved therein denied first amendment rights to the
petitioners because the result of such actions was to discourage other citizens from
the exercise of those same freedoms. In re Stolar, 401 U.S. 23 (1971). See Shelton
v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 485 (1960).
49. The notion of due process, as applicable here, is two-fold. First, there is
the procedural aspect; that is, the right to receive proper notice and the right to
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employment, the Supreme Court has held that substantive due process
means that the reason for dismissal must bear a reasonable relation to the
employee's "fitness or competence"50 to perform a specific job. In other
words, there must be a rational connection between the reason for dismissal - Republican Party membership - and the "fitness or competence"
of the employee for the particular job - here, unskilled work performed
under the direction of the transportation department. Similarly, Mr.
Justice Black, in reversing the denial of an application to take a bar
examination because of Communist Party affiliation, wrote:
[Alny qualification must have a rational connection with the applicant's fitness or capacity to practice law ....

[A]n applicant would

not be excluded merely because he was a Republican, or a Negro,
or a member of a particular church. 5'
Likewise, lower federal courts have held that dismissal of homosexuals
from government employment violated due process absent a showing that
homosexuality related to "occupational competence or fitness." 52 In the
have a hearing. The other is substantive, which focuses on the reasons for the
action taken. The important question there is whether the decision was arbitrary.
Such is not an easy decision for the courts. As one court wrote:
Discretionary power does not carry with it the right to its arbitrary exercise.

Otherwise the existence of the power itself would encounter grave constitutional
doubts. .

.

. What is arbitrary, however, in the sense of constituting a denial

of due process, depends upon circumstances.
Shactman v. Dulles, 225 F.2d 938, 941 (D.C. Cir. 1955).
50. Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 485 (1960). There, an Arkansas statute

allowed the school board to require teachers to state all their associational ties. The
board then used this list in deciding whether to retain such teachers, none of
whom had tenure. The Court ruled that such interference with freedom of
association infringed upon due process since there was no legitimate reason for
such an inquiry beyond those factors which related to a teacher's "fitness and
competence."
51. Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, 353 U.S. 232, 239 (1957). In Schware,
the New Mexico board refused to allow the petitioner the right to take the bar
examination because he had previously been a Communist Party member, had been
arrested, and had used aliases. The Supreme Court, in reversing the board's decision,
was of the opinion that in the context of violating due process, the traditional
dichotomy between a "right" and a "privilege" to practice law was meaningless.
Mr. Justice Black wrote: "[Ilt is sufficient to say that a person cannot be prevented
from practicing except for valid reasons." Id. at 239 n.5.
52. Scott v. Macy, 349 F.2d 182, 185 (D.C. Cir. 1965). In Scott, the Civil Service
Commission refused to allow the petitioner to make application for a federal job
on the basis of his prior, although unspecified, "immoral" conduct. The action
of the Commission was voided by a majority of the court. The minority opinion
written by then Circuit Judge (now Chief Justice) Burger was based on the court's
prior opinion in Dew v. Halaby, 317 F.2d 582 (D.C. Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 379
U.S. 951 (1964), which dealt with a similar situation. The Government there tried
to use the pre-employment homosexual acts of the employee as basis for dismissal
from his job as an air traffic controller. The court upheld the dismissal on the
grounds that it was not arbitrary since given the nature of the position and the
nature of the employee's prior conduct there was sufficient proof that be lacked
the needed "skill, alertness and responsibility" necessary. Id. The court concluded that "[fun considering whether the plaintiff's removal was arbitrary and
capricious we cannot ignore the nature of the appellant's duties." Id. at 587. So
even though the specific result differed, the difference on the face of the decision
would seem to be a factual one rather than a conceptual one in that both courts
recognized and utilized the same standard in determining the final result.
Likewise, in Adams v. Laird, 420 F.2d 230 (D.C. Cir. 1969), cert. denied,

397 U.S. 1039 (1970), although the court refused to give the employee-homosexual
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instant case, no such showing appears in the record,5 3 and it is doubtful
that any could be found since political party membership bears no relation
at all to the unskilled, non-policy making position in question. Moreover,
54
the Commonwealth seems to have specifically violated the Schware
rationale by using a stated prohibited reason for the dismissal. The
instant court's reluctance to apply the fourteenth amendment's prohibitions
did not end with the due process clause, for it also failed to shed any light
on the equal protection issue.
Equal protection is a multi-faceted concept, but its essence is an
impermissible classification of persons with respect to the laws of the
state. The United States Supreme Court has decided that to withstand
an equal protection attack:
[T]he classification must be reasonable, not arbitrary, and must rest
upon some ground of difference having a fair and substantial relation
to the object of the legislation,
so that all persons similarly circum55
stanced shall be treated alike.
There are those, Justice Barbieri apparently among them, 56 who believe
that the presence of two categories of public employees, those covered by the
civil service statutes and those not, violates the latter's right to the equal
protection of the law. The argument is that the distinction between the
two groups of public employees is arbitrary and discriminatory since it
does not treat all public employees alike, and there is no rational purpose
served by the distinct classifications. Where the distinction made between
individuals in a similar class - public employees - is based solely on an
arbitrarily drawn line, giving to some the benefit of the law and withholdthe relief requested, namely clearance to classified material, the rational was
consistent. The majority held:
Neither do we think that the standard here involved is lacking in a
particularized enunciation adequate to satisfy due process elements of notice
and rationality. DOD 5220.6 sets forth many "Criteria," which include ample
indications that a practicing homosexual may pose serious problems for the
Defense Department in making the requisite finding for security clearance. They
refer expressly to the factors of emotional instability and possible subjection
to sinister pressures and influences which have traditionally been the lot of
homosexuals living in what is, for better or worse, a society still strongly
oriented towards heterosexuality.
Id. at 239. See Chaturvedi, Legal Protection Available To Federal Employees
Against Wrongful Dismissal,63 Nw. U.L. REv. 287 (1968); Note, 48 N. CAR. L. REV.
912 (1970).
53. Moreover, since the state stipulated the reasons for its action, those are
the only grounds upon which the action may be judged. In this vein, Justice
Frankfurter wrote: "The grounds upon which an administrative order must be
judged are those upon which the record discloses that its action was based."
SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80, 87 (1943).
54. Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, 353 U.S. 232 (1957). See note 51
supra.
55. F. S. Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412, 415 (1920). See
Tussman & tenBroek, The Equal Protection of the Laws, 37 CALIF. L. REV. 341, 346
(1949).
56. Justice Barbieri wrote:
Indeed the failure of the legislature to provide civil service protection to some
state employees and not to others is in itself an obvious form of discriminatory
treatment.
443 Pa. at 544 n.6, 280 A.2d at 382 n.6 (Barbieri, J., dissenting).
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ing it from others, its application denies those detrimentally affected the
equal protection of the laws unless a legitimate and constitutionally permissible public purpose is demonstrated or inferred from the provision.57
In the instant case, it would seem that the petitioners were denied equal
protection since they were excluded from the operation of the civil
service law.
A second argument for overturning the dismissal of public employees
for associational reasons can be posited on traditional equal protection
reasoning. The Supreme Court, in Wieman v. Updegraff,' 8 held that
dismissal from public employment because of membership in a "Communistfront" organization was a violation of equal protection absent a showing
of the employee's actual knowledge of the illegal nature and purpose of
the organization.5 9 The Court concluded that constitutional protection
does extend to public employees, and that on these facts the state statute
was "patently arbitrary and discriminatory."6 0 The Court reasoned that
this classification was not appropriate since the purpose of the law was
to deny public employment on the basis of association, and the state had
made no showing that the persons excluded were "those and only those
persons" that the state had a legitimate interest in excluding. 61 In the
instant case, there is presumably no illegal nature or purpose of the
association in question. The classification therefore could not have been
based upon a proper constitutional purpose. Thus, the exclusion of employees because of their political affiliation was patently arbitrary, and
hence, such employees were arguably denied equal protection under the
fourteenth amendment.
The plaintiffs' final equal protection claim was that the right violated
by their dismissal, that of association, is a fundamental right and, therefore, any infringement of it is subject to the most rigid scrutiny by the
court, such as that given a "suspect classification. '6 2 The Supreme Court
has decided "that where fundamental rights and liberties are asserted
under the Equal Protection Clause, classification which might invade or
restrain them must be closely scrutinized and carefully confined. '63 The
test of whether a right is fundamental is difficult, but would seem to go
57. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886). For a more detailed analysis
of this issue and others in this area, see Schoen, Politics, Patronage and the
Constitution,3 IND. L.F. 35, 77 (1968).
58. 344 U.S. 183, 192 (1952).
59. Id. at 191.
60. Id. at 192.
61. Id. at 191-92.
62. Mr. Justice White, in discussing the effect of labelling a classification
"suspect," wrote:
There is involved here an exercise of the state police power which trenches
upon the constitutionally protected freedom from invidious official discrimination
based on race. Such a law . . . bears a heavy burden of justification . . . and
will be upheld only if it is necessary, and not merely rationally related, to the
accomplishment of a permissible state policy.
McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 196 (1964).
63. Harper v. Board of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 670 (1966).
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64
If it
to the preciousness of that right in terms of individual liberty.

is fundamental, then as in the case of suspect classifications, the "most
rigid scrutiny" 65 is given to it, and the burden is on the state to show
that it is more than reasonable, but in fact necessary to accomplish a
constitutional purpose.66 It would appear that first amendment rights are
of the type the courts would consider fundamental. To date the Supreme
Court has recognized interests such as voting, 67 procreation, a s criminal
procedural rights, 69 and travel 70 as fundamental. One recent discussion,
after analyzing the types of rights considered fundamental, continued:
Other interests, such as those protected by the first amendment, would
likely call forth this same strict scrutiny in the equal protection
contexts, but courts commonly use other provisions of the Constitution
to safeguard them . . .71
Mr. Chief Justice Warren's statement in Robel appears consonant with
this position:
Wherever one would place the right to travel on a scale of constitutional values, it is clear that those rights protected by72 the First
Amendment are no less basic in our democratic scheme.
In NAACP v. Alabama,78 Mr. Justice Harlan commented that state action
which has the effect of curtailing political association "is subject to the
closest scrutiny . . . . 74 It is submitted that if the right to freedom
of association is accepted as a fundamental right, then the Commonwealth
would have a difficult, if not impossible, task of showing that the continuation of the patronage system "is necessary . . .to the accomplishment
of a permissible state policy . . . . 75 The record in the instant case
makes no mention of a constitutionally permissible object necessarily
dependent upon the "spoils system," and the heavy burden on the Commonwealth to show a "compelling state interest" would seem insurmountable.
64. The Court has never stated the standard by which one could determine
what rights are "fundamental." Apparently it is done on a case-by-case basis.
However, implicit in the Court's reasoning seems to be certain factors such as
the nature of the right itself, the extent and manner of the state infringement and
the Court's view as to the effects of such a deprivation on the individual. Perhaps
simply a list of the rights declared fundamental would be the best "definition" of
the concept. See notes 67-70 and accompanying text infra.

65. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944).
66. McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 192 (1964).
67. Harper v. Board of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 670 (1966) ; Reynolds v. Sims,
377 U.S. 533 (1964).
68. Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942).
69. See, e.g., Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
70. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
71. Comment, Developments in the Law -

Equal Protection, 82 HARV. L. REV.

1065, 1128 (1969). To that above list of fundamental rights, the authors added that
education, after Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954), was also a
fundamental right "to a lesser degree." Id. at 1127.
72. United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258, 263 (1967).
73. 357 U.S. 449 (1958).
74. Id. at 460-61.
75. McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 196 (1964).
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Therefore, unless the Commonwealth could establish such a necessarily
related reason for a classification based upon political affiliation, the
labelling of this right as fundamental, which seems proper, would carry
the equal protection argument for the plaintiffs.
Finally, a cause of action under the Civil Rights Act of 187176
would seem to exist if any of the previous arguments were upheld. The
Supreme Court has determined that if a claim under the due process
clause, 77 equal protection clause 78 or the first amendment 79 exists, then
a claim also exists under the Civil Rights Act of 1871. Further, one of
the permissible remedies pursuant to that Act is the equitable remedy of
injunctive relief.8 0 Lower federal courts have applied the Act in the area
of public employees' rights in fashioning remedies for non-tenured public
school teachers,"' and municipal 2 and county employees 8 discharged or
denied rehiring on account of membership in a union, since the exercise
of that right was cognizable under the first amendment. Similar decisions
have been rendered with regard to school community workers not rehired
due to their active participation in a school-tax question ;84 a non-tenured
professor not rehired because of classroom discussion of controversial
76. Act of April 20, 1871, ch. 22, § 1, 17 Stat. 13, codified in 42 U.S.C. § 1983
(1970). See note 21 supra. The Supreme Court, in Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167
(1961), adopted for the Civil Rights Act the definition of "under color of law"
that Mr. Justice Stone had previously advanced to define the same phrase under
the Federal Criminal Code:
[M]isuse of power, possessed by virtue of state law and made possible only
because the wrongdoer is clothed with the authority of state law is action taken
"under color of" state law.
365 U.S. at 184, citing United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 326 (1940).
77. Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
78. McNeese v. Board of Educ., 373 U.S. 668 (1963).
79. Greenwood v. Peacock, 384 U.S. 808 (1966).
80. See note 21 supra.
81. McLaughlin v. Tilendis, 398 F.2d 287 (7th Cir. 1968). In that case,
Circuit Judge Cummings wrote:
Public employment may not be subjected to unreasonable conditions, and the
assertion of First Amendment rights by teachers will usually not warrant
their dismissal.
He concluded :
Even though the individual plaintiffs did not yet have tenure, the Civil Rights
Act of 1871 gives them a remedy if their contracts were not renewed because
of their exercise of constitutional rights.
Id. at 288-89.
82. American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees v. Woodward, 406 F.2d 137 (8th Cir. 1969).
83. Service Employees Int'l Union v. Butler County, 306 F. Supp. 1080 (W.D.
Pa. 1969). There, the court wrote:
The complaint alleges a discharge from employment because of membership in
the labor association. Plaintiffs do not allege the breach of any contract of employment, or denial or protection of any civil service or tenure statute. It is admitted
that their employment was at will. Does such an allegation state a cause of
action under the Civil Rights Act of 1871? We believe that such a cause of
action has been recognized in the reported decisions . . . as well as the general
judicial construction of the Act.
Id. at 1082 (emphasis added).
84. McGee v. Unified School Dist., 306 F. Supp. 1052 (N.D. Cal. 1969). See
Chalk Appeal, 441 Pa. 376, 272 A.2d 457 (1971).
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subjects;85 and a non-tenured professor not rehired presumably because
of strongly vocalized opinions relating to school administration."6 All
were held to have been denied their civil rights on account of their
discharge for exercise of first amendment guarantees. Following the
reasoning of these decisions, one could clearly conclude that the plaintiffs,
having been denied public employment because of membership in a lawful
and established political party, would have similar success under the
Civil Rights Act of 1871.
In asserting the unconstitutionality of the Commonwealth's action,
the plaintiffs did not argue the specific question of its illegality under
section 706 of the Public Employe Relations Act.87 Therefore, the question of "just cause" for the discharge required by that statute was not
an issue here, but was a separate claim.88
The effects of this case, while drastic for the plaintiffs, would seem
to be limited. For many of the reasons discussed, it would seem that the
holding in the instant decision is directly opposed to contemporary rulings
in analogous cases. Because of the narrow and perhaps outdated view the
court took on the matter of public employment, it would seem that few
85. Hetrick v. Martin, 322 F. Supp. 545 (E.D. Ky. 1971). The Hetrick court
analyzed the state of the law regarding public employment as follows:
It may be fairly stated that an employee of a State does not have a contractual
right to have his contract renewed, however, a State, by and through its officials,
may not elect to discontinue a contract of employment solely because the
employee has exercised his constitutional rights and privileges in a manner displeasing to certain of his superiors. This is somewhat of a paradoxical statement
for it boils down to the proposition that a person does not have a constitutional
right to public employment, but does have a constitutional right not to be dismissed
(for certain reasons) from public employment.
Id. at 546.
86. Roth v. Board of Regents, 310 F. Supp. 972 (W.D. Wis. 1970). There, the
court, in discussing the question of the petitioner's rights as a public employee, wrote:
With respect to the substantive protection of a professor's "First Amendment" rights, the rule is crystal clear. The employment of a teacher in a public
school cannot be terminated because he has exercised that freedom secured to
him by the Constitution of the United States . . . .This substantive constitutional
protection is unaffected by the presence or absence of tenure under state law.
Id. at 976 (citations omitted).
87. Public Employe Relations Act, PA. STAT. tit. 43, § 1101.706 (Supp. 1971),
provides:
Nothing contained in this act shall impair the employer's right to hire
employees or discharge employes for just cause consistent with existing legislation.
88. On August 17, 1971, the Pennsylvania supreme court, in a 5-2 decision,
denied the union's request for a reargument. 443 Pa. at 545, 280 A.2d at 383.
Because of this ruling, the previous commonwealth court injunction was dissolved.
The union moved the next day for a new injunction from the commonwealth court.
It was granted on the basis of section 706, PA. STAT. tit. 43, § 1101.706 (Supp. 1971),
but after rehearing the commonwealth court dissolved the latter injunction also.
The Commonwealth then fired 1500 more employees. The union, which had become
the certified bargaining agent of the employees, then brought a new suit on the
ground that the Commonwealth was refusing to bargain with the representative of
the bargaining unit, a violation of section 201 (a) (5), PA. STAT. tit. 43, §
1101.201 (a) (5) (Supp. 1971). A preliminary injunction was issued again. The
parties then agreed to bargain and reached agreement on all matters except the
state of the 3500 discharged employees. Both sides agreed to binding arbitration as
permitted under section 804, PA. STAT. tit. 43, § 1101.804 (Supp. 1971). The
arbitration board ruled that the original firings would be sustained, but that the
latter group of employees should be reinstated.
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other jurisdictions would rely on the reasoning used in this decision.
In Pennsylvania, the result would seem to be limited also. The controversy
surrounding the "spoils system" is being put to rest as the legislature
increasingly limits its scope, and thereby the number of employees affected.
However, for those persons still subject to the archaic system, the effect
of the instant holding is severe. The severity of this effect may supply
the impetus necessary to hasten further legislative action whether such
action merely limits further the jobs under control of the patronage system
or does away with it altogether. 80 One reason for the court's decision may
have been the majority's reluctance to decide a question so basic to the
way political parties have traditionally functioned. For example, Chief
Justice Bell wrote:
Politics or political patronage is and always has been an important
part and parcel of our Local, State and National Governments, and
unless changed by the Legislature, will, we believe, undoubtedly
continue to be a part of our Country's Governments - Local, State
and National. 0
Thus, the court may have felt that when so many "pure" political questions
were involved, the legislature should make the final determination. However, the necessity for further revision of the law regarding non-Civil
Service public employees within the Commonwealth depends to a large
degree upon how the court will interpret "just cause," since the new
Civil Service Act generally covers all employees not covered by other
protective legislation. 91 Thus, if "just cause" were read much as the
due process requirement under the fourteenth amendment is read, then
perhaps the present legislation would be sufficient.
The court has seen fit to continue the viability of the "spoils system"
so far as Pennsylvania is concerned. The statement by Chief Justice Bell
that "[t]hose who . . . live by the political sword must be prepared
to die by the political sword," 9 2 amply illustrates the manner in which the
majority viewed the problem. The court reasoned that since these men
received favored treatment at hiring time, they should not complain when
they are treated summarily at discharge time. While this view might seem
appropriate in the Old Testament sense, it certainly is out of step with
current views of public employees' constitutional rights. If the court
89. The court condemned the continuation of the whole "spoils system" and
in effect challenged the legislature to legislate it out of existence. Id. at 536, 280
A.2d at 378. For example, part of the reason for this litigation was the refusal
of the employees to change party registration because of the expected "donation"
to the new party which customarily accompanies it.
90. Id. at 536 n.4, 280 A.2d at 378 n.4.
91. PA. STAT. tit. 43, § 1101.301(2) (Supp. 1971). This section provides that
the exclusions include elected officials, appointees of the governor when senate
confirmation is necessary, management level employees, confidential employees, and
those employees affiliated with some religious purpose. In addition, the protection
of the Act apparently does not extend to those who are not represented by a
bargaining agent.
92. 443 Pa. at 536, 280 A.2d at 378.
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relied upon hiring standards, then it should have waited until a party
claimed he had been denied a job because of his political affiliation to rule
upon that aspect of the system. Instead, the majority upheld a system
which denies basic rights to employees throughout, in the interest of
insuring that employees hired because of politics do not receive unfair
advantages.
Paul R. Beckert, Jr.

LABOR LAW

- RAILWAY LABOR ACT - "EVERY REASONABLE EFFORT"
REQUIREMENT OF RAILWAY LABOR ACT, SECTION 2, FIRST, HELD TO
BE JUDICIALLY ENFORCEABLE.

Chicago & North Western Railway Co. v. United Transportation
Union (U.S. 1971)
Petitioner, Chicago & North Western Railway Company, brought
suit in the United States District Court for the Northern District of
Illinois to enjoin a threatened strike by the respondent, the United Transportation Union, after the two parties had failed to reach a settlement
of their labor dispute.' The railway company alleged that the injunction should issue because the union had not performed all of its obligations under the Railway Labor Act (the "RLA") 2 and therefore was
not entitled to resort to self-help measures. Specifically, the petitioner
alleged that the union had not exerted "every reasonable effort" to settle
the dispute, as required by Section 2, First of the RLA.3 The district
1. Chicago & N.W. Ry. v. United Transp. Union, 402 U.S. 570 (1971). The
dispute between the railway and the union concerned the number of brakemen who
were to be employed by the railway. Generally, this type of dispute is labeled a
"crew consist" dispute. Chicago & N.W. Ry. v. United Transp. Union, 422 F.2d 979,
980 (7th Cir. 1970). Pursuant to an arbitration board award in 1963, some 8,000
brakemen across the nation had lost their jobs. Unhappy with this situation, the
union, in July 1965, served notices on the railway pursuant to 45 U.S.C. § 156
(1970) of an intended change in their existing agreement. The union wanted to
restore most of the brakemen jobs that had been lost as a result of the arbitration
award by having the railway company employ at least two brakemen for every freight
and yard crew. The railway responded by serving section 6 notices upon the union
in December 1965, requesting an agreement that the existing rules regarding minimum
crews be rescinded and that crew size be left to managerial discretion.
The parties then invoked the procedures of the RLA, holding conferences
pursuant to section 6, and requesting the services of the National Mediation Board
pursuant to section 5. 45 U.S.C. §§ 155, 156 (1970). The parties could not reach a
settlement, and the NMB suggested submission of the dispute to arbitration. When
the union declined arbitration, the NMB terminated its jurisdiction on October
16, 1969.
The RLA provides for one last step at this point
to forestall self-help - a
Presidential Emergency Board. Id. § 160. However, the President failed to invoke
this provision and when the thirty day cooling off period of section 5 expired, the
union threatened to strike. 402 U.S. at 584-86.
2. 45 U.S.C. §§ 151 et seq. (1970).
3. Id. § 152, First. This section provides:
It shall be the duty of all carriers, their officers, agents, and employees to exert
every reasonable effort to make and maintain agreements concerning rates of
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court held that it had no jurisdiction to enforce Section 2, First,4 and
on appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
affirmed. 5 The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve a conflict in the circuit courts. 7 In a 5 to 4 decision, 8 the Court
reversed the decision of the court of appeals, 9 holding that: (1) Section
2, First, imposes a legal obligation upon both carriers and unions to
exert every reasonable effort to reach an agreement; (2) this legal obligation is judicially enforceable; and (3) section 4 of the NorrisLaGuardia Act' ° does not prohibit the issuance of a strike injunction to
enforce compliance with the duty of Section 2, First. Chicago & North
Western Railway Co. v. United Transportation Union, 402 U.S. 570
(1971).
pay, rules, and working conditions, and to settle all disputes, whether arising out
of the application of such agreements or otherwise, in order to avoid any
interruption to commerce or to the operation of any carrier growing out of any
dispute between the carrier and the employees thereof.
The essence of the railway's allegation was that the union would not bargain
the dispute jointly with the other railroads upon whom similar notices had been served
by the Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen, and that the union would not deviate from
its original bargaining position. None of the courts in the instant case ruled as to
whether the union had in fact violated Section 2, First's reasonable effort requirement.
402 U.S. at 574, 586-87.
4. The district court, in an unreported opinion, stated that questions concerning
Section 2, First were matters for administrative determination. 402 U.S. at 572.
However, it did grant an injunction pending appeal because of the importance of
the ruling and the impact that a strike would have on the commerce. Id. at 587.
5. Chicago & N.W. Ry. v. United Transp. Union, 422 F.2d 979 (7th Cir. 1970).
On the issue of the justiciability of Section 2, First, the court of appeals construed
the section as being merely "a statement of the purpose and policy of the subsequent
provisions of the Act and not as a specific requirement anticipating judicial enforcement." Id. at 985. The court concluded that it was the duty of the NMB to enforce
the requirements of Section 2, First, and that this function should not be assumed
by the courts since judicial enforcement would necessitate inquiry by the courts
into every step of the RLA procedure to determine if a reasonable effort was being
exerted. In the opinion of the Seventh Circuit, such judicial involvement was never
intended by Congress. Id. at 985-88.
6. 400 U.S. 818 (1970).
7. Compare Chicago & N.W. Ry. v. United Transp. Union, 422 F.2d 979
(7th Cir. 1970), with Piedmont Aviation, Inc. v. Air Line Pilots Ass'n, 416 F.2d 633
(4th Cir. 1969). The latter case held that judicial enforcement of the reasonable
effort requirement was necessary to effectuate the congressional purpose of providing
machinery for the prevention of strikes. The Piedmont court reasoned that since
"the [Railway Labor] Act requires the parties to confer and negotiate in good faith,"
restraining the parties from resort to self-help until they have complied with that
requirement would be consistent with the purposes of the Act. Id. at 636.
8. Mr. Justice Harlan delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice
Berger and Justices Blackmun, Marshall and Stewart joined. Mr. Justice Brennan
filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Black, Douglas and White joined.
9. The case was remanded to the court of appeals with instructions to return
the case to the district court to decide the merits of the railroad's claim that the
reasonable effort requirement of Section 2, First had been violated. 402 U.S. at 584.
10. 29 U.S.C. § 104 (1970). This section provides:
No court of the United States shall have jurisdiction to issue any restraining
order or temporary or permanent injunction in any case involving or growing
out of any labor dispute to prohibit any person or persons participating or
interested in such dispute (as these terms are herein defined) from doing, whether
singly or in concert, any of the following acts:
(a) Ceasing or refusing to perform any work or to remain in any
relation of employment ....
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Originally enacted in 1926, the Railway Labor Act was the product
of almost fifty years of experimental legislation regulating labormanagement relations in the railroad industry." Both carriers and unions
were well aware of the gravity of railway labor disputes and their
potentially catastrophic effect on commerce. Motivated by this consideration and by a strong sense of public duty, 12 the industry exerted a
united effort to achieve a workable system for settling disputes.1" The
parties, having agreed upon a proposal, sought the aid and cooperation
4
of Congress to enact it into law.1
Prior to the enactment of the RLA, an extensive inquiry into the
proposed legislation was conducted by the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce.'" The committee's hearings reveal that
the primary goal of the RLA was to establish a system for the voluntary
settlement of railway labor disputes with minimal governmental intervention and compulsion.' 6 Notwithstanding this basic policy of self11. Prior legislation included the Arbitration Act of 1888, ch. 1063, 25 Stat. 501;
the Erdman Act of 1898, ch. 370, 30 Stat. 424; the Newlands Act of 1913, ch. 6,
38 Stat. 103; the Adamson Act of 1916, ch. 436, 39 Stat. 721; and the Transportation
Act of 1920, ch. 91, 41 Stat. 456. For a discussion of this prior legislation, see
International Ass'n of Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S. 740, 755-58 (1961) ; General

Comm. of Adjustment v. Missouri-Kansas-Texas R.R., 320 U.S. 323, 328 n.3 (1943).
12. Throughout the legislative history there is continual reference to the extraordinary sense of public responsibility and sincerity manifested by the railway parties.
H.R. REP. No. 328, 69th Cong., 1st Sess. 1-5 (1926) ; S. REP. No. 606, 69th Cong.,
1st Sess. 1-7 (1926) ; Hearings on H.R. 7180 Before the House Comm. on Interstate
and Foreign Commerce, 69th Cong., 1st Sess. 11, 21-22 (1926) [hereinafter cited as
House Hearings]. In fact, most of those involved believed that this spirit of fair
play and cooperation would be the key to the success of the legislation. Id. at 22.
Although the hearings do not constitute testimony of Congress itself, in
light of the recognized fact that the RLA was drafted jointly by management and
labor, "the statements of the spokesmen for the two parties made in the hearings
on the proposed Act are entitled to great weight in the construction of the Act."
402 U.S. at 576 (majority opinion) (emphasis added).
13. During the aforementioned hearings, Mr. Richberg remarked:
This bill . . . represents the product of months of negotiations and conferences
between the representatives of 20 railroad labor organizations and the Association
of Railway Executives representatives, representing the great majority, practically
all, of the carriers by railroad.
House Hearings, supra note 12, at 9; H.R. REP. No. 328, 69th Cong., 1st Sess. 1-3
(1926) ; S. REP. No. 606, 69th Cong., 1st Sess. 1-3 (1926).
14. The purpose of the framers of the RLA in approaching Congress was to seek
the legislature's cooperation and not its compulsory powers. House Hearings, supra
note 12, at 11, 21-22.
15. This proposed legislation was adopted without any significant change by the
Congress. As Mr. Justice Frankfurter observed, "[i]t is accurate to say that the
railroads and the railroad unions between them wrote the Railway Labor Act of
1926 and Congress formally enacted their agreement." Railway Employes' Dep't v.
Hanson, 351 U.S. 225, 240 (1956) (concurring opinion) (emphasis added), quoted in
International Ass'n of Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S. 740, 758 (1961). For a detailed
discussion of the formation of the Act, see Murphy, Agreement on the Railroads The Joint Conference of 1926, 11 LAB. L.J. 823 (1960).
16. The parties wanted legal compulsion to be minimal for two main reasons.
First, they were afraid that a system of compusion would stifle the spirit of free and
peaceful negotiation which the bill was intended to promote. Secondly, they did not
think that enforcement provisions would be necessary. Three reasons account for
the latter position: (1) the framers hoped that the spirit of cooperation which had
been prevalent during the earlier conferences would continue and instill in all of the
parties the moral duty to comply with the Act's provisions in good faith, (House
Hearings, supra note 12, at 21) ; (2) it was hoped that the persuasive powers of the
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government by the industry, the courts on a number of occasions have
intervened to enforce various provisions of the Act. 17 Prior to the
instant case, however, the Supreme Court had never held Section 2,
First to be judicially enforceable, although the circuit courts were split
on the issue. 18
In the instant case, the majority enumerated three issues that had
to be decided: (1) whether the "reasonable effort" requirement of Section 2, First imposed a legal obligation upon the railway parties; (2) if
it were a legal obligation, whether it was judicially enforceable; and
(3) if it were judicially enforceable, whether section 4 of the NorrisLaGuardia Act deprived the federal courts of jurisdiction to grant
injunctive relief.
In addressing the first issue, the Court concluded that Section 2,
First does impose a legal obligation on the parties to exert every reasonable effort to make and maintain agreements and to settle all disputes.
Its decision was grounded in both case law and the legislative history
of the RLA. In analyzing the decisional law, the Court deemed Virginian Railway v. System Federation19 to be the principal case on the
legal obligation theory, and relied on its language which strongly suggested that the duty to exert every reasonable effort is a legal obligation.2 0 To buttress its conclusion, the Court cited several cases reNMB would assist in securing adherence to the Act's provisions (id. at 65-66) ; and
(3) it was expected that informed public opinion would pressure the parties into
compliance with the Act. Id. at 19.
17. In general, the courts have intervened to afford injunctive relief in four situations in the major dispute area: (1) the status quo provisions of the RLA (45 U.S.C.
§§ 155, 156, 160 (1970) ; see note 58 infra) ; (2) Section 2, Third, which provides
for the designation of representatives without interference by either party (45 U.S.C.
§ 152, Third (1970) ; see note 58 infra); (3) the union's duty to represent employees
in a craft without invidious discrimination (see note 57 infra) ; and (4) the carrier's
duty to treat with the union's representatives under Section 2, Ninth (45 U.S.C. § 152,
Ninth (1970) ; see note 56 infra).
The RLA deals with the settlement of both major and minor disputes. The
classic distinction is found in Elgin, J. & E, Ry. v. Burley, 325 U.S. 711, 723 (1945),
aff'd on rehearing, 327 U.S. 661 (1946). For an excellent description of the major
dispute settlement procedures of the RLA, see Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v.
Jacksonville Terminal Co., 394 U.S. 369, 378 (1969).
The instant case dealt with the major dispute provisions of the RLA and
their enforcement, because the dispute concerned the formation of a new agreement.
325 U.S. at 723. In the minor dispute area, the courts have intervened to compel
compliance with some of the provisions of the RLA. See, e.g., Brotherhood of R.R.
Trainmen v. Chicago River & Ind. R.R., 353 U.S. 30 (1957) ; Elgin, J. & E. Ry. v.
Burley, 325 U.S. 711 (1945) ; Flight Eng'rs Int'l Ass'n v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc.,
359 F.2d 303 (2d Cir. 1966) ; Aaxico Airlines, Inc. v. Air Lines Pilots Ass'n,
331 F.2d 433 (5th Cir. 1964).
18. See note 7 supra.
19. 300 U.S. 515 (1937). The Virginian Railway Court held that Section 2,
Ninth's mandate that the carrier treat with the certified union representative was
judicially enforceable. The Court reasoned that judicial enforcement was appropriate
because it did not compel the parties to reach an agreement, only to meet and confer
with each other. Id. at 547-48.
20. The Virginian Railway Court had stated that:
The statute [RLA] does not undertake to compel agreement between the employer
and employees, but it does command those preliminary steps without which no
agreement can be reached. It at least requires the employer to meet and confer
with the authorized representative of its employees, to listen to their complaints,
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affirming this same position.21 Of even greater significance, however, in
bolstering the Court's holding is the legislative history of the RLA.
Mr. Justice Harlan, writing for the Court, cited from the House hearings the testimony of Donald R. Richberg, counsel for the organized
railway employees. In the cited passage, Mr. Richberg asserted that
Section 2, First imposes a legal obligation on the parties to exert every
reasonable effort to reach agreement. 22 This affirmation was reiterated
23
on several other occasions in the legislative history.
Contrary to these findings, the Seventh Circuit, relying on the Supreme Court's decision in General Committee of Adjustment v. Missouri-Kansas-Texas Railroad,24 had ruled that Section 2, First is merely
a statement of the purpose and policy of the RLA and is not a judicially
enforceable legal obligation. 25 However, the Chicago & North Western
Court rejected the Seventh Circuit's view and concluded that, in
light of the authority previously mentioned, the passing reference in
General Committee to Section 2, First as an expression of policy did
not have the impact which the court of appeals had indicated. 26
to make reasonable effort to compose differences -

in short, to enter into a
negotiation for the settlement of labor disputes such as is contemplated by § 2,
First.
Id. at 548.
21. The cases cited by the Chicago & North Western Court were Detroit &
T.S.L. R.R. v. United Transp. Union, 396 U.S. 142, 149, 151 (1969); Brotherhood
of Ry. Clerks v. Association for the Benefit of Non-Contract Employees, 380 U.S. 650,
658 (1965) ; International Ass'n of Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S. 740, 758 (1961) ;
Order of R.R. Telegraphers v. Chicago & N.W. Ry., 362 U.S. 330, 339 (1960);
Elgin, J. & E. Ry. v. Burley, 325 U.S. 711, 721-22 n.12 (1945); Stark v. Wickard,
321 U.S. 288, 306-07 (1944).
22. House Hearings,supra note 12, at 91.
23. Id. at 40-41, 66, 84-85; S. REP. No. 606, 69th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1926);
H.R. REP. No. 328, 69th Cong., 1st Sess. 1, 3 (1926).
24. 320 U.S. 323 (1943). In General Committee, the validity of a mediation
agreement between the carrier and the bargaining representatives of the firemen craft
was challenged by the engineer craft as violative of Section 2, Ninth. 45 U.S.C.
§ 152, Ninth (1970) (establishing procedures for the resolution of representational
disputes). The Court held that Congress via Section 2, Ninth had clearly entrusted
the settlement of these disputes to the NMB, and nothing in the statute or legislative
history authorized judicial intervention. Therefore, according to the Court, "[tihe
inference is strong that Congress intended to go no further in its use of the processes
of adjudication and litigation than the express provisions of the Act indicate." Id.
at 333.
In Chicago & North Western, the Seventh Circuit relied on language in
General Committee to the effect that "§ 2, Second, like § 2, First, merely states
the policy which those other provisions buttress with more particularized commands."
320 U.S. at 334. Thus, the circuit court concluded that Section 2, First was not a
legal obligation. 422 F.2d at 985. In addition, reliance was placed on passages from
General Committee which stressed restraint in implying judicial remedies in the
RLA area. 320 U.S. at 332-33. As a result the Seventh Circuit concluded that
Section 2, First could not be enforced by the courts. 422 F.2d at 985-86.
It is interesting to note that the Seventh Circuit's holding of non-justiciability
rested solely upon the authority of General Committee, whereas the dissent, in the
Supreme Court opinion, reached the same result, ignoring that case and relying on
other cases and the legislative history. See notes 49-64 and accompanying text infra.
25. 422 F.2d at 985; see note 5 supra.
26. Although the Chicago & North Western Court had good reason for disposing
of the General Committee case with respect to the legal obligation issue, that was the
last mention the Court made of the case. This is noteworthy in light of the fact that
the Seventh Circuit relied on General Committee to support not only its ruling as to

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol17/iss4/5

58

Editors: Recent Developments

MARCH

1972]

RECENT DEVELOPMENTS

Having decided that Section 2, First imposed a legal obligation on
the parties, the Court addressed the crucial question of whether this legal
obligation could be judicially enforced. Noting that duties created by
the RLA had been enforced in the past,'2 7 the Court announced its test

for determining the propriety of judicial enforcement of a given section of the RLA:
Our cases reveal that where the statutory language and legislative
history are unclear, the propriety of judicial enforcement turns on
the importance of the duty in the scheme of the Act, the capacity
of the courts to enforce it effectively, and the necessity for judicial
enforcement if the right of the aggrieved party is not to prove
28
illusory.
The validity of the majority's test clearly depends upon whether
the cases cited by Justice Harlan do, in fact, substantiate it.2 9 In each of
the cases, the Supreme Court had supported its holding primarily by
considering the importance of the duty to be enforced, the capability
of the courts to enforce it, and the need for judicial involvement. One
example is Texas & New Orleans Railroad v. Brotherhood of Railway
Clerks,80 where the Court held that Section 2, Third (providing that
employee representatives shall be designated without interference by
either party) was judicially enforceable. In so concluding, the Court
opined that: (1) the section was the essential foundation of the statutory scheme (importance); (2) the Court was capable of detecting
coercive tactics since it must make similar determinations in applying
rules of fraud and undue influence (capacity) ; and (3) Congress must
have intended judicial enforcement because it was inconceivable that
Congress would pass this specific statutory prohibition only to have it
ignored by the courts (necessity of enforcement if right is not to prove
illusory) .3

Given that the majority's test is supported by precedent, it is appropriate to question whether it is satisfied by the facts in the instant
legal obligation, but also its determination as to the judicial enforceability of Section 2,
First. See note 24 supra.
27. 402 U.S. at 578 n.10. The Court cited Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v.
Howard, 343 U.S. 768 (1952) ; Virginian Ry. System Fed'n, 300 U.S. 515 (1937);
and Texas & N.O. R.R. v. Brotherhood of Ry. Clerks, 281 U.S. 548 (1930), as

examples of its previous enforcement of RLA provisions. See note 17 supra.
28. 402 U.S. at 578 (emphasis added). The majority chose to rely upon this
test as the sole justification for its holding that Section 2, First could be judicially
enforced.
29. Justice Harlan, while stating that "our cases reveal" the test, did not specifically refer to which cases these were. It seems logical, however, that the Court
meant the cases it had cited as having previously enforced the RLA provisions to be
the "revealing cases" in question. See note 27 supra.
30. 281 U.S. 548 (1930).
31. Id. at 567-69. The Court in Virginian Railway and Brotherhood of Railroad
Trainmen similarly concluded that judicial enforcement was proper, relying on those
same factors expressed in the Chicago & North Western majority's test. Brotherhood
of R.R. Trainmen v. Howard, 343 U.S. 768, 773-75 (1952) ; Virginian Ry. v. System
Fed'n, 300 U.S. 515, 545-53 (1937).
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case. The Court found that the first prong of the test - the importance
of the duty in the scheme of the Act - was satisfied. The duty to exert
every reasonable effort was, according to the Court, essential to the
effective operation of the RLA because absent that reasonable effort
during the negotiation process, the Act's elaborate settlement machinery
would be ineffective. The case law and legislative history utilized by
the majority to conclude that the reasonable effort requirement is a
legal obligation were also relied upon by the Court in its conclusion
that the duty was crucial to the vitality of the Act. 32 With respect to
the second requirement of its test, the majority reasoned that because
courts must determine the presence of a reasonable effort under section
8 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act,3 3 and because the Virginian Railway
Court suggested that such issues are "everyday subjects of inquiry by
[the] courts," 3 4 the judiciary should be deemed capable of effectively
enforcing the duty imposed by Section 2, First. Although the Court
was justified in concluding that the courts are capable of enforcing the
duty, it must be noted that mere capacity to enforce, alone, does not
necessarily establish the authority to do so.85 Finally, the Chicago &
North Western Court concluded that judicial enforcement of Section
2, First was necessary in order to prevent the right of the aggrieved
party from being illusory. 86 Justice Harlan reasoned that because the
Congress had not committed enforcement of Section 2, First to the
National Mediation Board (the "NMB"), the conclusion was "inescapable"
that it had intended judicial enforcement of the provision, for other7
wise the duty would be unenforceable .
It is reasonably certain that Congress did not intend the NMB to
enforce Section 2, First.8 8 The House hearings indicate that because
32. See notes 19-23 and accompanying text supra.
33. 29 U.S.C. § 108 (1970) provides:

No restraining order or injunctive relief shall be granted to any complainant ...
who has failed to make every reasonable effort to settle such dispute ....
34. 300 U.S. at 550.
35. The analogy made by the instant Court between Section 2, First and section
8 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act illustrates this point. It is logical to conclude that
the same courts should be capable of ruling on the "reasonable effort" issue in both
situations - the RLA and the Norris-LaGuardia Act. However, under the NorrisLaGuardia Act Congress specifically authorized the court to determine this issue,
whereas the Congress made no such provision in the RLA.
36. Although the Court did not discuss the third prong of its test as such, one
must assume that the majority's analysis of the non-adjudicatory status of the NMB
was directed at the conclusion that judicial enforcement would be necessary to
vindicate both parties' rights to "reasonable effort" bargaining by the other.
37. 402 U.S. at 579-81.
38. Nevertheless, the Seventh Circuit in the instant case held that the responsibility of enforcing Section 2, First should lie with the NMB and not with the
courts. The circuit court recognized that the Board's role is basically nonadjudicatory, but contended that it is better qualified than the court to determine
whether the parties are exercising a reasonable effort because of the Board's
"expertise, proximity to the negotiation process and power to maintain the status quo
.
" 422 F.2d at 988. This opinion is convincing since administrative agencies
are generally established for the very reason that they can acquire greater expertise
in a specific area than the courts. However, the NMB is apparently not the kind of
board that can assume adjudicatory functions and continue to perform effectively its
primary duty of mediation. See note 45 and accompanying text infra.

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol17/iss4/5

60

Editors: Recent Developments

MARCH

1972]

RECENT DEVELOPMENTS

of the Railroad Labor Board's failure to effecuate settlements under
the 1920 Transportation Act,8 9 attributed primarily to the Board's adjudicatory role under that statute, 40 the NMB should be given no adjudicatory functions. 41 Thus, although the NMB was given a dominant
role in the settlement-negotiation process under the 1926 Act, 42 it was
not until the 1934 Amendments that it was granted any specific adjudicatory power. In those amendments, new provisions were added to
Section 2, Ninth which gave the NMB the power to determine employee
bargaining representatives. 48 It is noteworthy, however, that even though
some precautions were taken in Section 2, Ninth to assure protection
of the Board's neutrality, 44 it has been suggested that the NMB cannot
effectively perform its Section 2, Ninth adjudicatory function because
this role sharply conflicts with the responsibility and the necessity of
the Board to maintain its status as an impartial mediator in the eyes
45
of the parties.
Not only is it clear that the NMB has no authority to enforce Section 2, First, but, if the premise is accepted that Congress would not
have established the duty of "reasonable effort" bargaining only to leave it
unenforceable, then Justice Harlan's reasoning that the court can enforce the provision because the Board cannot is persuasive. Clearly,
this premise had been accepted in previous cases as one basis for holding other provisions of the Act enforceable. 46 There is, however, lan39. Ch. 91, 41 Stat. 456 (1920).

40.
41.
NMB's
remain

House Hearings,supra note 12, at 18.
Id.; 67 CONG. REc. 4670 (1926) (remarks of Representative Arentz). The
status was to be strictly non-adjudicatory in order to insure that it would
a persuader and would maintain the confidence of both parties throughout

the entire negotiation process.

42. Chicago & N.W. Ry. v. United Transp. Union, 422 F.2d 979, 986 (7th Cir.
1970) ; 45 U.S.C. § 155 (1970).
43. 45 U.S.C. § 152, Ninth (1970). Of course, it has been argued that since

the statute expressly provides for the exercise of adjudicatory power by the NMB
with respect to Section 2, Ninth and does not so provide under Section 2, First, the
inference is that Congress intended to deprive the NMB of any adjudicatory power
with respect to the latter section. Note, 45 N.Y.U.L. REV. 928, 938 n.58 (1970).
44. This section expressly provides the NMB with the opportunity to appoint a
committee of three neutrals to decide what employees may participate in the election
of bargaining representatives so that the Board's effectiveness and usefulness in
settling disputes will not be impaired. 45 U.S.C. § 152, Ninth (1970) ; Switchmen's
Union of North America v. NMB, 320 U.S. 297, 303 (1943), quoting S. REP. No. 1065,
73d Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1934).
45. Risher, Selection of the Bargaining Representative Under the Railway Labor
Act, 17 VILL. L. REv. 246, 269 (1971). The author expressed the view, similar to Mr.
Richberg's, that effective mediation requires a smooth relationship between the
mediator (the NMB) and the parties, and that it is extremely difficult to achieve
this harmony when the NMB assumes adjudicatory functions. Id.; House Hearings,
supra note 12, at 18. See notes 40-41 supra. It is for this reason that the Board
itself regards the resolution of representation disputes as a secondary function and
has remarked upon the detrimental effect that this duty has on its mediatory functions.
Risher, supra at 269 & nn.90-91, citing NMB, ADMINISTRATION OF THE RAILWAY
LABOR ACT BY THE NATIONAL MEDIATION BOARD, 1934-1957, at 11, 26 (1958).
46. See note 31 and accompanying text supra. For example, in Brotherhood of
R.R. Trainmen v. Howard, 343 U.S. 768 (1952), the Court stated that judicial
enforcement was necessary to prevent "obliteration" of the rights of Negro workers
under the Act, "[flor no adequate administrative remedy can be afforded by the
National Railroad Adjustment or Mediation Board." Id. at 774.
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guage in the General Committee case which suggests that there may be
situations where neither the NMB nor the courts can act.47 However,
it is not clear whether any weight can be attributed to General Committee
since it is factually distinguishable from the instant case, having involved representational disputes under Section 2, Ninth. 48 Moreover,
Justice Douglas, who wrote the majority opinion there, joined the dissenters in the instant case who made no mention of General Committee.
Mr. Justice Brennan authored the dissenting opinion in Chicago &
North Western and, although he did not directly challenge either the
validity or the application of the majority's test for determining the
propriety of judicial enforcement under Section 2, First, he concluded
that judicial review of the relative merits of each party's bargaining
position was clearly prohibited. 49 In arriving at this conclusion, the
dissent focused initially upon the legislative history of the RLA, on
the ground that this was essential in order to determine whether judicial
enforcement of Section 2, First was intended. Noting that the thrust
of the Act was voluntary settlement through the traditional means of
conciliation and mediation, with few expressly enforceable provisions,5 °
the dissent examined the role of Section 2, First's reasonable effort requirement in this scheme. From the testimony of Mr. Richberg at the
House hearings, 5 1 Justice Brennan concluded that the general understanding among Congress, the unions and carriers 52 was "that the duty
'to exert every reasonable effort' was judicially enforceable at least to
the extent of requiring the parties to sit down at the bargaining table
and talk to each other.1 53 An examination of that testimony reveals
that only an arbitrary refusal to even meet and confer with the other
54
party would constitute an enjoinable violation of Section 2, First.
Therefore, in light of justice Harlan's remark as to the "great weight"
that must be afforded the statements of the party spokesmen at the
47. Mr. Justice Douglas, speaking for the majority in General Committee,

stated :
There may be as a result many areas in this field where neither the administrative
nor the judicial function can be utilized. But that is only to be expected where
Congress still places such great reliance on the voluntary process of conciliation,
mediation and arbitration. Courts should not rush in where Congress has not
chosen to tread.
320 U.S. at 337.
48. See note 24 supra. It has been suggested that General Committee merely
illustrated the Court's reluctance to interfere with the NMB's authority over representational disputes under Section 2, Ninth, and therefore its holding is limited to
such disputes. Note, supra note 43, at 936.
49. That is, irrespective of the fact that the NMB was not intended to enforce
the duty, the courts are not authorized to do so either. 402 U.S. at 587-88.
50. Id. at 588-91. See House Hearings, supra note 12, at 21, 65-66; notes 12-16
and accompanying text supra.
51. House Hearings,supra note 12, at 40-41, 66, 84-85.
52. Justice Brennan noted that Mr. Richberg's testimony had not been controverted by the carrier representatives who were present at the hearings. 402 U.S.
at 593 n.7.
53. Id. at 593.
54. Howse Hearings,supra note 12, at 66, 84-85.
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775

hearings, 55 Justice Brennan's argument is persuasive - that the legislative history does not support the conclusion that it was to be the
courts' function to enforce Section 2, First to the extent of determining
what is and is not reasonable effort bargaining.
With this legislative history as background, Justice Brennan examined the situations in which the Court had intervened in the past to
afford injunctive relief in the major dispute area of the RLA. Only
three such situations were discovered: (1) violation of the carrier's
duty to treat with the union representative;" (2) invidious discrimination by union representatives against employees ;5 7 and (3) violations
58
of the Act's status quo provisions.
Justice Brennan concluded that there were two critical distinctions
between these situations and the instant case. First, the instant case did
not follow the pattern of the prior cases in that in each of them the
scheme of the RLA could not have begun to operate without judicial
involvement. 59 This distinction is sound. Enforcement of the carrier's
Section 2, Ninth duty to treat with the union representatives is necessary to initiate RLA procedures since negotiations cannot occur if the
carrier does not even meet with the union representatives. The provisions as to status quo, non-discriminatory representation and free designation of representatives (Section 2, Third) must be enforced in order
55. 402 U.S. at 576. See note 12 supra.

56. The judicial enforceability of the carrier's duty to treat with the union's
representative (45 U.S.C. § 152, Ninth (1970)), was established in Virginian Ry.

v. System Fed'n, 300 U.S. 515 (1937).

Since this mandate to "treat with" was

interpreted by the Virginian Railway Court as requiring the employer to at least
meet and confer with the employee representative (id. at 548), the Court was acting
consistently with Mr. Richberg's opinion that the absolute refusal to meet and confer
with the other party could be judicially enjoined. 402 U.S. at 593-94; House Hearings,
supra note 12, at 66, 84-85. The Virginian Railway Court, however, did not refer
to the 1926 House hearings for authority, but this is understandable since the duty
the Court was enforcing was not added to the Act until the 1934 amendments.
57. It is well established that the Court will use its injunctive power to prevent
invidious discrimination on the part of a union as against employees. Brotherhood of
R.R. Trainmen v. Howard, 343 U.S. 768, 773-74 (1952); Tunstall v. Brotherhood
of Locomotive Firemen, 323 U.S. 210, 213-14 (1944); Steele v. Louisville & N.R.R.,
323 U.S. 192, 202-03 (1944). The leading case on this point is Steele, where the Court
held that the authority to enforce equal representation could be drawn from the
language of the sections dealing with employee representatives read in view of the
general purpose of the Act - to promote free representation and negotiation. 323
U.S. at 202-03.
58. Detroit & T.S.L. R.R. v. United Transp. Union, 396 U.S. 142, 150 (1969).
Basically, the status quo provisions include: (1) section 6, 45 U.S.C. § 156 (1970)
(requiring 30 days written notice of any intended changes in agreements affecting wages,
rules or working conditions, and providing that once notice is given, such terms shall
not be altered until the controversy is acted upon) ; (2) section 5, 45 U.S.C. § 155
(1970) (prohibiting such changes during the 30 days following the termination of the
NMB proceedings) ; and (3) section 10, 45 U.S.C. § 160 (1970) (providing that there
shall be no change in wages, rules or working conditions while the Emergency
Board is making its findings and for 30 days thereafter, except by agreement).
Although the dissent only mentioned three classes of judicial enforcement
there is one other situation in which the Court has intervened - to enforce compliance
with Section 2, Third. 45 U.S.C. § 152, Third (1970); Texas & N.O. R.R. v.
Brotherhood of Ry. Clerks, 281 U.S. 548, 567 (1930). See notes 30-31 and accompanying text supra.
59. 402 U.S. at 595.
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for the bargaining process to proceed smoothly and undisturbed. If
these mandates were not enforced, any chance of a negotiated settlement would be seriously jeopardized because the parties' attentions
would be diverted from the bargaining table. In the instant case, on
the other hand, the step-by-step procedures of the RLA had already
been completed and the dangers of the earlier cases which had demanded judicial intervention were not present.60 Thus, enforcement of
Section 2, First is not needed either to start the bargaining process or
to keep it running smoothly.
The second distinction found by Justice Brennan was that in each
of the prior cases "the judicial involvement was minimal and in keeping with the central theme of the Act - to bring about voluntary settlement," 61 while in the instant case the role of the court is no longer to
merely initiate the bargaining process, but rather to review extensively
the bargaining positions of the parties "after the entire statutory scheme
has run its course. '62 The dissent maintained that such involvement
violated both the contemplated enforcement of Section 2, First68 and
the general policy of the Act - voluntary settlement with minimal
government interference.6 4 It is submitted that Justice Brennan's conclusions are valid in light of the legislative history. As previously examined, the history does not support the view that it was to be the
court's function to review the actual bargaining positions of the parties
to determine if a reasonable effort has been expended.65 Furthermore,
since the the court is now given some control over the substance of the
negotiations, in that it can control the subject matter about which the
parties may or may not bargain based on its determination of what is a
reasonable effort, the general policy of self-government in the industry
is contravened. 6 Justice Harlan, in fact, recognized that caution must
be exercised in this area so as not to infringe upon "the strong federal
labor policy against governmental interference with the substantive
67
terms of collective-bargaining agreements."
Although the dissent did not mention it, there is another distinction
between the situations in which judicial enforcement had previously
been permitted and the present case in terms of the legislative history.
60. Specifically, "all parties were fairly represented, the status quo was being
maintained, and, most important, each bargaining representative met and conferred
with his counterpart." Id. at 596.
61. Id. at 595.
62. Id. at 596. As was stated by the Seventh Circuit in the instant case:
To imply judicial enforcement to [Section] 2, First, would insert a judicial
inquiry into every step of the Railway Labor procedures to determine in each
case if reasonable effort is being exerted; this is a role which we believe Congress
did not intend the courts play in the settlement of Railway disputes.
422 F.2d at 985.
63. See notes 51-55 and accompanying text supra.
64. 402 U.S. at 596. See notes 13-16 and accompanying text supra.
65. See notes 51-55 and accompanying text supra.
66. House Hearings, supra note 12, at 9-17, 22; 67 CONG. REC. 4670 (1926)
(remarks of Representative Arentz).
67. 402 U.S. at 579 n.11.
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The House hearings reveal that in three of the four areas of enforce63
ment by the Court - the duty of Section 2, Ninth to "treat with,"
the status quo provisions, 69 and the duty of Section 2, Third not to
interfere with the designation of representatives 0 - such involvement
was specifically contemplated by the drafters of the Act. 71 The fourth
area of enforcement, racial discrimination, was not mentioned in the
hearings, 72 but it is significant that enforcement of the other three provisions would not be objectionable because of any conflicting legislative
78
history as in the instant case.
It is interesting to note that both the majority and the dissent in
the Chicago & North Western case arrived at their opposite conclusions
while relying on essentially the same cases. The majority concentrated
on the reasoning used to justify judicial enforcement in each of those
cases. From those opinions, Justice Harlan deduced the factors which
had motivated the Court in reaching its decisions and combined these
factors into a "test" for determining the propriety of judicial enforcement. 74 The dissent, on the other hand, looked not to the particular
rationale of the Court in the previous cases, but focused on the nature
of the provisions involved therein.75 Hence, what was critical to the
dissent was the pattern established by those holdings and not the reasons which supported them. In this way, both opinions drew support
from the case law, although the majority's would appear to be the more
reliable and rational of the two.
Moreover, there were several factors raised by the majority which
not only support judicial enforcement but demand it.76 It cannot be
68. 45 U.S.C. § 152, Ninth (1970). See House Hearings, supra note 12, at 66,

84-85; note 56 supra.
69. 45 U.S.C. §§ 155, 156, 160 (1970). See House Hearings, supra note 12, at
94; note 58 supra.
70. 45 U.S.C. § 152, Third (1970). See House Hearings, supra note 12, at 41;
note 58 supra. A further indication that enforcement of this provision was contemplated
by Congress is the fact that in 1934 amendments Congress added Section 2, Tenth
which made willful violation of Section 2, Third a criminal offense. 45 U.S.C. § 152,
Tenth (1970).
71. It should be noted, however, that none of the prior cases specifically relied
upon the hearings to support their holdings of judicial enforceability.
72. No mention of racial discrimination was made probably because discrimination, a social problem, would not have been a prime subject of concern at the legislative
hearings.
73. A fourth possible distinction between the past cases and the instant case is
that, aside from racial discrimination, the provisions enforced were specific statutory
mandates, while the reasonable effort requirement is a general standard of conduct
which has not yet been defined by Congress. However, although the reasonable effort
requirement is not defined in the RLA, the standard is substantially the same as that
developed by the National Labor Relations Board and the courts with respect to the
duty to bargain in good faith under the National Labor Relations Act. Therefore,
reliance on NLRA precedents in determining whether there has been reasonable effort
bargaining under Section 2, First would be appropriate. Harper, Major Disputes
Under the Railway Labor Act, 35 J. AIR L. & CoM. 3, 34-39 (1969). For an excellent
discussion of the development of the duty to bargain in good faith under the NLRA,
see Cox, The Duty to Bargainin Good Faith, 71 HARV.L. REv. 1401 (1958).
74. See notes 28-31 and accompanying text supra.
75. See notes 56-64 and accompanying text supra.
76. See notes 32-45 and accompanying text supra.
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denied that the duty to exert every reasonable effort is the "heart" of
the RLA77 and that some kind of enforcement of the reasonable effort
requirement is needed since "[t]he bargaining status of a union can be
destroyed by going through the motions of negotiating almost as easily
as by bluntly withholding recognition. ' 7 8 Although the House hearings
emphasize that judicial enforcement of the RLA provisions was to be
minimal, this was largely due to the assumption that the good faith and
spirit of cooperation of the parties would make enforcement unnecessary 79 - an assumption that may have been true in 1926 but is probably no longer viable. Furthermore, since the NMB was neither designed nor equipped to enforce Section 2, First,80 judicial enforcement
is the only possible and practical means of enforcing this provision at
the present time. Moreover, the National Labor Relations Board, with
the aid of judicial review, has been enforcing the duty to bargain in
"good faith" under the National Labor Relations Act for years, and if
such enforcement is necessary under that Act, perhaps it is time for
similar action with respect to the RLA.8 1 Finally, the dispute in the
instant case had been going on since 1963, and something had to be
2
done to resolve it.9

Nevertheless, it must be noted that both the dissenting and majority
opinions have merit in their positions and each apparently recognized
this fact. The majority probably realized that the legislative history did
not support a holding of judicial enforcement here, since Justice Harlan
avoided reference to the hearings on this issue, while relying heavily on
the hearings in resolving the questions of legal obligation83 and the
non-adjudicatory status of the NMB. 4 Likewise, the dissent made no
attempt to refute the validity of the majority's test or its application.
In fact, Justice Brennan hinted that enforcement of the reasonable effort
requirement may indeed be necessary under today's changed labor conditions. However, he deferred to Congress to fashion a remedy for this
deficiency in the Act. 5 This is the essence of the division between the
two opinions. Both were obviously cognizant of the need for some type
of enforcement on the one hand, and the problems of judicial authority
to enforce on the other. To the majority, the compelling need for enforcement so outweighed the lack of authority argument as to make the
result "unavoidable if we are to give effect to all our labor laws . .

.,,6

77. Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Jacksonville Terminal Co., 394 U.S. 369,
377-78 (1969) ; House Hearings,supra note 12, at 11.
78. Cox, supra note 73, at 1413.
79. House Hearings,supra note 12, at 65-66. See note 16 supra.
80. 402 U.S. at 580-81; House Hearings,supra note 12, at 18; 67 CONG. REc. 4670
(1926) (remarks of Representative Arentz) ; see notes 39-45 and accompanying text
supra.
81. See Cox, supra note 73; Harper, supra note 73, at 38-39.
82. 402 U.S. at 573, 584-85.
83. Id. at 576-77. See notes 22-23 and accompanying text supra.
84. 402 U.S. at 580-81. See notes 38-45 and accompanying text supra.
85. 402 U.S. at 599.
86. Id. at 583.
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To the dissent, the lack of authority for judicial enforcement made it
87
the duty of the Congress, and not the Court, to correct the situation.
After holding that Section 2, First was judicially enforceable, the
Chicago & North Western court discussed the effect of section 4 of the
Norris-LaGuardia Act 8s on the enforceability of Section 2, First. In
enforcing provisions of the RLA, the courts have expressed a policy of
reconciliation with Norris-LaGuardia which has been labeled the accommodation doctrine.8 9 Based upon this doctrine, the Court in the
instant case concluded that the Norris-LaGuardia Act did not prohibit
the use of a strike injunction to enforce the duty of Section 2, First of
the RLA.90 Once it is decided, however, that the duty of Section 2,
First is enforceable, then Norris-LaGuardia does not present much of
an obstacle, due to the well established accommodation principle.
The majority and dissenting opinions in the instant case both recognized that, notwithstanding the question of jurisdiction, there are
other serious problems with judicial enforcement of the reasonable effort
obligation and the issuance of strike injunctions to enforce this duty.
Among these problems are the danger that the parties will bargain with
an eye on the courts rather than channelling their efforts toward the
negotiations at hand,9 ' and that enforcement proceedings will unreasonably postpone the parties' right to self-help measures so as to vitiate
them as effective bargaining tactics. 2 Furthermore, a party interested
in maintaining the status quo may be less willing to compromise during
the settlement process if he feels there is a possibility of postponing
87. Id. at 599.
88. 29 U.S.C. § 104 (1970). See note 10 supra.
89. Although it had been previously held that the Norris-LaGuardia Act was
not an absolute bar to the federal courts' use of injunctive relief in labor disputes,
(Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Howard, 343 U.S. 768, 774 (1952) ; Graham v.
Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen, 338 U.S. 232, 237-40 (1949); Virginian Ry.
v. System Fed'n, 300 U.S. 515, 549-53, 562-63 (1937), it was not until Brotherhood
of R.R. Trainmen v. Chicago River & Ind. R.R. that the Supreme Court first
articulated the accommodation doctrine. 353 U.S. 30 (1957). In that case the Court
held that:
[Tihe Norris-LaGuardia Act cannot be read alone in matters dealing with railway
labor disputes. There must be an accommodation of that statute and the Railway
Labor Act so that the obvious purpose in the enactment of each is preserved.
We think that the purposes of these Acts are reconcilable.
Id. at 40.
90. 402 U.S. at 581-84. The dissent also recognized the need for accommodating
the two statutes, but felt that because there was no specific mandate for an injunction
in this case, Section 2, First being unenforceable, the more general provisions of the
Norris-LaGuardia Act controlled. Id. at 598.
91. Id. at 583. See Risher, The Railway Labor Act, 12 B.C. IND. & CoM. L. REv.
51, 55-56 (1970). The author discusses how RLA dispute resolution procedures may
produce less effective bargaining because the parties will become conditioned to expect
government intervention to avoid threatened strikes. Id. He points out, however,
that the Supreme Court has indicated that drawing out the settlement process is a
deliberate measure to motivate the parties to resolve the dispute by voluntary agreement.
Id. at 58-59.
92. 402 U.S. at 598. A delay may be critical in situations where the prolonged
passage of time will weaken the bargaining position of the defendant party or make
resort to self-help measures impractical when it becomes permissible. Note, rupra
note 43, at 935.
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through legal proceedings the other party's recourse to self-help.9 ' There
is also a chance that the carefully planned scheme of the Act, "of gradually escalating pressures" to reach a settlement, will be impaired since
the parties will realize that self-help can be enjoined even after the
statutory mechanism has run, 94 without any guidance as to where in
the bargaining process the parties are to be remanded. 9' In addition,
the undefined standard of reasonable effort bargaining could "provide a
cover for freewheeling judicial interference." 96 Compounded with these
considerations 97 is the lack of administrative machinery in the RLA to
guide and facilitate enforcement of this provision. The NLRA does
not have the same void. Under the NLRA, the NLRB has the primary
function of enforcing the "good faith" bargaining duty, 95 with the courts
merely reviewing its orders.9 9 It should also be noted that upon review,
the court has the advantage of prior expert screening by the Board in
deciding the complex issue of "good faith" bargaining.
Despite all of these factors, the Court concluded that the duty to
exert every reasonable effort was simply so crucial to the successful
operation of the RLA scheme that it had to be enforced not only to
preserve the RLA but "to give effect to all our labor laws . .

.-.

Such a conclusion is not devoid of merit. The RLA certainly does not
compel agreement, but agreement is, without doubt, the intended result
of the legislation. The Court's decision will at least assure all the parties
of reasonable effort bargaining and, in this respect, should foster the
prospects of settlement. As for the practical problems with enforcing
the reasonable effort obligation, they have all been encountered under
the NLRA and enforcement of that Act's "good faith" bargaining requirement continues despite them. 101
93. 402 U.S. at 583; Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Jacksonville Terminal Co.,

394 U.S. 369, 380--81 (1969).
94. Justice Brennan felt that the step-by-step bargaining process of the RLA
was designed to exert varying pressures on the parties to reach settlement at each step.
He argued that the Act did "not evidence an intention to return to any step once
completed," as the decision in this case would require. 402 U.S. at 597.
95. Id.; Note, supra note 43, at 936.
96. 402 U.S. at 583. But see note 73 supra. Justice Harlan also noted that:
Section 8(d) of the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) [(1970)],
[which defines the meaning of "to bargain collectively"] was added precisely
because of congressional concern that the NLRB had intruded too deeply into the
collective-bargaining process under the guise of enforcing the duty to bargain in
good faith.
402 U.S. at 583 n.19.
97. It is interesting to note that the dangers mentioned by the Court in the
instant case, with regard to enforcement of the reasonable effort requirement, have
been also recognized as arising under the NLRA. Cox, supra note 73, at 1435-42.
There, the author highlights the problems and suggests caution in light of them. This
approach is similar to that of Mr. Justice Harlan who stated that "[t]hese weighty
considerations indeed counsel restraint in the issuance of strike injunctions based on
violations of [Section] 2, First." 402 U.S. at 583.
98. 29 U.S.C. § 160(a) (1970).
99. Id. § 160(f).
100. 402 U.S. at 583.
101. Cox, supra note 73, at 1435-42.
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In the final analysis, it is clear that the Court's holding is not the
final solution, but rather must be recognized as a temporary measure to
protect the bargaining process until Congress acts to redress the deficiencies in the present legislation. It is submitted that a procedure
similar to that under the NLRA, with enforcement entrusted initially
to an administrative agency possessing adjudicatory powers, would best
handle the delicate issue of "reasonable effort" bargaining. Such an
agency would be better qualified to determine this issue because of
expertise acquired through specialization and proximity to the actual
negotiations. This system would relieve the federal courts of the heavy
burden of direct enforcement by assigning to them the role of reviewing
agency action. Perhaps Justice Harlan had this in mind when he stated
"the conclusion is inescapable that Congress intended the enforcement
of [Section] 2 First to be overseen by appropriate judicial means ....-102
Finally, even though there are dangers when either a court or agency
attempts to enforce a concept as vague as "reasonable effort," protection can be secured by a tight legislative framework.
In any event, it is the duty of Congress to concentrate its attentions
on fresh legislation in the railway area that will afford an efficient and
comprehensive system for the settlement of disputes and assure the
public of uninterrupted service on our nation's railroads.
Denis F. McLaughlin
102. 402 U.S. at 581 (emphasis added).
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